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From the Editor in Chief

ur Winter issue opens with In Focus, featuring a special commentary
by former US Foreign Service officer, Todd Greentree. In “What Went
Wrong in Afghanistan?,” Greentree argues America’s intervention in Afghanistan
failed because the US government went in “too big.” A better model, he suggests,
is small-footprint counterinsurgency as practiced during the final decade of the
Cold War.
This issue’s first full forum, Deterring Aggression in Asia, offers two contributions
concerning strategic issues in Asia. In “Broken Nest: Deterring China from
Invading Taiwan,” Jared M. McKinney and Peter Harris contend America’s
deterrence objectives vis-à-vis a Chinese invasion of Taiwan can be achieved
through a tailored force package that looks beyond fighting over Taiwan. In “SinoIndian Border Disputes in an Era of Strategic Expansions,” Roman Muzalevsky
draws attention to recent border incidents between India and China and offers
steps US policymakers can pursue to reduce tensions in the region.

Our second forum, Rethinking US Strategic Concepts, offers two articles
addressing shortcomings in the way the US military is thinking about future
warfare. Frank Hoffman’s “Defeat Mechanisms in Modern Warfare” revisits
the prominent role of attrition in US strategic concepts, including the US
Army’s multi-domain operations concept. In “The Air Littoral: Another Look,”
Maximilian K. Bremer and Kelly A. Grieco maintain a paradigm shift is needed in
US military thinking to make full use of “verticality” in the air and land domains.
The third forum of the Winter issue, In Tribute, consists of a single essay,
“The Grand Strategic Thought of Colin S. Gray,” by Lukas Milevski, a student of
the renowned scholar and strategist Colin Gray. Milevski discusses key themes,
continuities, conceptual relationships, and potential discontinuities from Gray’s
decades of grand strategic thought.
In the final section of this issue is a review essay.Mitchell G.Klingenberg’s “Sherman
and His Historians: An End to the Outsized Destroyer Myth?” reveals how the
historical emphasis on Sherman’s Civil War campaigns has obscured his postbellum
career as the eighteenth Commanding General of the US Army. This emphasis
also overlooks critical lessons Sherman derived from the war and sought to carry
into the future. ~AJE
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What Went Wrong in Afghanistan?
Todd Greentree

©2021 Todd Greentree

ABSTR ACT: Critics of the Afghan war have claimed it was always
unwinnable. This article argues the war was unwinnable the way it was
fought and posits an alternative based on the Afghan way of war and
the US approach to counterinsurgency in El Salvador during the f inal
decade of the Cold War. Respecting the political and military dictates of
strategy could have made America’s longest foreign war unnecessary and
is a warning for the wars we will f ight in the future.

W

Introduction: The Judgment of Failure

hat went wrong in Afghanistan? Why did a nation predominant
in all instruments of power, priding itself on winning its wars,
lose to an inferior and unpopular extremist movement? This
scenario was not the first time the United States blundered into misfortune
under such circumstances. And it is unlikely to be the last. Self-inflicted
defeat is a serious problem because there will be no guarantee of escaping
consequences the next time, especially if we again ignore the basic dictates of
strategy. For this reason, it is prudent to remember the wars we have fought
may foreshadow the kind of wars we will fight in the future, even as the United
States refocuses on great-power competition and the prospect of a major war.

The Afghan war is exceptionally well documented through authoritative
histories, official reports of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction, and social science research into the empirical problems of
“proxy war.” 1 Yet, lacking the agony of defeat, the loss in Afghanistan may
well be forgotten. 2
While military and civilian leaders voiced compelling reasons to continue
in Afghanistan, despite the improbability of reversing the Taliban onslaught,
This article benefited enormously from comments by Kalev Sepp, Frank Hoffman, Bruce Hoffman, Emile
Nakhleh, Carter Malkasian, and Hew Strachan.
1. Theo Farrell, Unwinnable: Britain’s War in Afghanistan, 2001–2014 (London: Vintage, 2017); Eli
Berman and David A. Lake, eds., Proxy Wars: Suppressing Violence through Local Agents (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2019); Carter Malkasian, The American War in Afghanistan: A History (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2021); Craig Whitlock, The Afghanistan Papers: A Secret History of the War (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 2021); and Eli Berman et al., Deterrence with Proxies, Minerva Research Initiative,
research project, https://minerva.defense.gov/Research/Funded-Projects/Article/1699260/deterrence-withproxies/.
2. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (NCTAUS), The 9/11 Commission Report:
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, official government ed.
(Washington, DC: NCTAUS, 2004), https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-911REPORT.
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they did not sway President Joseph Biden’s belief that Afghanistan was
no longer worth the cost, even if leaving meant risking a rise in terrorism
and abandoning progress that had benefited so many Afghans. However
dishonorable the endgame, the president’s decision to withdraw on the
twentieth anniversary of 9/11 relieved the United States of a distraction
from the increasing pressures of great-power competition, at least for the
time being. Though the withdrawal seems an embarrassment in the short
term, Eliot Cohen is right to note a long-term judgment of the Afghan
war remains premature. 3 Unfortunately, it is not too soon to measure the
immediate costs of strategic failure: approximately 2,324 American military
deaths and $1 trillion expended, excluding the price tags of three dozen
other coalition members; sanctioned violence that resulted in a grossly
disproportionate body count on the order of 160,000 Afghans against
the 2,996 people who died on 9/11; an overly ambitious democratic
state-building project in shambles; Islamic extremists strengthened instead
of weakened; and a vacuum in an unstable region left to be filled by
adversarial parties such as China, Iran, Pakistan, and Russia. 4
To take stock of America’s protracted commitment to this bloody, messy
war, one criterion above all is indispensable—results. To what degree did
the United States achieve its policy goals in Afghanistan? Proponents of
withdrawal emphasize, no matter the contentious outcome, counterterrorist
operations met the original aim of degrading al-Qaeda and other terrorist
organizations sufficiently and any recrudescence can now be handled from
offshore. They argue, further, the war was always unwinnable and, in any
case, continued involvement in combating the Taliban was futile. However
compelling, these judgments insufficiently account for the policy, strategy,
and performance deficiencies that yielded strategic failure. How accurately
did US administrations conceive the nature and character of the war? Were
alternatives to the chosen course of action considered? How timely were
reassessment and adaptation? Were relations with allies and the partner
government optimally managed? How effectively employed were the
instruments of power? Did the United States act against its interests?
Another crucial issue regarding results is evident—failure was not
inevitable. Afghans, no matter their shortfalls, are not to blame. The
shock of 9/11 and the legacies of earlier wars forgotten or misremembered
3. Eliot A. Cohen, “Exit Strategy,” Atlantic, April 13, 2021, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/04
/exit-strategy/618590/.
4. US Department of Defense, Casualty Status, updated October 13, 2021, https://www.defense.gov
/casualty.pdf; “ Costs of War,” Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, updated October 15,
2021, https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/; and United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan
(UNAMA), Reports on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conf lict (Kabul, Afghanistan: UNAMA,
2008–21), https://unama.unmissions.org/protection-of-civilians-reports.
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explain, but do not excuse, those in positions of authority who should
have known better. The United States was not misled in Afghanistan but
rather bears responsibility for its strategic myopia.

The Afghan War: Unwinnable—The Way It Was Fought
Although often overlooked, America’s longest foreign war did not
begin in 2001, but over 40 years ago as a war within the global Cold War.
When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, they became
enmeshed in a creeping intervention to stabilize a communist revolution
that confronted a rising Islamic backlash and was spinning out of control.
While the United States levied a panoply of sanctions to punish Moscow,
the only one to endure was President Jimmy Carter’s authorization
of covert action to arm the nascent mujahideen, whom Carter called
“freedom fighters.” 5 The mujahideen thrived with President Ronald
Reagan and CIA Director Bill Casey’s embrace of anti-communist
insurgents and the largesse of “Charlie Wilson’s War.” 6 With Pakistan
as the controlling agent, Saudi Arabia and other contributors matched
the CIA program dollar for dollar and launched a parallel program to
keep Islamic extremists—including Osama bin Laden—away from Mecca
by helping them fight jihad in Afghanistan. 7 The mujahideen turned
the Afghan war into the Soviet’s “bleeding wound,” compelled their
withdrawal in 1989, and contributed to the bankruptcy and collapse of the
Soviet system in 1991. 8
The strategy imposed high costs on the Soviets. The costs to Afghans,
however, were even more extreme: approximately five million refugees,
5. Zbigniew Brzezinski, to President Jimmy Carter, memorandum, December 26, 1979, document
now declassified, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/carterbrezhnev/docs_intervention_in_afghanistan_and_the_fall
_of_detente/doc73.pdf; Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents
and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 142–43; Odd Arne Westad, The
Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2007), 288–330; and Vladimir Snegirev and Valery Samunin, The Dead End: The Road
to Afghanistan, trans. and ed. Svetlana Savranskaya and Malcolm Byrne (Washington, DC: National
Security Archive, 2012), https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB396/.
6. George Crile, Charlie Wilson’s War: The Extraordinary Story of the Largest Covert Operation in History
(New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003); and Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret Story of the CIA, Afghanistan,
and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Press, 2004).
7. Mustafa Hamid and Leah Farrall, The Arabs at War in Afghanistan (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2015); and
Kim Ghattas, The Black Wave: Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the Forty-Year Rivalry that Unraveled Culture, Religion,
and Collective Memory in the Middle East (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2020), 2, 71–90.
8. Mikhail Gorbachev, Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress
(Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1986), 45; Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the
CIA, 1981–1987 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), 316–18; CIA, USSR: Withdrawal from Afghanistan,
special national intelligence estimate, March 24, 1988, document now declassified, https://www.cia.gov
/readingroom/docs/DOC_0005564723.pdf; Svetlana Savranskaya and Thomas Blanton, eds., Afghanistan
and the Soviet Withdrawal 1989: 20 Years Later (Washington, DC: National Security Archive, 2009),
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB272/; and Bruce Riedel, What We Won: America’s Secret
War in Afghanistan, 1979–89 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2014), x, 152.
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one million dead, and civil war among the divisive mujahideen, who had
no political project and were unprepared to govern. When US efforts
to reconcile seven competing factions floundered, the United States
abandoned Afghanistan. 9 The most devout among the mujahideen
reformed themselves into the Taliban and, aided by Pakistan, campaigned
to restore order to Afghanistan. They seized Kandahar as their religious
center and then Kabul in September 1996. Declaring themselves an Islamic
Emirate, they launched a brutal fundamentalist regime that governed by
delivering a rough form of Sharia justice. They also welcomed the return
of bin Laden.
The mujahideen had served America’s purpose as anti-Soviet proxies,
and no one at the time raised serious concerns regarding the risks of
Islamic jihad. It would have required clairvoyance to see how these seeds of
the Cold War would bear the poisonous fruit of terrorism in 2001. It was
equally inconceivable the second US intervention in Afghanistan would—
like the Soviets—flounder, dragging along dozens of coalition members
and perpetuating another 20 years of Afghan tragedy. This unanticipated
sum of contingencies should not obscure the central problem: Afghanistan
was unwinnable—the way it was fought. 10
Operation Enduring Freedom started well. The invasion of Afghanistan
began on October 7, 2001, with just cause and clear aims as Commander in
Chief George W. Bush had ordered: destroy al-Qaeda, which had attacked
the United States on 9/11, and overthrow the Islamic Emirate, which
had hosted them. As it had in the 1980s, the CIA took the lead with a small
number of paramilitary operatives, alongside US and allied special operations
forces, and directed airpower armed with precision-guided munitions to
support allied Afghan ground forces in the north and south. By early December,
they had routed al-Qaeda and the Taliban. It was a conventional victory
achieved through unconventional means, but as Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld proclaimed, it was not the triumph of a revolution in military affairs.11
Political-diplomatic action complemented military success. While air and
ground operations proceeded, regional state representatives and other members
of the international community, led by State Department troubleshooter James
Dobbins, convened with a multiethnic, multifactional array of Afghans under
9. Coll, Ghost Wars, 336–52; and Peter Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan: Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts, and
the Failures of Great Powers (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 243–66.
10. NCTAUS, 9/11 Commission Report, 254–65; Bruce Hoffman, “The War on Terror 20
Years on: Crossroads or Cul-De-Sac?,” Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, March 18, 2021,
https://institute.global/policy/war-terror-20-years-crossroads-or-cul-de-sac.
11. Stephen Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy (Carlisle,
PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002); and Robert L. Grenier, 88 Days to Kandahar: A CIA Diary (New York:
Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2016).
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UN auspices in Bonn, Germany.12 During negotiations, they reconstituted
Afghanistan as an Islamic Republic and endorsed American-anointed Hamid
Karzai as its interim president. In this early phase, force and diplomacy
succeeded by acting in harmony.
The model was not proxy war, but a joint venture in which, despite
great asymmetries and wildly disparate cultures, international and
Afghan partners shared resources, risks, and common interests—at least
in principle.
After this venture, the way was lost. In December 2001, reluctance to
concentrate available US forces in the mountains of Tora Bora enabled bin
Laden to escape to Pakistan.13 In March 2002, Operation Anaconda in the remote,
cold, and high-altitude Shah-i-Khot Valley eliminated the final resisting
concentrations of al-Qaeda and Taliban. The unexpectedly difficult and
prolonged battle, however, foreshadowed the challenges of fighting an elusive
and determined enemy in the arduous conditions of Afghanistan.14
On the political side, the joint venture quickly ran into trouble and never fully
consolidated. Afghanistan’s multiethnic Islamic population, with its fractious
political clans and society corroded by warfare and misgovernment, paired poorly
with the institutional and liberal transformation envisoned by Western statebuilding efforts. Despite meaningful progress, this mash-up produced the worst
of both worlds: pervasive corruption fueled by billions of dollars of foreign aid;
multiple actors—including the United States—vying simultaneously to constrain
some warlords while patronizing others; and intractable friction between a
half-conceived democracy stitched to a hyper-centralized state presided over
by a president with quasi-monarchical prerogatives but limited authority.15 By
2009, trust had eroded so deeply Ambassador Karl Eikenberry sent two highly
classified cables addressed personally to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
containing a litany of complaints about America’s Afghan partners and criticizing

12. James F. Dobbins, After the Taliban: Nation-Building in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Potomac Books,
2008).
13. Tora Bora Revisited: How We Failed to Get Bin Laden and Why It Matters Today: A Report to Members of the US
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 111th Cong., 1st sess., Senate Print 111–35 (November 30, 2009), https://
www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-111SPRT53709/html/CPRT-111SPRT53709.htm; and Dalton Fury,
Kill Bin Laden: A Delta Force Commander’s Account of the Hunt for the World’s Most Wanted Man (London:
St. Martin’s Griffin, 2009).
14. Adam Geibel, “Operation Anaconda, Shah-i-Khot Valley, Afghanistan, 2–10 March 2002,” Military
Review (May–June 2002): 72–77; Paul L. Hastert, “Operation Anaconda: Perception Meets Reality in the Hills of
Afghanistan,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28, no. 1 (2005): 11–20; and Lester W. Grau and Dodge Billingsley,
Operation Anaconda: America’s First Major Battle in Afghanistan (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011).
15. Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2010); and Jonathan L. Lee, Afghanistan: A History from 1260 to the Present (London: Reaktion Books, 2018).
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President Karzai as “not an adequate strategic partner.” When the cables leaked,
they prompted analogies to what went wrong in Vietnam.16
Bringing order should have been an overriding priority; however, the
strategic behavior of the United States became its source of instability. Behind
affirmations of national interest and rational calculus, fear and passion drove
the US response to 9/11. The so-called Global War on Terrorism was doubly
misconceived—first, as an existential fight of good versus evil, and second, as a
war against terror, which is a method rather than an enemy. With Americans
rallying to avenge 9/11, the Bush administration funneled national purpose into a
grand strategy of counterterrorism. Critically, American power concentrated this
narrow and extrinsic interest initially on Afghanistan, where it conflated the
Taliban with the hunt for al-Qaeda. The scheme to invade Iraq and bring
democracy to the Middle East reduced Afghanistan to a secondary theater and
inadvertently led allies creeping into not one but two quagmires.
Fixed on rooting out terrorists but leery of the “graveyard of empires” myth,
US leaders disdained so-called nation building as a job for lesser powers.17 British
Prime Minister Tony Blair’s government took the vanguard, attempting to merge
military action with the liberal world order and convincing NATO to invoke its
Article 5 collective defense clause for the first time.18 While special operations
forces fought the Global War on Terrorism, coalition countries joined the separate
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), signing up for remaining ad hoc
tasks such as conducting armed development in Provincial Reconstruction Teams.
Dragged reluctantly into it, the Bush administration acquiesced to investing in
these wider undertakings; however, it persistently overestimated both the utility of
force and America’s ability to transform the nature of Afghanistan.19

Accidental Guerrillas and Accidental Counterinsurgents
One misconception led to another: al-Qaeda was defeated, its remnants on
the run; the Taliban had ceased fighting, its emirate overthrown; the situation
demanded stabilization. But bringing order to Afghanistan conflicted with
16. Robert W. Komer, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in
Vietnam (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1972), 18–30; Karl W. Eikenberry, US ambassador to
Afghanistan, to Hillary Clinton, secretary of state, “COIN Strategy: Civilian Concerns,” November 2009, in
“Ambassador Eikenberry’s Cables on US Strategy in Afghanistan,” New York Times, January 5, 2010; and Don
Snow, “Watching Karzai, Seeing Diem,” Atlantic Council, April 8, 2010, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs
/new-atlanticist/watching-karzai-seeing-diem/.
17. Dobbins, After the Taliban, 125; and Seth G. Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2010).
18. Christopher L. Elliott, High Command: British Military Leadership in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 89–92.
19. Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London: Vintage Books, 2008);
and James M. Dubik, Accelerating Combat Power in Afghanistan, report 2 (Washington, DC: Institute for the
Study of War, 2009), https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep07878.
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hunting terrorists. As foreign forces flowed in, they searched for combat. Most
Pashtuns who sided with the Taliban had little sympathy for the Arabs of
al-Qaeda or interest in international terrorism and tolerated the coalition because
of their promise to end the chaos in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, all former and
suspected Taliban became residual targets for indiscriminate coalition manhunting
supported by ample airpower and assisted with mixed enthusiasm and motives by
Afghan security forces and warlord militias. Thousands of Taliban suspects filled
prisons in Afghanistan, and they—not al-Qaeda or other terrorists—became the
largest category of prisoners at Guantanamo.20 While rooting out fighters in the
corners of Pashtun tribal lands, incidents such as serial bombings of wedding
parties and government delegations led to tens of thousands of civilian casualties
over the years.21 Popular grievances grew, and the insurgency revived.
David Kilcullen coined a fitting aphorism: Afghans were accidental guerrillas,
fighting foreign infidels because they happened to be in their space.22 The same
was true in reverse. The United States and its coalition partners became accidental
counterinsurgents, fighting the Taliban for its support of al-Qaeda, which violated
our space in the 9/11 attack. Viewed in this manner, the Afghan war, with one
warrior culture attacking another, was literally an accident.
What, exactly, was fighting the Taliban expected to achieve? The mission
became vague and open-ended but was prosecuted on an urgent timeline,
confused with counterterrorism but intended somehow to build a stable and
democratic Afghanistan by defeating insurgents who presented no direct
threat to the United States and its partners. Neither was it clear how means
matched ends: a fundamental source of strategic error. For the better part of two
decades, ISAF struggled to hold the initiative, carrying out stabilization and
reconstruction missions but never able to abandon combat operations. For most
of that time, Afghanistan was an economy of force operation conducted to
manage the war at low cost and sacrifice. Contradictorily, commanders and troops
strove to assert control with extremely expensive combat power one valley and
one Groundhog Day at a time while aspiring to win Afghan hearts and minds. In

20. New York Times, “The Guantánamo Docket,” New York Times, updated October 14, 2021, https://www
.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/us/guantanamo-bay-detainees.html.
21. UNAMA, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict.
22. David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2009).
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fact, throughout most of the war what passed for strategy was reactive and
amounted, as Hew Strachan explained, to a succession of operations.23
There were limits to the utility of force in what British General Rupert
Smith called “war amongst the people.”24 Nonetheless, with the exception
of Special Forces, this realization came slowly and very late. It took America
until 2006 to recognize the Taliban had regrouped, and then another three
years, including a presidential election followed by nearly a year of study and
deliberation, before the United States adapted. In 2009, eight years into the war,
General Stanley McChrystal issued his ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency
Guidance, while General David Petraeus, who replaced McChrystal in 2010, had
previously presided over the much-anticipated publication of Counterinsurgency
Field Manual (FM) 3-24.25 Their revised approach placed protecting the
population ahead of firepower, derived from the lesson experience had taught
the hard way: attrition is an insufficient strategy because killing and capturing
provokes more insurgents. The new strategy, in fact, represented the belated
revival of Foreign Internal Defense and Internal Defense and Development:
US doctrines with pedigrees that predate World War II and the Cold War.26
With the Taliban rampant, however, there seemed little choice other than
getting ahead of the curve by going big—the same purportedly miraculous
strategy that had rescued Iraq from chaos in 2007.27 In December 2009, President
Barack Obama announced a surge that would bring combined US and coalition
troops in Afghanistan to 130,000, along with a notional target of increasing
Afghan security forces to 400,000.28 For a brief period, force ratios and force
employment aligned to reverse the deteriorating security situation. Not only was
this escalation patently unsustainable, by declaring the surge would end in 18
months, Obama inadvertently created a strategic paradox. Everyone understood
23. Hew Strachan, “Strategy or Alibi? Obama, McChrystal and the Operational Level of War,” Survival 52,
no. 5 (2010): 157–82.
24. Rupert Smith, “Interview with General Sir Rupert Smith,” International Review of the Red Cross 88,
no. 864 (December 2006): 719–27.
25. Michael T. Hall and Stanley A. McChrystal, ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance
(Washington, DC: NATO, 2009), https://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/counterinsurgency_guidance
.pdf; and The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, U.S. Army Field Manual No. 3-24
/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).
26. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Foreign Internal Defense, Joint Publication (JP) 3-22 (Washington, DC: JCS,
2021), https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_22pa.pdf?ver=2018-10-10-112450-103;
and US Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication 12–15 (Washington, DC:
Department of the Navy, 1940).
27. William A. Knowlton Jr., The Surge: General Petraeus and the Turnaround in Iraq (Washington, DC:
National Defense University Press, 2010).
28. “President Obama on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” White House,
December 1, 2009, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/photos-and-video/video/president-obama
-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan; US Department of Defense, Enhancing Security and Stability
in Afghanistan, a report prepared in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act, June 2020, https://
media.defense.gov/2020/Jul/01/2002348001/-1/-1/1/ENHANCING_SECURITY_AND_STABILITY_IN_
AFGHANISTAN.PDF, 29; and Jens Stoltenberg, “Speech” (speech, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Lisbon,
Portugal, October 11, 2021), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_187391.htm?selectedLocale=en.
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what this decision meant. For ISAF, there would be no time to execute a
conditions-based strategy.29 Conversely, the Taliban knew it would suffer but
merely had to wait for the preordained drawdown, which it did.
Although the US national security system appeared to work in Afghanistan,
an astoundingly disconnected institutional apparatus left myriad contradictions
unmanaged and magnified the complexities of the war.30 Examples abound.
Despite the prescriptions of FM 3-24, the US military was so oriented
to warfighting even money became a “weapons system,” while foreign aid
fostered a corrupt and dependent rentier state.31 Counternarcotics and
counterinsurgency operated at cross-purposes, while illegal opium production
remained the country’s second-largest source of revenue, much of it flowing
into Taliban coffers.32 The United States paid handsomely for Pakistan’s
cooperation while lacking the leverage to stem its duplicitous support for
the Taliban.33 Organizationally, while the primacy of political strategy
and whole of government was praised excessively, friction-filled bureaucratic
politics persisted in Washington and Kabul. In the absence of unity of
command, unity of effort was a second-best solution as military
predominance, combined with an insurmountable lack of civilian capacity and
authority, remained a source of civil-military estrangement.
Despite sincere intentions, the United States never did overcome the
course initially set under George W. Bush. To America, Afghanistan remained
Chinatown, a battlefield more than it ever was a nation.34 Nothing symbolized
this analogy more than the ISAF fortifications that encircled the country.
As expedient as they were for protecting troops and serving as operational
29. Craig Whitlock, “At War with the Truth,” in Whitlock, Afghanistan Papers.
30. Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked (Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution, 1979); Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and
US Policy, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report RL30588 (Washington, DC: CRS, July 21,
2010); Todd Greentree, “Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: US Performance and the Institutional Dimension of
Strategy in Afghanistan,” Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no. 3 (2013): 325–56; and Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), https://www.sigar.mil.
31. Commander’s Guide to Money as a Weapons System: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, handbook
no. 09-27 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, April 2009); Scott Smith and Colin
Cookman, eds., State Strengthening in Afghanistan: Lessons Learned, 2001–14 (Washington, DC: US Institute
for Peace, 2016); and Kate Clark, The Cost of Support to Afghanistan: Considering Inequality, Poverty and Lack
of Democracy through the ‘Rentier State’ Lens, special report (Afghanistan Analysts Network, May 2020),
https: / / www.afghanistan - analysts.org /en /reports /economy - development - environment /the - cost - of - support - toafghanistan-new-special-report-considers-the-causes-of-inequality-poverty-and-a-failing-democracy/.
32. Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Counterinsurgency, Counternarcotics, and Illicit Economies in Afghanistan:
Lessons for State-Building,” in Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization, ed.
Michael Miklaucic and Jacqueline Brewer (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2013), 189–209;
and Counternarcotics: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan (Arlington, VA: SIGAR, June 2018), https://
www.sigar.mil/interactive-reports/counternarcotics/index.html.
33. Daniel Markey, “America’s Perennial Pakistan Problem: Why Washington Failed to Win Over
Islamabad—and Prevent a Taliban Victory,” Foreign Affairs, September 9, 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com
/articles/afghanistan/2021-09-09/americas-perennial-pakistan-problem.
34. Todd Greentree, “Triple Feature: A Letter from Kandahar,” American Interest VI, no. 5 (May/June 2011):
110–16, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2011/05/01/triple-feature-a-letter-from-kandahar/.
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platforms, these ubiquitous, cheap, and temporary Hesco bastions lacked the
one message Afghans needed most—a sense of enduring commitment.35 In
the end, they were easier to abandon than they were to erect.
After a long flirtation with negotiations, the alibi for exit that ubiquitous
Afghan-American middleman Zalmay Khalilzad finally achieved in February
2020 was profoundly deficient. The agreement legitimized the Taliban by dealing
with its leaders directly, humiliated the government by excluding it, and committed
the United States to full withdrawal on dubious Taliban promises to dissociate
itself from al-Qaeda and hold national peace talks.
The uncritically accepted notion that Afghanistan, somehow, was an endless
war is a fallacy. What drives effort, sacrifice, and duration in war is the perception
of what is at stake.36 All wars end; how they end matters most.37 Exit is not
war termination, and negotiated withdrawal is not negotiated peace. These are
matters of strategic choice. Three presidential administrations—Bush, Obama,
and Trump—wished to lower the stakes in Afghanistan but did not. The Biden
administration finally did so decisively. Withdrawal, accompanied by rapid
government collapse and Taliban victory in the summer of 2021, was merely
the culmination.

Afghanistan: The Small COIN Option
Could Afghanistan have been a success instead of a failure? An option to Big
COIN was certainly available. But, like the lessons of Vietnam, this option was
forgotten in the diversion to counterterrorism, except in the collective memory of
Special Forces and a few others.38 In the accidental creeping counterinsurgency
early on, small COIN was never seriously considered. There is no guarantee it
would have worked in Afghanistan, but there was a precedent.
El Salvador in the 1980s was the single major US commitment to
counterinsurgency between Vietnam and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The intervention was bloody, messy, and controversial, but it succeeded.
Admittedly, this conclusion has long been disputed on the grounds that a decade
of US support to the Armed Forces of El Salvador was insufficient to defeat
35. David Betz, “Citadels and Marching Forts: How Non-Technological Drivers Are Pointing Future Warfare
towards Techniques from the Past,” Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies 2, no. 1 (April 17, 2019): 33–34,
https://doi.org/10.31374/sjms.25.
36. Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1973), 92.
37. Fred Charles Iklé, Every War Must End (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971).
38. Linda Robinson, “How Afghanization Can Work,” Council on Foreign Relations, December 2, 2011,
https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/how-afghanization-can-work; H-Diplo, “Forum 9 on ‘What Have We
Learned? Lessons from Afghanistan & Iraq,’ ” H-Diplo/ISSF, July 8, 2015, https://issforum.org/forums
/lessons-afghanistan-iraq-2; and Todd Greentree, “The Accidental Counterinsurgents: U.S. Performance in
Afghanistan,” in Learning the Lessons of Modern War, ed. Thomas G. Mahnken (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 2020), 157–78.
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the insurgents of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front, along with
El Salvador’s record of searing human rights violations and low-quality
governance.39 Nevertheless, to judge by results, the stalemate between the Armed
Forces of El Salvador and Latin America’s toughest guerrilla army proved
sufficient to achieve US policy aims—Soviet/Cuban-backed communism was
contained, and democracy took hold.
More than chance links the wars in El Salvador to Afghanistan. In the late
1970s, both countries spiraled into violent instability and became gray-zone
cauldrons of the global Cold War.40 At the same time the Carter administration
began arming the Afghan mujahideen, it also laid the foundation of
US support for insurgency and counterinsurgency in Central America. Reagan
embraced and expanded the approach, even though the Iran-Contra scandal
nearly wrecked his second term, while George H. W. Bush sustained it for over
a decade with consistent strategy until the Cold War ended.41
The origin was the victory of the Sandinista National Liberation Front in
Nicaragua over US-client dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle in July 1979.
Secured with Fidel Castro’s active support, the party’s victory was America’s
first failure to contain communist-backed revolution in Latin America since
Cuba in 1959. Neighboring El Salvador, on fire with leftist insurrection and
rightist repression, was the next Marxist-Leninist target. To avoid another loss
in Central America, the Carter administration took advantage of a reformist
coup in October 1979 to forge an uneasy partnership between the Salvadoran
armed forces and the Christian Democrat Party with the aim of building
a democratic center where none had survived before. The new government
offered change, but state terrorism sponsored by government security forces
and right-wing extremists also did its job, as the death squads eliminated
revolutionaries and sowed fear among the population. By 1981, the war had
morphed into a protracted insurgency. For the next three years, it was a
close-run thing. What made the difference was US commitment to a politicalmilitary strategy, dubbed “reform with repression,” in which counterinsurgency
39. Andrew J. Bacevich et al., American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador, special report
(Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1988); Walter C. Ladwig III, The Forgotten Front:
Patron-Client Relationships in Counterinsurgency (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 217–88; and
Ryan T. Baker, “El Salvador, 1979–92: Revisiting Success,” in Berman and Lake, Proxy Wars, 137–58.
40. Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1985); Westad, Global Cold War; Robert Strausz-Hupé
et al., Protracted Conflict: A Challenging Study of Communist Strategy (New York: Harper Colophon Books,
1959); Frank G. Hoffman, “Examining Complex Forms of Conflict: Gray Zone and Hybrid Challenges,”
PRISM 7, no. 4 (November 8, 2018): 30–47; and Linda Robinson et al., Modern Political Warfare: Current
Practices and Possible Responses (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018).
41. John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy
during the Cold War (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005); and Todd Greentree, Crossroads of
Intervention: Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Lessons from Central America (Westport, CT: Praeger Security
International, 2008).

TOC

18

Parameters 51(4) Winter 2021–22

complemented and reinforced state-building.42 The joint venture between
Americans and Salvadorans was hardly friction free and, compared with arming
insurgent proxies, required entirely different types of responsibility and trust.
The tragedy of Vietnam was still fresh in the minds of the American
public and armed forces and proved a major strategic constraint. Aversion
to casualties and the prospect of another quagmire made it politically
imperative that containing Soviet-backed expansion in the Western
Hemisphere be pursued at the lowest possible level of cost and risk. On
succeeding Carter in January 1981, Reagan’s first foreign policy crisis was
El Salvador. To secure support, the new administration reached an
agreement with Congress to limit the Special Forces to 55 trainers.
So sensitive was the issue that, on March 3, in Reagan’s first television
interview as president, Walter Cronkite’s first question was, “Do you see any
parallel in our committing advisers and military assistance to El Salvador
and the early stages of our involvement in Vietnam?”43 Despite fears to the
contrary, Reagan assured the public he had no intention of sending US troops
into combat in Central America. This was America’s bright redline.
Counterinsurgency in El Salvador was more than a matter of keeping
US boots off the ground. Small COIN substituted economy of force for
combat power by focusing on training and assisting the Armed Forces of
El Salvador.44 By the mid-1980s, successive elections attracted strong
popular turnouts, even in contested areas, and the performance of the
Salvadoran Army gradually improved.45 Concern in the United States relaxed
as it became evident the situation had roughly stabilized.
Victory—in fact, any form of war termination—was no more a goal in
Central America than it was in Afghanistan. After all, the Cold War was
open-ended. Although El Salvador remained a source of controversy in
Congress, with escalation off the table and ground troops absent, the Reagan
and Bush administrations had sufficient means to manage US intervention
for the duration of the conflict. By the time of the Soviet demise, authentic
negotiations were underway between Farabundo Martí National Liberation
Front insurgents and the Salvadoran government. With the signing of
42. William M. LeoGrande and Carla Anne Robbins, “Oligarchs and Officers: The Crisis in El Salvador,”
Foreign Affairs 58, no. 5 (Summer 1980): 1084–1103.
43. “Excerpts from an Interview with Walter Cronkite of CBS News,” Ronald Reagan Presidential
Library and Museum, March 3, 1981, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/excerpts-interview
-walter-cronkite-cbs-news.
44. Fred F. Woerner, Report of the El Salvador Military Strategy Assistance Team, 1981, document now
declassified, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nsa/DOCUMENT/930325.htm; and T. E. Lawrence, Article 15,
“Twenty-Seven Articles,” Arab Bulletin, August 20, 1917.
45. Michael Childress, The Effectiveness of U.S. Training Efforts in Internal Defense and Development: The Cases
of El Salvador and Honduras (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1995), https://www.rand.org/pubs
/monograph_reports/MR250.html.
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the Chapultepec Peace Accords in 1992, the war ended definitively. The
Salvadoran civil war was protracted, but it was not endless.

Afghanistan: The Afghan Way of War
In association with considering the Small COIN option, an alternative
course of action is available and raises the possibility America’s longest
war was unnecessary altogether. Such a counterfactual idea based on pure
speculation would court skepticism and be of little value. In Afghanistan,
however, not only did a concrete option exist, it was proposed for decision
at the time but summarily rejected.
By mid-November 2001, the Taliban had signaled the fall of their
emirate by abandoning Kabul. Mullah Omar—amīr al-mu’minīn, the
Taliban’s commander of the faithful—fled from Kandahar to Pakistan. This
culminating point of victory, married to the formation of a new government
in Bonn, should have led to war termination but regrettably did not.
As coalition forces searched for enemies and followed the American way
of war, something else was happening. In accord with the very different
Afghan way of war, thousands of Taliban, ranging from erstwhile cabinet
ministers to young recruits, had ceased fighting and were streaming in to
swear fealty to the winning side.46 Karzai’s fledgling government was
prepared to agree not to punish them; they would be welcome to resettle
in their communities while enjoying benefits such as keeping their
AK-47s for protection and receiving help to reunify family members
residing in Pakistan. Nearly all Taliban were Pashtun; in seeking to
negotiate, they were recognizing the authority of their new leader, Hamid
Karzai, who shared their Islamic identity and possessed traditional
legitimacy, both as a Southern Pashtun aristocrat from the Popalzai tribe
and by virtue of his consensual endorsement by loya jirga in Bonn.
Karzai had a long association with the Taliban. Even though they
had assassinated his father in 1999 and had tried to kill him just weeks
earlier, he called them “my brothers.”47 However unfathomable this
reconciliation may have been to Westerners, it fit the fluid pragmatism
of Afghan politics and was strategic. The intent was to pacify and separate
46. Robert Warburton, Eighteen Years in the Khyber, 1879–1898 (London: John Murray, 1900); and Robert
Johnson, The Afghan Way of War: How and Why They Fight (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2011).
47. Bette Dam, A Man and a Motorcycle: How Hamid Karzai Became Afghanistan’s President (Utrecht, NL:
Ipso Facto Publishers, 2014); and Hamid Karzai, “We Afghans Are Just Being Used against Each Other,”
interview by Susanne Koelbl, Spiegel International, May 22, 2021, https://www.spiegel.de/international/world
/ former- afghanistan- president- hamid- karzai- we- afghans -are -just -being -used -against -each -other -a -81412b96
-c7e5-4287-b423-f bc2b600f317.
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them from their Pakistani patrons while consolidating Karzai’s leadership
and establishing a basis to stabilize Afghanistan. Once the Taliban dispersed
to their communities across southern and eastern Afghanistan, only limited
security forces would be needed to ensure their loyalty and prevent them from
reconstituting, even if some hardcore leaders remained on the other side of
the border and continued to enjoy sponsorship from Pakistan’s Inter-Service
Intelligence, the ISI.48
In December 2001, however, when Karzai and other Afghans advocated
inviting a few Taliban representatives (vetted for their willingness to
reconcile) to the Bonn conference, the Bush administration, along with
non-Pashtuns from the Northern Alliance, vetoed the idea.49 Seasoned UN
negotiator Lakhdar Brahimi would later call this act the “original sin.”50
US leaders were simply unprepared to comprehend how magnanimity after
victory could be the best way to terminate the war and bring order to
Afghanistan. Instead, the CIA and special operations forces and willing
Afghan partners set about killing or capturing the Taliban, thus provoking
an insurgency where none had existed.51
Had this course of action been adopted, an entirely different set of
strategic circumstances may very well have evolved. As reprehensible as the
Taliban were, they had been defeated. They were not the enemy; al-Qaeda
was. Even while counterterrorist operations continued, the United States
and its allies should have focused on restoring order, training, and assisting
Afghan security forces with more sustainable numbers, perhaps 50,000, while
standing in the way of interference from Pakistan. We should have listened
to the Afghans; it was their war to finish. Instead, by taking over, the
United States caught the whirlwind. As Clausewitz observed, “in war too
small an effort can result not just in failure, but in positive harm.”52 The same
is true of excessive force unwisely applied.

48. Author communications with Karzai family and allies in connection with duties as director of Strategic
Initiatives Group, Regional Command – South, 2010–11.
49. Dobbins, After the Taliban, 157–58; James Dobbins, “Afghanistan Was Lost Long Ago: Defeat Wasn’t
Inevitable, but Early Mistakes Made Success Unlikely,” Foreign Affairs, August 30, 2021, https://www
.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2021-08-30/afghanistan-was-lost-long-ago.
50. Lakhdar Brahimi, Mary Sack, and Cyrus Samii, “An Interview with Lakhdar Brahimi,” Journal of
International Affairs 58, no. 1 (Fall 2004): 244.
51. Sarah Chayes, The Punishment of Virtue: Inside Afghanistan after the Taliban (New York: Penguin
Press, 2007); Abdul Salam Zaeef, My Life with the Taliban, trans. Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix
Kuehn (London: C. Hurst and Co., 2011); Anand Gopal, No Good Men among the Living: America, the Taliban,
and the War through Afghan Eyes (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2014); and Antonio Giustozzi, The Taliban
at War, 2001–2018 (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2019).
52. Michael Handel, “Corbett, Clausewitz, and Sun Tzu,” Naval War College Review 53, no. 4 (Autumn
2000): 106–24.
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Conclusion—A Failure of Judgment
Strategic failure in the Afghan war was not a case of how the weak win,
but how the strong lose.53 It was neither preordained nor a matter of
chance. The United States took over because it could. Notwithstanding the
urgency of combating terrorism, making war on the Taliban was a failure of
judgment and not in the national interest.54 Once again, the core of the problem
was the long-attested and largely disregarded overmilitarization of American
foreign policy.55 Small COIN using the El Salvador model, which balanced
political and military strategies while keeping US troops out of combat, could
have avoided an unnecessary war. It was worth a try. The warning is specific—
if one finds oneself accidentally fighting Big COIN, it is too late.
If the US military was the instrument of failure, the error was
misconceiving the situation in Afghanistan and ignoring the basic dictates of
strategy. Here, responsibility lies with key US decisionmakers who believed
they were masters of a technology-driven revolution in military affairs
endowed with boundless power to reshape the nature of war. This hubris,
combined with the panic of 9/11 and the opening of a new theater in Iraq,
explains but does not excuse their folly. They should have known better.
Unconstrained by the political imperative that kept combat forces out of El
Salvador, and like the US leaders, who with heedless arrogance, delivered
disaster in Vietnam, they may have been brilliant, but they behaved as fools. 56
Next time, we can and we must do better.
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ABSTRACT: Deterring a Chinese invasion of Taiwan without recklessly
threatening a great-power war is both possible and necessary through a
tailored deterrence package that goes beyond either fighting over Taiwan or
abandoning it. This article joins cutting-edge understandings of deterrence
with empirical evidence of Chinese strategic thinking and culture to build
such a strategy.

W

Introduction

ould the People’s Republic of China (PRC) invade Taiwan if it meant
risking war with the United States and its allies? In the past, it was clear
Beijing had no appetite for starting a war over Taiwan its military could
not win. Today, however, a growing number of US-based analysts are skeptical China can
be deterred from attempting unification with Taiwan by force. They claim Chinese leaders
no longer tremble at theprospect of the United States coming to the defense of Taipei
because Beijing’s top brass increasingly believes it would prevail in a war over the island.1

Some of Taiwan’s staunchest supporters argue for a strengthening of US
commitments in response to China’s growing confidence and assertiveness. One
familiar recommendation is for Washington to trade its long-standing policy
of “strategic ambiguity” (meant to leave both China and Taiwan guessing as to
how the United States would respond in the event of war) for “strategic clarity”
in favor of Taipei.2 This view claims the threat of a Chinese invasion has grown
only because the United States has failed to keep pace with China’s rising power.
If Beijing were convinced any move against Taiwan would be met with the full
force of the US military, then the risk of war would drop precipitously.
While the United States no doubt has a strong interest in deterring a
Chinese takeover of Taiwan, relying on the latent threat of a great-power
war is the wrong approach. Not only is such a strategy becoming less credible
as the regional military balance shifts in China’s favor, but it also requires both
1. Oriana Skylar Mastro, “The Taiwan Temptation: Why Beijing Might Resort to Force,” Foreign Affairs 100,
no. 4 (July/August 2021): 58–67.
2. Richard Haass and David Sacks, “American Support for Taiwan Must Be Unambiguous: To Keep the Peace, Make
Clear to China That Force Won’t Stand,” Foreign Affairs, September 2, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles
/united-states/american-support-taiwan-must-be-unambiguous.
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the United States and Taiwan to accept unnecessarily high risks as the
price of maintaining a fragile peace. Instead, leaders in Washington and
Taipei should develop a joint strategy of deterrence by punishment to
convince their counterparts in China that, although Taiwan might be
conquerable in the short term, its capture would trigger the imposition of
unacceptable economic, political, and strategic costs upon Beijing. If done
correctly, such a strategy could discourage a Chinese invasion of Taiwan
while simultaneously lessening the chances of an unwanted great-power
conflict, especially if combined with good-faith efforts by the United States
to make the status quo more tolerable for both China and Taiwan.

The Threat of War
The US interest in preventing a PRC invasion of Taiwan is straightforward
and compelling. If Taiwan fell to China, a successful democracy would be
extinguished, and Beijing’s geopolitical position in East Asia would be enhanced
at the expense of the United States and its allies.3 Even analysts who caution
against inflating the strategic importance of Taiwan accept the fact that . . . all
things being equal, there are substantial costs and risks attached to abandoning
Taipei to China.4 Yet, the United States obviously has a countervailing interest
in avoiding war with Beijing.5 Such a conflict would be ruinous even if the
United States won—a misleading term, perhaps, given even a military action that
successfully averted a Chinese takeover of Taiwan would still leave the United
States in the unenviable position of “becoming the permanent defense force
for Taiwan.”6 Needless to say, with the changing military balance in East
Asia, it is entirely possible the United States would lose.7 Of course, if a
US-China war “went nuclear,” then the outcome could be nothing short of
cataclysmic for people in the United States, Taiwan, China, and elsewhere.
No matter how much the United States wishes to preserve Taiwan’s de
facto independence, the costs of war mean US responses suffer from serious
3. Blake Herzinger, “Abandoning Taiwan Makes Zero Moral or Strategic Sense,” Foreign Policy, May 3, 2021,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/03/taiwan-policy-us-china-abandon/.
4. Charles L. Glaser, “A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and
Accommodation,” International Security 39, no. 4 (2015): 72–78.
5. Charles L. Glaser, “Washington Is Avoiding the Tough Questions on Taiwan and China,” Foreign Affairs,
April 28, 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2021-04-28/washington-avoiding-tough-questions
-taiwan-and-china; and Barry R. Posen, Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2014), 102–4.
6. Daniel L. Davis, “The US Must Avoid War with China over Taiwan at All Costs,” Guardian,
October 5, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/oct/05/the-us-must-avoid-war-with
-china-over-taiwan-at-all-costs. See also Andrew Scobell, “How China Manages Taiwan and Its Impact on
PLA Missions,” in Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other Than Taiwan, ed. Roy D. Kamphausen, David Lai, and
Andrew Scobell (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008), 32–35.
7. Kyle Mizokami, “The U.S. Military ‘Failed Miserably’ in a Fake Battle over Taiwan,” Popular Mechanics,
August 2, 2021, https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/a37158827/us-military-failed-miserably-in-taiwan
-invasion-wargame.
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credibility problems. Relying on an explicit or implicit threat of war to deter
China might even be counterproductive if it leads Beijing to assess that the
military balance across the Taiwan Strait permits an invasion. For example,
it might be rational for Chinese leaders to order an assault if they had
intelligence suggesting the United States would not fight—or would fight
and lose.
In previous decades, the United States enjoyed clear military supremacy
over China, and thus, American deterrence capabilities were more credible.
For example, in June 1950, President Harry Truman interposed the Seventh
Fleet between mainland China and Taiwan “to ‘neutralize’ the Taiwan
Strait” and to discourage Chinese forces from attempting an amphibious
attack.8 More than 40 years later, President Bill Clinton impressed America’s
military superiority upon Chinese leaders with the dispatch of two carrier
strike groups to the region—a show of force that, while successful in the
short term, had the long-term effect of convincing China’s leaders to pursue
massive investments in anti-ship ballistic missiles.9
Today, the United States has more difficulty engaging in such exercises
of “deterrence by denial.”10 The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is now
powerful enough it probably could overrun Taiwan even if the United States
intervened to defend Taipei. Both sides know this—or at least strongly
suspect it. A Chinese analyst with connections in the PLA Navy told us
the PLA’s goal for a successful invasion was 14 hours, while it projects the
United States and Japan would require 24 hours to respond. If this scenario
is close to being accurate, China’s government might well be inclined to
attempt a fait accompli as soon as it is confident in its relative capabilities.
This perspective is consistent with thinking expressed in the PLA’s 2013
Science of Military Strategy, which exhorts the nation “to strive to catch the
enemy unexpectedly and attack him when he is not prepared, to seize and
control the battlefield initiative, paralyze and destroy the enemy’s operational
system and shock the enemy’s will for war.”11
Even if the United States intervened before China could secure a fait
accompli, Chinese strategists have growing confidence the United States
8. Abram N. Shulsky, Deterrence Theory and Chinese Behavior (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation,
2000), 7–8.
9. Tai Ming Cheung, “Racing from Behind: China and the Dynamics of Arms Chases and Races in
East Asia in the Twenty-First Century,” in Arms Races in International Politics: From the Nineteenth to the
Twenty-First Century, ed. Thomas Mahnken, Joseph Maiolo, and David Stevenson (Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press, 2016), 247–69.
10. Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence by Denial and Punishment (Princeton, NJ: Center of International Studies,
1959); and Michael J. Mazarr, Understanding Deterrence (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018).
11. Shou Xiaosong, ed., 战略学 [Science of Military Strategy] (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2013), translated
by the China Aerospace Studies Institute (Montgomery, AL: Air University, 2021), hereafter cited as Science of
Military Strategy, 143.
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would lose a war over Taiwan. If such a scenario played out, it would offer
China a major victory in terms of domestic and international prestige—
an enticing prospect for any leader, especially one intent on definitively
reestablishing China as a great power. Chinese strategic thinking emphasizes
the possibility and utility of limited wars and projects confidence in the
ability of war handlers to bring such an engagement to a favorable political
outcome. This strategy is precisely what the PRC attempted to execute in
the Sino-Indian War in 1962, the Sino-Soviet border conflict in 1969, and
the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979. The fact that all of these operations were
successful militarily but failures politically seems to go unnoticed.
China’s
geographic
advantages
and
technological
advances
make it difficult for the United States to restore the credibility of a
deterrence-by-denial strategy. At most, bolstering the number and type of US
forces in the region could help reduce China’s expectations of a quick and
decisive victory. Beijing would not remain passive in the face of an expanded
US military footprint around Taiwan. To maintain long-term strategic
advantage, the United States must be willing to participate in an all-out
arms race with Beijing—one that could not easily be won, and which would
substantially reduce the chances of finding a diplomatic solution to the dispute.
This possibility does not mean China is altogether undeterrable. What it does
mean is deterrence must be based more on threats of penalties in response
to an invasion (deterrence by punishment) rather than threats to prevent
conquest from succeeding militarily (deterrence by denial). If penalties for
invading Taiwan can be made severe and credible enough, Beijing could
still be deterred from choosing such a course of action.12
Of course, America’s current policy toward Taiwan is already partly
based on the logic of deterrence by punishment—that is, an implicit threat
to wage a war against China that might not be limited to the Taiwan Strait.
The “AirSea Battle” concept, for example, included extensive strikes on the
Chinese mainland.13 From the US perspective, however, this military-heavy
version of deterrence by punishment is grossly unattractive. Not only does China
have good reasons to doubt whether the United States would follow through
with escalatory attacks, but it is not clear that China would emerge as the
biggest loser even if such strikes were meted out and China responded, either
asymmetrically or in kind. Moreover, even winning such a war would not provide
the United States and Taiwan a permanent sustainable resolution to the issue of
cross-Strait relations. We agree with Andrew Scobell’s point that “for the
12. Evan Braden Montgomery, “Primacy and Punishment: US Grand Strategy, Maritime Power, and Military
Options to Manage Decline,” Security Studies 29, no. 4 (2020): 769–96.
13. Jan van Tol et al., AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept (Washington, DC: Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010).
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Taiwan issue to be resolved once and for all, the outcome must be satisfactory
to Beijing.”14 Below, we propose a deterrence-by-punishment strategy that does
not hinge upon the credibility of a US threat to wage a great-power war against
China and which, while not offering a roadmap to a permanent resolution, at
least promises to lower the costs of the status quo for all concerned.

Beijing’s Changing Calculus
It would be better for the United States and Taiwan if a Chinese
invasion could be deterred without Washington having to threaten a greatpower war. Below, we aruge there are other options in this regard—options
worth exploring. But first, it is useful to consider why China has adopted
a more assertive position toward Taiwan in recent years. Informed analysts
now assess there is a nontrivial chance of a Chinese invasion within the
next decade. Why?
One reason is the military balance across and around the Taiwan Strait
has shifted in Beijing’s favor. China’s much vaunted anti-access/areadenial capabilities mean the PLA now stands a greater chance of keeping
US forces at bay than was feasible in the past, allowing the PLA to seize
what it calls the “three dominances”: (1) localized command of the sea, (2)
command of the air, and (3) command of information. In the event of war,
China’s advanced radar systems and overwhelming missile firepower would
now likely be enough to clinch victory in what Chinese strategists predict
would be a “localized war under informationized conditions.”15 Chinese
strategists have judged such a conflict as one of both high probability and
high danger, and so for more than two decades the PLA has focused on
preparing for such a scenario. From Beijing’s perspective, these preparations
greatly reduce the cost of action against Taiwan. As the PLA continues to
modernize and gain relative advantages over other actors in East Asia, the
costs of such action will continue to decrease.
On the other side of the ledger, the cost of restraint has increased for
China. The cost of restraint is a critical, but undertheorized, aspect of
deterrence.16 It indicates the acceptability of the status quo—in this case,
the acceptability of a prolonged irresolution to the dispute over Taiwan’s
political status. For China, the cost of restraint is increasing as Taiwan
moves further away from the mainland, particularly in terms of its core
national identity. The assertiveness of Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive
14. Scobell, “How China Manages Taiwan,” 35.
15. Xiaosong, Science of Military Strategy, 123.
16. Kayse Jansen, “How Competition Undermines Deterrence” (graduate thesis, Missouri State University,
2021), https://bearworks.missouristate.edu/theses/3666.
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Party and the associated decline of the Chinese Nationalist Party are concrete
representations of this shift. Since the Taiwanese view developments in
mainland China and Hong Kong with alarm—especially the PRC’s
anti-democratic policies—it is increasingly difficult to envisage Taiwan and China
“com[ing] together and mov[ing] forward in unison,” as Xi Jinping and other
PRC leaders insist must happen.17 It is small wonder growing numbers of
Taiwanese recoil at the idea of political union with Beijing, but if China perceives Taiwan
as rejecting the principle of peaceful reunification, its leaders might see no option but to
pursue a military solution.
Hawks in China blame the United States for encouraging what they see
as Taiwan’s shift away from the 1992 consensus of “one China with
different interpretations.”18 To them, US policies of reassurance seem
increasingly provocative. Whereas the United States once professed an interest
in upholding the status quo across the Taiwan Strait, China now suspects a
more aggressive policy that places Taiwan back under the US defense umbrella,
as it was before 1979. This perception is fueled by talk of Taiwan once again serving as a
useful outpost for the “free world.”19
The factors pushing China toward an invasion are not ones the United
States can easily forestall. China’s military gains can be blunted, but not
reversed. Nor is it possible for Washington to alter Taiwan’s domestic politics
or the fervor with which the PRC opposes the idea of indefinite Taiwanese
independence. Yet there are levers US leaders could pull to make an invasion of
Taiwan less desirable to China. First, the United States can raise the costs
of action for China via a deterrence-by-punishment strategy that threatens
Beijing, not with war, but with the frustration of its other national priorities.
Second, it can reduce the costs of restraint for China by making good-faith
efforts to fulfill the spirit of the US-China rapprochement vis-à-vis Taiwan.
These two goals can be pursued in tandem with a view to strengthening
deterrence, enhancing the long-term stability of cross-Strait relations, and
thereby furthering the national security interests of both the United States and
Taiwan—and, perhaps, even the PRC. In what follows, we take each lever in turn.
17. Xi Jinping, “Speech at a Ceremony Marking the Centenary of the Communist Party of China,” Qiushi
Journal (English edition), July 1, 2021, https://en.qstheory.cn/2021-09/08/c_657713.htm; Yang Zhong,
“Explaining National Identity Shift in Taiwan,” Journal of Contemporary China 25, no. 99 (2016): 336–52,
https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2015.1104866; Qiang Xin, “Having Much in Common? Changes and
Continuity in Beijing’s Taiwan Policy,” Pacific Review 34, no. 6 (2020): 926–45, https://doi.org/10.1080
/09512748.2020.1773908; and Frédéric Krumbein, “The Human Rights Gap in the Taiwan Strait: How China
Pushes Taiwan towards the US,” Pacific Review, September 1, 2020, https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2020.18
12699.
18. Lindsay Maizland,“Why China-Taiwan Relations Are So Tense,” Council on Foreign Relations, updated
May 10, 2021, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations-tension-us-policy.
19. Ted Yoho, “Free World Must Embrace Taiwan,” Taipei Times, April 20, 2021, https://www.taipeitimes
.com/News/editorials/archives/2021/04/20/2003755998.
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The Broken Nest
A Chinese proverb asks, “Beneath a broken nest, how (can) there be any whole
eggs?”20 The proverb means if the United States cannot prevent China from
seizing Taiwan by force, it should instead develop a strategy to convince China’s
leaders an invasion would produce a peace more injurious than the status quo.
As noted previously, the United States already incorporates the logic of deterrence
by punishment into its overall Taiwan strategy. What distinguishes the broken
nest approach from other deterrence-by-punishment proposals is that it
does not rely upon America’s willingness to use military force; the strategy
is unique in the sense that it has the potential to deter China from invading
Taiwan while also reassuring all sides a great-power war is not being threatened
by the United States.
Short of military reprisals, the United States could levy a number of penalties
on Beijing. The most obvious first step is to make Taiwan more resilient to an
invasion, such as through the purchase of the right kind of defensive weapons
from the United States (for example, truck-mounted harpoons, mobile rocket
systems, and surf-zone sea mines).21 Progress has been made recently in this
regard.22 The more Taiwan can credibly threaten to wage a war of necessity
to defend itself, the less the United States will have to threaten to wage its own
war of choice. Leaders in Taipei must also convince Beijing it would face a long
and costly struggle to repress Taiwan’s 23.5 million citizens.23 At minimum,
Beijing must anticipate widespread civil disobedience. More seriously, China
could be made to expect guerrilla warfare in Taiwan and perhaps even the
prospect of violence being exported to the mainland. At present, Taiwanese
vary by how far they support fighting a “war of necessity” to defend their
island.24 For deterrence to work, it will be important for leaders in Taipei to

20. John S. Rohsenow, ABC Dictionary of Chinese Proverbs (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press,
2002), 102.
21. Patrick Porter and Michael Mazarr, Countering China’s Adventurism over Taiwan: A Third Way
(Sydney: Lowy Institute, 2021), https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/countering-china-s-adventurism
-over-taiwan-third-way; and William S. Murray, “Revisiting Taiwan’s Defense Strategy,” Naval War College
Review 61, no. 3 (Summer 2008): 1–27.
22. Matthew Strong, “Harpoon Missile System Delivery to Taiwan Will Be Completed 2028,” Taiwan News,
October 22, 2021, https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4322413.
23. “Taiwan,” World Factbook, updated October 18, 2021, https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries
/taiwan/.
24. Yao-Yuan Yeh and Charles K. S. Wu, “When War Hits Home: Taiwanese Public Support for War
of Necessity,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 21, no. 2 (May 2021): 265–93; and Chung-li Wu and
Alex Min-Wei Lin, “The Certainty of Uncertainty: Taiwanese Public Opinion on U.S.-Taiwan Relations in
the Early Trump Presidency,” World Affairs 182, no. 4 (November 11, 2019): 350–69.
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consolidate domestic support for resisting Chinese aggression and to build
resistance capabilities. 25
On its own, however, the expectation of facing a robust but eventually
unsuccessful defense is unlikely to deter a Chinese invasion. Beijing must
also be made to believe conquering Taiwan, while satisfying one core goal
of the Chinese state, cannot be done without jeopardizing other core
interests. In practice, this strategy means assuring China an invasion
of Taiwan would produce a major economic crisis on the mainland, not
the technological boon some have suggested would occur as a result of
the PRC absorbing Taiwan’s robust tech industry. 26
To start, the United States and Taiwan should lay plans for a targeted
scorched-earth strategy that would render Taiwan not just unattractive
if ever seized by force, but positively costly to maintain. This could
be done most effectively by threatening to destroy facilities belonging
to the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, the most
important chipmaker in the world and China’s most important supplier.
Samsung based in South Korea (a US ally) is the only alternative for
cutting-edge designs. Despite a huge Chinese effort for a “Made in
China” chip industry, only 6 percent of semiconductors used in China
were produced domestically in 2020. 27 If Taiwan Semiconductor
Manufacturing Company’s facilities went offline, companies around the
globe would find it difficult to continue operations. 28 This development
would mean China’s high-tech industries would be immobilized at
precisely the same time the nation was embroiled in a massive war effort.
Even when the formal war ended, the economic costs would persist for
years. This problem would be a dangerous cocktail from the perspective
of the Chinese Communist Party, the legitimacy of which is predicated
on promises of domestic tranquility, national resilience, and sustained
economic growth.
The challenge, of course, is to make such a threat credible to Chinese
decisionmakers. They must absolutely believe Taiwan’s semiconductor
industry would be destroyed in the event of an invasion. If China
suspects Taipei would not follow through on such a threat, then
25. See Otto C. Fiala, Resistance Operating Concept (ROC) (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: Joint Special
Operations University Press, 2020).
26. Rachel Esplin Odell et al., “Strait of Emergency?: Debating Beijing’s Threat to Taiwan,” Foreign Affairs,
September/October 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-08-09/strait-emergency.
27. Wei Sheng, “China Made 6% of Chips It Used in 2020: Report,” technode, February 19, 2021,
https://technode.com/2021/02/19/china-made-6-of-chips-it-used-in-2020-report/.
28. David Pierson and Michelle Yun, “The Most Important Company You’ve Never Heard of Is Being
Dragged into the U.S.-China Rivalry,” Los Angeles Times, December 17, 2020, https://www.latimes.com
/world-nation/story/2020-12-17/taiwan-chips-tsmc-china-us.
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deterrence will fail. An automatic mechanism might be designed,
which would be triggered once an invasion was confirmed. In addition,
Taiwan’s leaders could make it known now they will not allow these
industries to fall into the hands of an adversary. 29 The United States and
its allies could support this endeavor by announcing plans to give refuge
to highly skilled Taiwanese working in this sector, creating contingency
plans with Taipei for the rapid evacuation and processing of the human
capital that operates the physical semiconductor foundries.
Such a “broken nest” approach is not without precedent. Sweden made
an analogous threat of selective scorched earth during World War II with
reference to its iron ore mines—a key source for industrial war materials—
as part of its overall strategy of anti-Nazi deterrence.30 Taiwan’s threat
would become even more potent than Sweden’s if Taipei made and publicized
plans to target the mainland’s chip-fabrication lines using cruise and
ballistic missiles, including the Semiconductor Manufacturing International
Corporation facility in Shanghai. A preplanned sanctions campaign against
any chip exports to China, led by the United States but supported by South
Korea and other allies, would enhance this approach.
No doubt the Taiwanese will have grave concerns about threatening
China with a defensive war that likely cannot be won. The prospects of
implementing scorched-earth and guerilla-warfare tactics will be similarly
unappealing. It will therefore be a major challenge to make these threats
credible to China, though perhaps not as difficult as convincing Beijing that
Taiwan and the United States are willing to risk a great-power war over
Taiwan’s political status. Paradoxically, however, it is only by making these
threats credible that they will never have to be carried out. In any case, the
threats outlined above—even if carried out to the maximum extent—will
be far less devastating to the people of Taiwan than the US threat of greatpower war, which would see massive and prolonged fighting in, above, and
beside Taiwan.
Nevertheless, it would be prudent to develop a deterrence-by-punishment
strategy that does not entirely rely upon threats made by the Taiwanese.
Other aspects of a this type of strategy might include economic sanctions and
threats in coordination with America’s regional allies, especially Japan (the
actor in East Asia with the greatest disparity between latent and actualized
29. James D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” American
Political Science Review 88, no. 3 (September 1994): 577–92, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2944796.
30. M. Gunnar Hägglöf, “A Test of Neutrality: Sweden in the Second World War,” International Affairs 36,
no. 2 (April 1, 1960): 153–67.
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power), to worsen China’s long-term regional security environment.31 At
minimum, the US government should take the lead in developing credible
threats of economic sanctions and political isolation, focusing especially
on the semiconductor sector—where many necessary high-tech inputs
originate from a handful of American companies—leaving leaders in
Beijing under no illusions about the punishments that would flow from
an invasion of Taiwan. More severely, the United States might signal an
attack on Taiwan would lead to a green light for allies such as Japan, South
Korea, and Australia to develop their own nuclear arsenals. If China can be
made to believe invading Taiwan will result in one or more additional
nuclear powers aligning against it, then this possibility ought to be an
effective deterrent.
Such threats would have the advantage of making the Taiwan issue not
just a battle of wills between the United States and China, but a fundamental
question of what China wants its place in the region and wider world to be.
Does China want to provoke the ire of its Asian neighbors, or would it prefer
to advance its ambitions of regional leadership and peaceful cooperation?
Again, the purpose here must be to convince Chinese leaders invading
Taiwan will come at the cost of core national objectives: economic growth,
domestic tranquility, secure borders, and perhaps even the maintenance of
regime legitimacy.
On their own, none of these expected punishments would suffice to deter
a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Taken together, though, they might prove
effective. If calibrated properly, a deterrence-by-punishment strategy would
make an attack irrational from the Chinese perspective. This result must be the
goal of a US and Taiwanese joint strategy.

Reducing the Costs of Restraint
One possible objection to our argument is, since reunification with Taiwan
is a long-standing objective of the Chinese state—a goal motivated by
nationalism, irredentism, and the Chinese Communist Party’s perpetual
quest for domestic legitimacy—China’s leaders will not pause to calculate
costs and benefits when weighing a decision to invade Taiwan. If this view
is correct, the possibility of deterring a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, whether
by denial or by threats of punishment, is minimal indeed.
Analysts in the United States cannot rule out the possibility China might
one day embark upon an invasion of Taiwan regardless of the costs. It would
31. Robert D. Blackwill and Philip Zelikow, The United States, China, and Taiwan: A Strategy to Prevent War,
Council Special Report no. 90 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2021), 45.
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be wrong, however, for America to base its Taiwan policy upon the belief
China’s leaders are irrational, or to lock itself into a strategy that would be
catastrophic if China acted recklessly. In the past, China has been persuaded
the status quo across the Taiwan Strait is tolerable, despite Chinese strategists
describing Taiwan as a “core interest” that admits no “room to maneuver.”32
As noted previously, Beijing also recognizes other core interests such
as national development, the pursuit of international prestige, and the
maintenance of domestic stability—all of which might be jeopardized by an
ill-judged conquest of Taiwan.33
The Chinese Communist Party has two principal objectives with
deadlines: to “basically realize” “socialist modernization” by 2035 and to
become a “great modern socialist country” by 2049.34 Given China’s internal
demographic, ecological, social, and economic challenges, these goals will be
difficult for the PRC to accomplish. They will become impossible targets if a
successful invasion of Taiwan is met with the punishments described above.
The rest of the “China Dream” will similarly be thrown into disarray. Strategy
is about balancing key interests—something Chinese leaders understand well.35
In a 1975 meeting, Henry Kissinger and Mao Zedong discussed when Taiwan
would return to the mainland. Mao said: “In a hundred years.” Kissinger replied:
“It won’t take a hundred years. Much less.” Mao then rejoined: “It’s better for
it to be in your hands. And if you were to send it back to me now, I
would not want it, because it’s not wantable. There are a huge bunch of
counter-revolutionaries there.”36 The goal of the broken nest strategy should
be to make Taiwan, given the PRC’s broader interests, unwantable.
Still, Beijing must be reassured that choosing to forgo an invasion of
Taiwan would not be tantamount to losing Taiwan. Raising the costs of a
Chinese invasion must constitute only one part of the solution to the current
strategic quandary; Taiwan and the United States must also move to ease
China’s costs of restraint. Washington must restate in unambiguous terms
the status of Taiwan is undetermined, that the United States has no plans to
support independent statehood for Taiwan, and it will not seek to shift the
status quo using gray-zone tactics that violate the spirit of Sino-American
32. Xiaosong, Science of Military Strategy, 15.
33. Michael J. Mazarr et al., What Deters and Why: The State of Deterrence in Korea and the Taiwan Strait
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2021), 46.
34. Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects
and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” (speech, 19th
CPC National Congress, Beijing, October 18, 2017), https://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download
/Xi_Jinping’s_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf.
35. Xinhua News Agency, “Xi Jinping’s Speech on the CCP’s 100th Anniversary,” 1 July 2021.
36. Mao Zedong to Henry A Kissinger, memorandum, “Memorandum of Conversation between Mao
Zedong and Henry A. Kissinger,” October 21, 1975, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, National Security
Adviser Trip Briefing Books and Cables for President Ford, 1974–76 (Box 19), accessed at Wilson Center Digital
Archive, https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118072.
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rapprochement. Simultaneously, Washington must remain implacably opposed
to a forcible resolution of the Taiwan question.
Unlike strategies placing the threat of military reprisal at their core,
a deterrence-by-punishment strategy does not rely on the United States
bolstering its military forces in Northeast Asia. This approach leaves the
United States some room to adopt a force posture capable of reassuring
allies such as Japan and South Korea about their collective defense,
while also convincing both Taiwan and China the United States is
truly committed to maintaining the status quo across the Taiwan Strait.
It also frees the US military to divest itself from vulnerable bases in Japan
that may on balance make great-power war more, rather than less, likely—
via a preemptive Chinese attack in an active-defense situation. Shifting the
burden of deterrence from military reprisal to non-military punishment
might also reduce the likelihood of a war caused by miscalculation,
while also removing the pretext that China’s buildup is a response to
US and Taiwanese provocations.
Of course, there are dangers associated with reducing the US military
footprint around Taiwan. Careful research and planning must be conducted
in conjunction with regional partners to ascertain what level and type
of US forward deployment would be necessary to reassure allies while
also lessening the chances of war. There should be no drawdown of
military forces until such a time as a credible deterrence-by-punishment
strategy has been put in place; otherwise Beijing might perceive a
window of opportunity to wage a successful attack. Additionally, Taiwan
might be less encouraged to stage an independent fight against China if
it no longer believes the United States would (or could) intervene on its
behalf. That said, given reports about low morale in the Taiwanese Armed
Forces, as well as low defense spending (around 2 percent of GDP), a shock
to the status quo might be just what the situation requires. Regardless,
relying less on threats of force is not the same as ruling out the use of
force altogether. Ambiguity will always exist about whether the United
States would use force in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. 37

37. Joshua Rovner, “Ambiguity Is a Fact, Not a Policy,” War on the Rocks, July 22, 2021, https://warontherocks
.com/2021/07/ambiguity-is-a-fact-not-a-policy/.
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Conclusion: Deterrence and Reassurance
The policy of the United States must be to discourage the use of
military force to upend the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. US foreign
policy, however, must also consider the reality of the situation: military
deterrence is becoming less credible than in the past. Additionally,
relying on military power to deter Chinese aggression requires the US
and Taiwanese governments to burden their citizens with high risks.
A new approach to deterrence is needed, one that relies less on the
dangerous threat of military force than is presently the case.
A twofold strategy of raising the costs of breaking Taiwan’s nest
while faithfully maintaining the value of an unbroken nest is the most
prudent way to deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan and, thus, avoiding a
great-power war. China must be made to believe there are no overall
gains to be had from a military invasion of Taiwan, whereas there are
considerable advantages to maintaining the status quo. In the final analysis,
a strategy based purely—or even mostly—upon military deterrence
cannot achieve these goals. Unless US leaders are truly willing to fight
World War III in defense of Taiwan, they would do well to consider
strategies of deterrence that do not rely upon the threat of a military
reprisal. We have argued it is possible to imagine such an alternative
strategy of deterrence—one that relies on nonmilitary means of severe
punishment rather than an expectation of being able to repel militarily a
Chinese invasion.
That said, we are clear-sighted about the difficulties of orchestrating a
credible strategy of deterrence by punishment. Not least of all, a broken
nest strategy means accepting China can likely conquer Taiwan if it
chooses to do so. It also means laying plans to destroy key Taiwanese
infrastructure at great economic cost. Nonetheless, we maintain China
could probably conquer Taiwan even if the United States intervened.
Morevover, the social and economic costs of a great-power conflict would
dwarf the targeted demolition of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry or the
inevitable harms produced by an insurgency.
To conclude, the broken nest strategy hinges on the United States
not taking any action that China’s leaders would interpret as an act of
war. In such a situation, if Beijing did consider the United States an
active belligerent, it might initiate first strikes against US forces. This
possibility must be considered seriously. There are few ways to deter a
Chinese invasion of Taiwan that involve zero risk of conflict. For the next
decade or so, the best way to deter Chinese aggression while lowering
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the chance of a great-power conflict is to follow the path outlined above:
if war, a broken nest; if peace, a tolerable status quo.
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Sino-Indian Border Disputes
in an Era of Strategic Expansions
Roman Muzalevsky

©2021 Roman Muzalevsky

ABSTR ACT: The June 2020 clash bet ween the People’s Republic of
China and India in the disputed Ladakh border area resulted from the
strategic expansions of both powers. Like two bubbles expanding in a
contained space, these expansions were bound to collide and cause friction.
This article explains how the expansions precipitated the incident and
might exacerbate border disputes in the future. In pondering implications,
it recommends Washington pursue a Eurasia-focused policy embracing
the disputed region.

O

n June 15, 2020, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Indian troops
engaged in a fight using fists and clubs close to Patrol Point 14 in the Galwan
Valley in the disputed border area of Ladakh in the Himalayas. At least
20 Indian and 45 Chinese soldiers died in the clashes. According to Indian reports,
PRC forces crossed the Line of Actual Control (LAC) that separates India-administered
Jammu and Kashmir from PRC-administered Aksai Chin.1 Beijing and Delhi claim
these territories in parts or entirety and blamed each other for the incident, the first deadly
clash since 1975.2 The skirmish did not involve the use of firearms, which the powers
banned in previous years. Despite an agreement to disengage, and a previous record
of withdrawal after similar clashes, the situation has not returned to the status quo ante.3
Analysis of the strategic expansions of both powers reveals the larger dynamics
which arguably made the June 15 incident inevitable. A strategic expansion
involves policies and measures aimed at extending a state’s political, economic,
and military influence or control within and outside its borders. Such policies and
activities are interconnected and mutually reinforcing but are harder to implement
in a region riddled with border disputes. The PRC and India are both pursuing

1. “A Border Dispute between India and China Is Getting More Serious,” Economist, May 28, 2020, https://
www.economist.com/asia/2020/05/28/a-border-dispute-between-india-and-china-is-getting-more-serious.
2. Alyssa Ayres, “The China-India Border Dispute: What to Know,” Council on Foreign Relations,
June 18, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/china-india-border-dispute-what-know?gclid=EAIaIQobChMI4IO
j6K7c6gIVkgiICR1AJwmLEAAYASAAEgL-dfD_BwE.
3. Special Correspondent, “LAC Standoff: India, China Hold Fourth Round of Consultations,” Hindu, July 14,
2020, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/lac-standoff-indian-and-chinese-commanders-hold-talks-on
-further-disengagement-in-eastern-ladakh/article32076879.ece; Nick Reynolds and Sidharth Kaushal, “122185A
Military Analysis of the Sino–Indian Border Clashes,” RUSI, June 2, 2020, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research
/publications/commentary/military-analysis-sino–indian-border-clashes; and Rajesh Roy, “India-China Border
Standoff Turns Violent, with 20 Indian Soldiers Dead,” Wall Street Journal, June 16, 2020, https://www.wsj.com
/articles/india-china-border-dispute-turns-deadly-11592305962.
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strategic expansion policies focused on the disputed Ladakh region and
deploying capabilities to shape their geopolitical environments and facilitate their
ongoing rise as great powers. The incident and the dispute thus represent the
focal points at which the powers’ strategic expansions interact. In this case,
it does not matter whether the incident was a provocation or an accident,
as the conflict’s geopolitical premise rooted in the strategic expansions connotes
a degree of inevitability.

Figure 1. Map of disputed borders and territory in the Himalayas
(Map courtesy of REUTERS Graphics) 4

The notion of strategic expansion is especially illuminating in the context
of the border dispute because India and China share the perception that each
is a victim of exploitation by foreign powers; each also desires to remedy this
legacy. As two of the world’s oldest civilizations, both countries seek to regain
a status befitting their size, population, and heritage; thus, each places
considerable value on “territory, past wrongs and restitution.”5 The “century
of national humiliation” in China and the colonization and partition of India
reinforce this commitment, with both powers seeking to reconstitute the
areas they once controlled and do so within perceived borders so as to right
the supposed wrongs caused by outside actors.6 The related efforts foster
an environment conducive to border conflicts, as conceptions of “inherent
4. Alyssa Ayres, “China’s Mixed Messages to India,” Asia Unbound (blog), Council on Foreign Relations,
September 17, 2014, https://www.cfr.org/blog/chinas-mixed-messages-india. Adapted by the authors.
5. Mohan Malik, China and India: Great Power Rivals (Boulder, CO: First Forum Press, 2011), 28.
6. John Garver, “The Unresolved Sino–Indian Border Dispute: An Interpretation,” China Report 47, no. 2,
(2011): 103, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/000944551104700204; Shreya Das, The Sino-Indian
Border Dispute: What Role for the European Union? (briefing paper, European Institute for Asian Studies,
2014), https://www.eias.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/EIAS_Briefing_Paper_2014-2_Das.pdf; and Manjari
Chatterjee Miller, Wronged by Empire: Post-Imperial Ideology and Foreign Policy in India and China (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2013), 110.
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historical and contemporary greatness” are difficult to reconcile in the case of
the contested borders.7
The latest border incident has implications for global security,
Sino-Indian-Pakistani ties, and the United States, which has been retreating
from its global security role over the past few years while increasingly directing
its capabilities toward containing the PRC. Having never developed a robust
Eurasia-focused policy featuring the Ladakh region, the United States’
ability to formulate a response to the incident has been limited. The strategic
expansions of the PRC and India into the disputed Ladakh region (on a micro
level encompassing political, economic, and military expansions) also have a
bearing on America’s role as a guarantor of global security, which has hinged
on its efforts to connect excluded regions to the international system.8 To shape
the strategic expansions of the PRC and India, the United States must develop
a policy with a focus on Central and South Asia strategies. Only then can it
maintain its role as a global security guarantor in a world order increasingly
influenced by the rise of Asian great powers.

Political Expansion
For India and the PRC, political expansion into the disputed border
region of Ladakh refers to an elevated focus on policy making regarding the
region at both national and local levels; promotion of the nations’ capacities
to control local administrations in the territories under their de facto control
by appointing and removing local officials and managing or setting local and
trans-regional policy agendas; and actions by the governments to redefine or
adjust the political and administrative status of the controlled territories in the
disputed region.
In the case of the PRC, political expansion refers to the extension
of political influence from the center of the country to its periphery in
service of the “Chinese dream.” 9 Beijing defines the dream as achieving a
“great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by restoring its preeminence and
7. David M. Malone and Rohan Mukherjee, “India and China: Conflict and Cooperation,” Survival 52,
no. 1 (February–March 2010): 137, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00396331003612513?
journalCode=tsur20&; Garver, “Unresolved Sino–Indian Border”; Tsering Topgyal, “Charting the Tibet
Issue in the Sino–Indian Border Dispute,” China Report 47, no. 2 (2011): 116, https://journals.sagepub.com
/doi/10.1177/000944551104700205; and Brahma Chellaney, “Coming Water Wars: Beware the Future,”
International Economy (Fall 2009): 38, https://www.international-economy.com/TIE_F09_Chellaney.pdf.
8. See Roman Muzalevsky, China’s Rise and Reconfiguration of Central Asia’s Geopolitics: A Case for U.S.
“Pivot” to Eurasia (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press, 2015), https://publications.armywarcollege.edu
/pubs/2351.pdf.
9. Patricia Kim, “Understanding China’s Military Expansion,” Pacific Council on International Policy,
September 19, 2019, https://www.pacificcouncil.org/newsroom/understanding-china%E2%80%99s-military
-expansion.
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making it a “fully-developed great power by 2049.” 10 Political expansion
supports this “dream” by advancing and consolidating institutions of
political and administrative control in peripheral, culturally different, and
autonomous areas exhibiting separatist tendencies. The PRC exerts control
over the political, cultural, and economic development agendas in these
areas, making them adhere to the party’s core values, beliefs, policies, and
strategic vision. Xinjiang and Tibet, bordering Ladakh and Aksai Chin,
are examples which elucidate Beijing’s sensitivities (and India’s for that
matter) when viewed through the prism of the incident and its
strategic expansion.
On the one hand, China’s political expansion is an organic process.
Beijing now has the capability to extend its political control to areas
beyond the “Han core,” something it had struggled with after incorporating
Tibet and Xinjiang in 1949.11 Various threats and challenges also limited
maneuverability in advancing national sovereignty claims during the
Cold War. 12 On the other hand, aspects of the expansion are a directed
process.This process has developed because Beijing is pursuing a balanced
and secure national economic development by shrinking the gap between
the prosperous eastern and poor western regions while building a secure
base to project power on its western flank. This dual imperative is critical
for the security of the PRC, which perceives advancing separatist forces
along its entire frontier from inner Mongolia in the north and Taiwan
and Hong Kong in the southeast to Tibet and Xingjian in the northwest.
This task is projected to grow in importance as economic growth slows
and the elite look for new sources of economic growth, legitimacy,
and power.
The perceived US efforts to foment separatism and contain Chinese
expansion in the Indo-Asia-Pacific make the western flank even more
important to Beijing’s grand strategy. These efforts also make the PRC
less restrained regarding its territorial and sovereignty claims. Chinese
actions in the disputed region include aims to change India’s strategic calculus
regarding Delhi’s unfulfilled role of a counterbalance, push for a
reinterpretation of the LAC, and deter India’s regional expansion while
securing its own. India’s territorial constitutional changes in August 2019
10. Kim, “Understanding China’s Military Expansion.”
11. M. Taylor Fravel, “Power Shifts and Escalation: Explaining China’s Use of Force in Territorial Disputes,”
International Security 32, no. 3 (Winter 2007/2008): 83, www.jstor.org/stable/30130518.
12. Aldo D. Abitol, “Causes of the 1962 Sino-Indian War: A Systems Level Approach,” Josef Korbel Journal
of Advanced International Studies (Summer 2009): 82, https://digitalcommons.du.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi
?article=1000&context=advancedintlstudies; and Zhihua Shen and Julia Lovell, “Undesired Outcomes: China’s
Approach to Border Disputes during the Early Cold War,” Cold War History 15, no. 1 (2015): 89–111, https://
www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14682745.2014.932350.
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and military expansion in the disputed areas have only reinforced
Beijing’s negative perception of India’s territorial claims over Ladakh,
Aksai Chin, and Arunachal Pradesh. 13 The country’s political expansion has
aggravated India’s insecurity, prompting a race for political control in the
region, which exacerbated the dispute and culminated in the incident.
Similarly, India’s concerns about its sovereignty and China’s territorial
claims drive its political expansion. At the heart of India’s concerns are
power asymmetry vis-à-vis the PRC on the Tibet issue, the border disputes,
and nuclear capabilities. Delhi considers Tibet a contested buffer state
with geopolitical benefits.14 The region contains 40 percent of the PRC’s
mineral resources and the world’s third-largest freshwater repository.15 It
also provides nations controlling it with major advantages to project power
toward the border with India or the rest of the China.16 Border tensions are
exacerbated by the construction of dams on the rivers originating in Tibet
as well as the regional expansions of both powers.17 Beijing’s resistance to
Delhi’s interpretation of the McMahon Line as India’s northeastern border
with Tibet further aggravates the border disputes.18
Like the PRC in Xinjiang and Tibet, India is extending its political
influence in the Muslim-dominated Jammu and Kashmir regions by
resorting to nationalism, which has become a more potent force under the
ruling Bharatiya Janata Party since it gained control of the administration
in 2014. 19 In 2019, India’s Hindu nationalist government stripped Jammu
and Kashmir of its status as an Indian state, breaking it into two territories
directly governed by New Delhi.20 It also divided its eastern Ladakh
region into a separate union territory. India’s minister of internal affairs
then reaffirmed India’s claim to Aksai Chin by stating “we are ready to give

13. Chaowu Dai, “China’s Strategy for Sino-Indian Boundary Disputes, 1950–1962,” Asian Perspective 43,
no. 3 (2019): 435–57, https://www.proquest.com/docview/2282990224/fulltextPDF/2C0ED2E7291C4EE6PQ
/1?accountid=41510.
14. Chellaney, “Coming Water Wars,” 38; and Malone and Mukherjee, “India and China,” 137–58.
15. Hongzhou Zhang, “Sino-Indian Water Disputes: The Coming Water Wars?,” WIREs Water 3 (March/April
2016): 155–66, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/wat2.1123.
16. Topgyal, “Charting the Tibet Issue,” 119.
17. Ayres, “China’s Mixed Messages”; Manuel Vermeer, “War over Water? Tibet, the Sino-Indian Power
Play and Potential Consequences for Asia,” ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on Defense and International Security,
no. 432 (July 2016), https://www.ispsw.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/432_Vermeer.pdf; Das, Sino-Indian
Border Dispute, 9; and Sudha Ramachandran, “India’s Worrying Border Infrastructure Deficit,” Diplomat,
June 19, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/indias-worrying-border-infrastructure-deficit/.
18. Abitol, “1962 Sino-Indian War.”
19. Dai, “China’s Strategy.”
20. Zeba Siddiqui and Fayaz Bukhari, “India, China Clash over Kashmir as It Loses Special Status and
Is Divided,” Reuters, October 31, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-kashmir/india-PRC-clash
-over-kashmir-as-it-loses-special-status-and-is-divided-idUSKBN1XA0M9.
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our lives for [Aksai Chin].”21 Beijing almost certainly factored this statement
in any decision to initiate or respond to the actions along the LAC.
Since the regional balance of forces favors China and Pakistan, India views
the extension of its political influence in the north as necessary to secure
its northern flank while also challenging the PRC’s assertive engagement
in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. To that end, India has sought to enhance its
engagement with Afghanistan, Bhutan, and Nepal. Its perceived need to catch
up has in turn elevated Beijing’s security concerns, making incidents such
as the June 15 clash more likely. Sino-Indian and Pakistani-Indian border
disputes are dangerous because their unstable interdependence, marked by
trilateral perceptions and unequal capabilities, lends itself to a possible armed
confrontation involving not two but three nuclear armed states.
Economic Expansion
The economic expansion of both powers refers to the promotion of
economic and development policies in and beyond the disputed border
region of Ladakh. Unlike political expansion, which focuses on domestic
development within a perceived geopolitical space, economic expansion has
a pronounced transregional component supporting the countries’ internal
and external expansion. Importantly, the expansion in both cases is meant to
shore up state legitimacy, communist or nationalist rule, and the countries’
nationalist economic agendas.22 These agendas eventually collide in domestic
and regional environments, accentuating the border disputes amid the spike
in regional economic infrastructure development. The expansions thus serve
as sources of tension that spill into border conflicts. Defining how these
expansions interact is key to ensuring a smoother reconfiguration of the
Western-led global economic order to one potentially dominated by Asian
powers in the coming decades.23
To fuel its global economic expansion, the PRC uses the Belt and Road
Initiative, which entails more than $1 trillion in infrastructure investments
in more than 60 countries (including the regions disputed with India).24 The
initiative’s maritime and land components are linked by the China-Pakistan
Economic Corridor, which facilitates Beijing’s Western Development Strategy.
21. Press Trust of India, “PoK, Aksai Chin Part of J&K; Will Give Life for It: Amit Shah in Lok Sabha,”
Business Standard, December 5, 2019, https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/pok-aksai-chin
-part-of-jk-will-give-life-for-it-shah-in-ls-119080600532_1.html.
22. Malone and Mukherjee, “India and China.”
23. Roman Muzalevsky, Strategic Landscape, 2050: Preparing the U.S. Military for New Era Dynamics (Carlisle,
PA: US Army War College Press, 2017), https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/3362.pdf.
24. Andrew Chatzky and James McBride, “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative,” Council on Foreign
Relations, January 28, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative.
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India increasingly views the PRC’s economic expansion in the border region
as incompatible with its own, not least due to a growing trade imbalance.
India has not joined the Belt and Road Initiative, which has also raised
concerns about Beijing’s agenda in Myanmar, Nepal, and even Pakistan.25
India has been apprehensive about the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
because it passes west of the Daulat Beg Oldie military base via the GilgitBaltistan region, which is disputed by Delhi and Islamabad, and because it
legitimizes Pakistan and China’s political and economic expansions. Prior
to the border incident, Delhi directed domestic companies “to avoid using
Chinese equipment to upgrade the 4G networks.”26 Following the border
clash, and amid growing economic tensions in the bilateral relationship, it
banned the use of Chinese applications and is considering further restrictions
on the use of Chinese telecommunications equipment.27 The economic
tensions against the backdrop of the political expansions in the contested
areas serve to increase misperceptions and prospects of border incidents.28
Augmented by the powers’ economic expansions in each other’s recognized
and disputed areas, the economic tensions contributed to the border clash—
which, in turn, brought the tensions to a new level.
As Beijing advances economic policies in the southwest and northwest,
Delhi leverages its Connect Central Asia policy to redefine the northern
periphery and match these economic advances. Several major factors, however,
constrain the policy. India has outlined a plan for developing and integrating
the union territories with the rest of India, but the disputed region features
mountainous terrain and high altitudes, making economic activities difficult
to organize and sustain. India also has no border with Afghanistan and
would have to rely on Pakistan to unleash the full potential of its regional
and transregional economic policies. Finally, India’s economy is $10 trillion
smaller than China’s economy and could fall further behind absent major
reforms.29 Still, Delhi continues to press forward with economic expansion
in the region while strengthening economic, political, and military ties
with countries in the Indo-Asia-Pacific, especially Australia, Japan,
Vietnam, and the United States.
25. Kim, “Understanding China’s Military Expansion.”
26. Tridivesh Singh Maini, China, India and the Galwan Valley Clashes: What Can India Do? (strategic
analysis paper, Future Directions International, 2020), https://www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/china
-india-and-the-galwan-valley-clashes-what-can-india-do/.
27. Rajesh Roy and Shan Li, “India Bans TikTok, Dozens of Other Chinese Apps after Border Clash,”
Wall Street Journal, June 30, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/india-blocks-dozens-of-chinese-apps
-including-tiktok-following-border-clash-11593447321; and Ayres, “China’s Mixed Messages.”
28. Ashley J. Tellis, “Hustling in the Himalayas: The Sino-Indian Border Confrontation,” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, June 4, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/06/04/hustling-in
-himalayas-sino-indian-border-confrontation-pub-81979.
29. Walter Russell Mead, “India Is a Natural U.S. Ally in the New Cold War,” Wall Street Journal,
May 27, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/india-is-a-natural-u-s-ally-in-the-new-cold-war-11590600011.
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Military Expansion
For both countries, military expansion refers to a greater focus on
military planning regarding the disputed border area of Ladakh and
competing territorial claims, the development of military infrastructure,
and the deployment of enhanced military capabilities in the region. These
expansions stem from the comprehensive military buildups both powers
have been pursuing over the past decade.
China’s military expansion is meant to help the country become a
world-class military by 2050, enabling it to protect its expanding economic
interests, including those in Central and South Asia. 30 Beijing views
Ladakh as an inalienable historical territory it must defend to protect
its economic expansion while preventing India’s expansion north and
perceived US encroachment in the east. As a result, the PRC is reevaluating
its “Active Defense” approach, seeking to preempt threats of attacks—not
just attacks—along its perimeter to deter opponents. 31 Its military planners
are also paying more attention to the southwest region and to India. 32
In recent years, Beijing has significantly upgraded military infrastructure
in the disputed region. 33 It has built 58,000 kilometers of railway and road
systems, five air bases, and supply hubs across Tibet to improve rapid
reaction and counterterrorism capabilities. 34 The network links to several
major highways crisscrossing the country—Central Highway, Eastern
Highway, Yunnan-Tibet Highway, and Western Highway—and is further
connected to the PRC-Pakistan Karakoram Highway and the disputed
Aksai Chin region. Aksai Chin is controlled by China and separated from
Indian-administered areas of the disputed Ladakh by the LAC. Many of
the network’s roads run close to or beyond the LAC—areas India considers
its territory. To improve military deployments, the Chinese have also
extended rail lines close to the Indian border. 35
During the border conflict with India on June 15, the PRC likely
occupied multiple new geographic positions to ensure greater protection
of the China National Highway 219 (G219) linking Xinjiang and Tibet
and the China National Highway 314 (G314) connecting China to
30. Kim, “Understanding China’s Military Expansion.”
31. See M. Taylor Fravel, Active Defense: China’s Military Strategy since 1949 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2019).
32. Antara Ghosal Singh, “What Is China Saying about the China-India Border Stand-Off?,” Diplomat,
June 2, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/what-is-china-saying-about-the-china-india-border-stand-off/.
33. Shivangi Borah, “Behind Doklam Lies an Uneven Infrastructure Race between China and India,”
New Perspectives in Foreign Policy, no. 14 (Fall 2017), https://www.csis.org/npfp/behind-doklam-lies-an
-uneven-infrastructure-race-between-china-and-india; and Ayres, “China’s Mixed Messages.”
34. Das, Sino-Indian Border Dispute.
35. Das, Sino-Indian Border Dispute.
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Pakistan.36 It may have also done so to prevent India from building its own
infrastructure and using “the 255 km Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie
road.”37 Completed in 2019, this road allows for rapid military deployment
to the LAC. 38 India’s construction of offshoot roads may have aggravated
Beijing’s concerns, triggering the alleged incursions.39 The PRC then used
the territorial gains as “a form of coercive issue linkage,” pressuring India
on the “disputed territories to secure concessions” on border-related or
non-border–related issues in other geographic areas.40 China could thus be
looking to pressure India to stay away from Nepal and roadbuilding in the
eastern sector to prevent Delhi from expanding its influence there. 41 The
disengagement, which has involved only select positions abandoned by the
Chinese since the clash of June 15, lends credence to this argument.
While India’s regional military expansion has proceeded more slowly
than China’s, many projects have been coming online over the past two
years, unnerving Beijing.42 India has completed the construction of most
of the 73 roads under the “India-China Border Roads initiative.”43 The
Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie Road now enables Delhi to move
military assets close to the contested areas along the LAC—a key change
considering the People’s Liberation Army’s own rapid deployment
capacity.44 India’s military was long focused on “insurgency in Kashmir and
the Naxalite uprising,” leaving it vulnerable to perceived military threats
from China. The PRC’s recent military expansion in Xinjiang, Tibet, and
the south has prompted Delhi to increase “manpower for the [country’s]
Indo-Tibetan Border Police,” to strengthen the capabilities of its “Eastern
Air Command,” and “expand [its] air bases” in the region.45
In upgrading its military potential, India has increased the capabilities
of its “airmobile 17 Mountain Strike Corps.”46 Once it completes its
military modernization, India could deploy more forces near its border with

36. Das, Sino-Indian Border Dispute.
37. Marcelo Duhalde, Dennis Wong, and Kaliz Lee, “India-China Border Clash Explained,” South China
Morning Post, July 2, 2020, https://multimedia.scmp.com/infographics/news/world/article/3091480/ChinaIndia-border-dispute/index.html.
38. Duhalde, Wong, and Lee, “India-China Border Clash.”
39. “Border Dispute between India and China”; and Derek Grossman, “Chinese Border Aggression against
India Likely Unrelated to Pandemic,” Diplomat (blog), RAND, July 6, 2020, https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/07
/chinese-border-aggression-against-india-likely-unrelated.html.
40. Reynolds and Kaushal, “Military Analysis.”
41. Singh, “China-India Border Stand-Off?”
42. Reynolds and Kaushal, “Military Analysis.”
43. Borah, “Behind Doklam,” 40.
44. Reynolds and Kaushal, “Military Analysis.”
45. Das, Sino-Indian Border Dispute.
46. Reynolds and Kaushal, “Military Analysis.”
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the PRC, whose troops are mostly positioned deeper inland.47 The PRC
may have initially sought to alter the status quo in the Galwan Valley by
gaining whatever military advantages it could (in complex terrain) in the
areas it now controls.48 After all, India’s military expansion into Ladakh could
enable it to sustain forward deployment closer to the PRC’s borders, thereby
eroding some of the PRC’s advantages.49 Pointedly, Colonel Zhang Shuili,
a spokesperson for the Chinese military’s Western Theater Command, said
the PRC had always maintained sovereignty over the Galwan Valley, despite
retreating from the area after a war with India in 1962. 50
India’s regional military expansion and attempts to match the PRC
in military infrastructure building are predicated on a need to protect
itself in a two-front war. The result is an unstable “arms race” dynamic
prone to miscalculations of intent and capabilities in the conditions of
a security dilemma.51 India’s relatively more acute threat perceptions,
as well as a sense of injury and resentment against the PRC, exacerbate
this dilemma. 52 With both powers now possessing the capacity to wage
large-scale war in the disputed area, this dynamic is even more menacing in
terms of its risks and implications.

Implications
For decades, the western frontiers of the PRC and the northern frontiers
of India were out of reach for both countries, but now ongoing expansions
are threatening the status quo. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the
disputed Ladakh, where both nations are expected to act more assertively
as their strategic expansions leave them less room to maneuver. Absent a
mutually agreed-upon modus operandi, the powers risk raising the bar of
acceptable levels of violence—a dangerous prospect considering their status
as nuclear-armed states. The region’s terrain will influence decisions to
initiate, sustain, freeze, or end a confrontation. A conventional or nuclear
confrontation is not inconceivable and awareness of the risks might facilitate
47. Frank O’Donnell, Stabilizing Sino-Indian Security Relations: Managing the Strategic Rivalry after Doklam
(paper, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, 2018), https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/06/21
/stabilizing-sino-indian-security-relations-managing-strategic-rivaly-after-doklam-pub-76622.
48. Reynolds and Kaushal, “Military Analysis”; and Tellis, “Hustling in the Himalayas.”
49. Reynolds and Kaushal, “Military Analysis.”
50. Niharika Mandhana, Rajesh Roy, and Chun Han Wong, “The Deadly India-China Clash: Spiked Clubs and
Fists at 14,000 Feet,” Wall Street Journal, June 17, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/spiked-clubs-and-fists-at
-14-000-feet-the-deadly-india-china-clash-11592418242; and “Border Dispute between India and China.”
51. Jonathan Holslag, China and India: Prospects for Peace (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 141;
and Abitol, “1962 Sino-Indian War,” 76.
52. Tien-sze Fang, Asymmetrical Threat Perceptions in India-China Relations (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press,
2013), https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198095958.001.0001/acprof-9780198095958;
Neville Maxwell, “Why the Sino–Indian Border Dispute Is Still Unresolved after 50 Years: A Recapitulation,”
China Report 47, no. 2 (2011): 71–82, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/000944551104700202; and
Malik, China and India, 45.
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a more effective mechanism to manage the border tensions. Both parties should
signal clear intentions and avoid misperception traps that could invite further
provocations and land grabbing. These actions are critical because both countries
operate in dissimilar political environments and differ in their abilities to control
national sentiment during conflict.
The border incident and conflict will prompt the PRC and India to adjust
regional military balances and relations with neighboring countries, foreign
powers, and institutions in response to each other’s regional advances. Both
will likely increase defense spending in the Ladakh region and adjoining areas,
partially as an extension of growing military spending trends. Both will also
boost engagement with neighbors along the shared perimeter to secure political,
economic, and military advantages. Finally, both will reexamine their roles in
multilateral institutions and adjust their relationships with regional and global
powers to balance each other’s strategic expansions.
The United States may try to use the border conflict to draw India into a
strategic alliance explicitly opposing the PRC. India is unlikely to embrace the
idea, instead positioning itself as an independent and self-sufficient power,
drawing on its growing capabilities and historical legacy as a nonaligned
movement leader during the Cold War. At that time, Delhi faced a choice of
aligning with either the United States or the Soviet Union but chose to chart
its own path and, just like Beijing, has treated the dispute on a bilateral basis.
India appears wary of causing misperceptions in the PRC’s calculus regarding a
strategic partnership with Washington and is likely to opt for a soft balancing.53
Yet, India’s foreign policy approach, rooted in strategic autonomy, is becoming
“more nuanced, more flexible and adaptable” as it comes increasingly under
strain “because of the rise of a realist strand of thinking” driven by the rise of the
PRC.54 This strain presents an opening for the United States to pursue a strategic
relationship with India and provides a counterbalance to China’s advances in
the Indo-Asia-Pacific and beyond. Ultimately, the United States should develop
a robust policy on Ladakh involving a series of economic, political, and military
initiatives in Central and South Asia. This approach will help Washington
influence the strategic expansions of both powers while serving as a credible global
security guarantor and integrator in the increasingly changing world order.

53. Amy Kazmin and Don Weinland, “Trump’s Embrace of Modi Stokes India-China Stand-off in Himalayas,”
Financial Times, June 9, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/dd253671-ee10-4e51-b9c0-c3fa9c2134e4.
54. Deepa Ollapally, “India: The Ambivalent Power in Asia,” International Studies 48, no. 3–4 (2013): 201,
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0020881713485009.

TOC

48

Parameters 51(4) Winter 2021–22

Roman Muzalevsky
Roman Muzalevsky is a multilingual analyst who has written extensively
on geopolitical and strategic trends in Eurasia and Indo-Asia-Pacif ic.
Some of his related works include Central Asia’s Shrinking Connectivity Gap:
Implications for US Strategy (2014) as well as China’s Rise and Reconfiguration
of Central Asia’s Geopolitics: A Case for U.S. “Pivot” to Eurasia (2015).

TOC

Rethinking US Strategic Concepts

Defeat Mechanisms in Modern Warfare
Frank Hoffman

©2021 Frank Hoffman

I

ABSTRACT: This article explores the current debate about service and
Joint operating concepts, starting with the Army’s multi-domain operations
concept. It argues for adaptations to an old operational design technique—
defeat mechanisms; updates to Joint and service planning doctrine; and
discipline regarding emerging concepts. Rather than debate over attrition
versus maneuver, combinations of a suite of defeat mechanisms should be
applied to gain victory in the future.

n 2018, the National Defense Strategy stressed the importance of
creative operational concepts to regenerate a competitive advantage in
today’s geopolitical context.1 New Joint and service concepts present an
array of new theories and terminology to articulate future modes of warfare
and shape tomorrow’s capabilities. Recent concepts, such as multi-domain
operations (MDO), have been developed to stimulate and guide the design
and development of future US military capabilities. A debate in the academic
literature has challenged the viability of these service concepts and even longstanding elements central to US military doctrine. At issue is the central basis
for gaining victory in warfare, which is critical to Joint and service planning
doctrine. Critics challenge the historical foundation of both service and
Joint warfighting concepts, especially the shifts to moral and psychological
factors, and stress putting more emphasis on attrition and physical destruction.
This essay reviews current conceptual efforts to better posture the US military
for success in the emerging era of strategic competition. The opening section
briefly examines an emerging debate over weaknesses in service and Joint operating
concepts. It summarizes the Army’s MDO operating concept and addresses two
recent advanced concepts—decision-centric warfare and systems warfare—to
underscore the use of cyber-enabled systems to produce advantageous effects at the
operational level of war. The assessment section explores a refined suite of defeat
mechanisms as the essential building blocks of testable operating concepts and offers
a revised set based on Army and Marine doctrine as a means of improving US
force development efforts. These mechanisms form the building blocks of a

The author would like to thank Andrew Orner, Dr. T. X. Hammes, and Colonel Rafael Lopez from National
Defense University; Captain T. S. Allen; Dr. Rob Johnson; Colonel Patrick Garrett; Franz-Stefan Gady;
Bryan Clark; and Major General Mick Ryan, Australian Army, for insights on this topic.
1. Thomas G. Mahnken, Grace B. Kim, and Adam Lemon, Piercing the Fog of Peace: Developing Innovative
Operational Concepts for a New Era (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, April
2019); and James Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the
American Military’s Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018).
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theory of victory that should be central to both operational plans and
warfighting concepts.

Current Debate
Scholars have recently resurrected an old debate about the underlying concepts
used in force development efforts. Heather Venable from Air University has
noted an increased emphasis on the use of nonkinetic elements in warfare and
the desire to seek cognitive effects including paralysis. Venable notes the historical
underpinning for claims of paralysis is thin: “Never validated through rigorous
historical study, these untested ideas have been removed from context and
sprinkled ahistorically throughout US doctrine.”2
Normally, airpower advocates endorse seeking strategic paralysis,
sometimes entirely by using kinetic means against economic targets. 3
Venable, however, rightfully criticizes maneuver warfare theories and new
concepts for having limited historical foundations. Her critique appears
more targeted against operational paralysis in nascent Joint operating
concepts and the infusion of maneuverist thinking, especially the stated
objective of creating dilemmas for the adversary. Yet, the same thinking pervades
recent Air Force doctrine.4
Other critics, like Franz-Stefan Gady, persuasively criticize the US Army’s
emphasis on achieving strategic paralysis against major competitors. Gady argues
US doctrinal thinking on future warfighting, which focuses on paralyzing an
enemy by imposing multiple cognitive dilemmas through maneuver, needs to be
rethought.5 He concludes that the proliferation of new intelligence, surveillance,
target acquisition, and reconnaissance capabilities makes offensive military
operations relying on maneuver formations far easier to detect and to counter.
Rather than count on maneuvering to create dilemmas, a greater reliance
on attrition is more likely to be effective. Finally, he argues the upper hand in
cyberspace will go to the defense, and it will impede, if not successfully counter,
maneuver in that domain. Moreover, he argues creating and exploiting “windows
2. Heather Venable, “Paralysis in Peer Conflict? The Material versus the Mental in 100 Years of Military
Thinking,” War on the Rocks, December 1, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/12/paralysis-in-peer-conflict
-the-material-versus-the-mental-in-100-years-of-military-thinking/; and Michael Kofman, “A Bad Romance:
US Operational Concepts Need to Ditch Their Love Affair with Cognitive Paralysis and Make Peace with
Attrition,” Modern War Institute at West Point, March 31, 2021, https://mwi.usma.edu/a-bad-romance-us
-operational-concepts-need-to-ditch-their-love-affair-with-cognitive-paralysis-and-make-peace-with-attrition/.
3. On strategic paralysis, see David S. Fadok, “John Boyd and John Warden: Air Power’s Quest for Strategic
Paralysis” (thesis, Air University, 1995).
4. US Air Force, Department of the Air Force Role in Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO), Air Force Doctrine
Publication (AFDP) 3-99 (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Curtis LeMay Center for Doctrine Development
and Education, 2020), https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_3-99/AFDP%203-99
%20DAF%20role%20in%20JADO.pdf.
5. Franz-Stefan Gady, “Manoeuvre versus Attrition in US Military Operations,” Survival 63, no. 4 (August–
September 2021): 131–48.
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of superiority” following penetration or paralysis—a core tenet of MDO—is
more difficult to achieve in conventional military operations and in the cyber
domain. Overall, Gady’s assessment counters the efficacy of MDO, as imposing
paralysis in the physical domains will be far more challenging in future
conventional military campaigns.
These critics share a strong emphasis on the physical and materiel aspects
of armed conflict and a distinct skepticism about any moral, psychological,
or cognitive sphere in warfare. Although Carl von Clausewitz, J. F. C. Fuller,
and T. E. Lawrence are undoubtedly spinning in their graves, Gady’s
arguments about the growing difficulty of conducting maneuver cannot be
easily dismissed. Yet, the same was true at the Battle of Gettysburg in 1863
and the First Battle of the Somme in 1916, and military forces evolved
their doctrine and tactics. The same type of evolution will be needed today.
The key question for today’s service chiefs and concept writers is determining
what organizational, conceptual, and technological changes should coevolve
to best advance multi-domain operations to gain victory in the emerging
operational environment? What strategies and sources of combat power will
promote military effectiveness in this decade? The debate is an old polar
distinction and presents a false dichotomy between the physical destruction via
attrition or via maneuver, the latter of which is more efficient and broadly
defined. As Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege argued nearly four
decades ago, the real world lies between—and you need both. 6
The progenitor of this long-standing debate is the British military
analyst Basil Henry Liddell Hart. 7 Attrition lost its appeal in the trenches
of World War I, and Liddell Hart’s studies were shaped by his own
searing experiences in that conflict. He advocated indirect approaches
to gain success, and he contended strategists should strive to think
about paralyzing opponents. Liddell Hart asserted, “[I]n all decisive
campaigns, the dislocation of the enemy’s psychological and physical
balance has been the vital prelude to his overthrow.” 8 At a higher plane,
he argued the ultimate aim was to bring pressure on a government, “so
that the sword drops from a paralysed hand.” 9 His own visceral combat

6. Huba Wass de Czege, “Army Doctrinal Reform,” in The Defense Reform Debate: Issues and Analysis,
ed. Asa A. Clark IV et al. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), 103.
7. B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2nd revised ed. (New York: Meridian, 1991), 5–6; Richard M. Swain,
“B. H. Liddell Hart and the Creation of a Theory of War, 1919–1933,” Armed Forces & Society 17, no. 1
(Fall 1990): 35–51; and Azar Gat, A History of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold War
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 645–95.
8. B. H. Liddell Hart, The Memoirs of Captain Liddell Hart, vol. 1 (London: Cassell, 1967), 162–63.
9. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 212.
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experience informed his desire to ensure Great Britain avoided the same
grinding attrition in the next war.
Attrition as a strategy, with its attendant costs, was further criticized
after Vietnam. Both the US Army and Marine Corps developed new
doctrines, seeking to put the jungles and highlands of Southeast Asia
behind them. The AirLand Battle concept sought to leverage new
technologies, especially deep attack and precision strike, integrated with
effective mechanized forces. 10 The Marines began a long debate over what
they called maneuver warfare, in which the writings of Vietnam veterans
were prominent. Air Force Colonel John Boyd provided a very influential
intellectual foundation for these ideas among Marines. 11 Boyd’s thinking
stressed moral and cognitive elements that were muted in US military theory.
But he also emphasized the moral, cognitive, and physical dimensions of
war were interrelated and interactive. 12 Advocates of maneuver warfare
claimed all positive virtues of operational art and castigated attrition as the
artless application of raw force. Richard Simpkin reflected this mindset in
Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare, with his
pejorative jab at the “addicts of attrition” in contrast to the astute masters of
maneuver.13 Today modern-day apostles of attrition are fighting back.
Yet, serious historians recognize the debate between attrition and maneuver
as a specious argument, since a strategy of attrition may be a necessary approach
under specific circumstances.14 Attrition, better described as physical destruction,
is necessary but rarely sufficient component in warfare.15 Some reduction of
adversary capability is required, not just to reduce physical assets but also to
produce the psychological shock of lost advantage or a surprise that induces
the opponent to recognize the continuation of the campaign is going to make
the outcome ever more costly. The velocity and combinations of force set up the
conditions for victory, not one form or another.
The real issue is the construction of operational concepts or plans that
have a historically demonstrated or testable theory of victory. Critics have
10. Benjamin M. Jensen, Forging the Sword: Doctrinal Change in the U.S. Army (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2016), 74–86.
11. On Boyd’s thinking, see Frans P. B. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd
(New York: Routledge, 2006); and Antulio J. Echevarria II, War’s Logic: Strategic Thought and the American
Way of War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 169–92.
12. Echevarria, War’s Logic, 177.
13. Richard E. Simpkin, Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare (London: Brassey’s Defence
Publishers, 2000), 181.
14. On attrition, see Carter Malkasian, A History of Modern Wars of Attrition (Westport, CT: Praeger
Publishers, 2002); and Cathal J. Nolan, The Allure of Battle: A History of How Wars Have Been Won and Lost
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).
15. Lamar Tooke, “Blending Maneuver and Attrition,” Military Review 80, no. 2 (March–April 2000): 10–11;
and J. Boone Bartholomees Jr., “The Issue of Attrition,” Parameters 40, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 5–19, https://press
.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol40/iss1/1/.

TOC

Rethinking US Strategic Concepts

Hoffman

53

challenged the vital component of major concepts, and with reason. Plans or
concepts should be built upon a theory of victory based on the application of
a set of defeat mechanisms. 16 These mechanisms form the requisite building
blocks upon which we can construct a hypothesis for obtaining victory.

Possible Defeat Mechanisms
Army doctrine defines a defeat mechanism as “a method through
which friendly forces accomplish their missions against enemy opposition.
Army forces at all echelons use combinations of four defeat mechanisms:
destroy, dislocate, disintegrate, and isolate.”17 While US Marine doctrine does
not explicitly refer to defeat mechanisms, the terminology is commonly used and
understood in discussions.18 The United Kingdom’s army doctrine does not employ
defeat mechanisms as a term, but lists destruction, dislocation, and disruption as
three ways land forces attack the moral and physical cohesion of the opponent.19
A possible suite of defeat mechanisms is depicted in figure 1. This matrix
contrasts the means and desired effects of various mechanisms, offers an initial
categorization schema, and accepts current Army doctrine except for dropping
isolation in favor of disorientation and degradation. These two mechanisms seem
highly relevant in an age of pervasive intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance,
and highly connected command and control (C2) systems.

Figure 1. Defeat/victory mechanisms

While this proposed set of mechanisms only modestly adapts the Army’s
doctrine, it avoids the paralysis- and dilemma-creating elements in MDO
16. See Brad Roberts, On Theories of Victory, Red and Blue, Livermore Papers on Global Security No. 7
(Livermore, CA: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Center for Global Research, June 2020).
17. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (Arlington, VA: US Army, 2017), 1-21–1-22.
18. Marinus, “Defeat Mechanisms,” Marine Corps Gazette 105, no. 7 (July 2021): 101–6.
19. UK Army, Land Operations, UK Army Doctrinal Publication AC 71940 (Bristol, UK: British Ministry
of Defence, 2017), 5–5.
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and could be used to enhance Joint doctrine. These mechanisms should not
be considered common terms. Instead, they need to be defined precisely and
employed consistently within the profession’s doctrinal and conceptual discourse.
Dislocation is a product of maneuver and creates a positional and temporal
advantage by making the location and/or defenses of one’s adversaries irrelevant
or less useful.20 It may force the opponents to move and expose their forces to
attack or face being surrounded or isolated from support. Its ultimate effect is
to deprive opposing commanders of the initiative and any advantage they
initially held. Destruction is self explanatory.
In addition to these concepts, two other proposed defeat mechanisms—
disorientation and degradation—are possible. One function of disorientation
could include the injection of disinformation into, or corruption of, an
adversary’s command and control systems with spoofed data. Passive forms of
deception and decoys might also be useful.
Degradation describes a reduced level of situational awareness or
lower level of functionality in C2 and intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance systems. As suggested by John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt,
and others, degradation could be the product of a kinetic attack or involve
cyber operations. 21 It captures effects that are probably temporary against a
competitor with competent technological agility, who can reconstitute and
adapt C2 systems over time. In Boyd’s conception, this mechanism reduces
the understanding or orientation of one’s adversaries and slows their
operating cycles and abilities to adapt. It provides an edge at the operational
level of war.
This study now turns to what Army force developers and the Washington
think-tank community are proposing in various operating concepts and
how well they postulate an adequate theory of victory.

Key Concepts
Current US Army doctrine stresses the importance of gaining the initiative
and leveraging it to attain advantage. The Army concludes its ability to place
adversary assets at risk across the depth of the battle space can neutralize
critical enemy functions and deny an opponent the ability to generate combat
power. It also stresses the importance of generating dilemmas for one’s
opponents so they cannot execute counter responses. Creating dilemmas can
20. Robert R. Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver-Warfare Theory and AirLand Battle (Novato, CA:
Presidio Press, 1991).
21. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, eds., In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1997), 2.
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have causal consequences for opposing commanders. As reflected in current
Army doctrine, the combination of taking the initiative and presenting
the enemy with multiple dilemmas forces enemy commanders to be reactive,
drives them into untenable positions, and presses them into making
costly mistakes.22
In contrast with present doctrine, the Army’s conceptual thinking about the
future focuses on obtaining a capability overmatch through convergence and/or
integration of capabilities—including nonkinetic ones—across multiple domains.
The central defeat mechanism is not clear, but appears to be a new concept
called “convergence,” defined as “the rapid and continuous integration
of capabilities in all domains, the [electromagnetic spectrum] EMS, and
information environment that optimizes effects to overmatch the enemy through
cross-domain synergy and multiple forms of attack all enabled by mission
command and disciplined initiative.”23 According to this definition, convergence
best describes what is being done by the Army but does not describe the impact
on the adversary.
The US Army has used disintegration in past doctrine, defining it as “breaking
the coherence of the enemy’s system by destroying or disrupting its subcomponents
(such as command and control means, intelligence collection, critical nodes, etc.),
degrading its ability to conduct operations while leading to a rapid collapse of the
enemy’s capabilities or will to fight.”24 We find a clearer logic in this statement,
as well as a hypothesis on how to reduce the adversary’s will or capacity to
resist. Generating multiple dilemmas and inducing mistakes is a less clear
causal argument for a successful defeat mechanism.
Multi-domain operations has received its share of criticism from various Army
strategic and operational artists. For example, longtime Army thought leader
Wass de Czege argues MDO’s dilemma-centric theory of victory needs a more
robust logic.25 His overall assessment is correct. When the Army moved from
AirLand Battle to multi-domain battle, clear thinking and historical analysis
diminished as concept writers wrestled with new tools and technologies.

22. US Army, Operations, Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 3-0 (Washington, DC: US Army, 2019),
2-4–2-5.
23. US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028,
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Washington, DC: US Army TRADOC, 2018), vii.
24. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 (2018), vii.
25. Huba Wass de Czege, Commentary on “The US Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028” (Carlisle, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, 2020), 10–11, https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/3726.pdf.
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Others find the notion of dominance to be vague.26 In short. many Army strategists
believe MDO requires more clarity.
The Joint warfighting community is also striving to define how to formulate
a theory of victory in its concepts and doctrine. Some major combatant
commands and at least one other service have embraced the creation of
dilemmas as the ultimate objective. The US Indo-Pacific Command contends
the US military can shape opponent decisions by “rapidly presenting the adversary
with multiple dilemmas, degrading adversary leadership’s sense of control.”27 The
Air Force also argues in its latest doctrine, “The joint force of 2035 will instead
place an adversary on the ‘horns of multiple dilemmas’ by swiftly applying
different strengths to produce multiple approaches.”28 Our allies appear to
have agreed on dilemma generation as well. The United Kingdom’s integrated
operating concept states, “We need to create multiple dilemmas that unhinge a
rival’s understanding, decision-making and execution.”29

Competing Alternatives
Two competing concepts have been offered to advance the development
of an overarching Joint warfighting concept. One is decision-centric warfare
(DCW), developed by Bryan Clark and a team of associates who claim attrition
is obsolete. They argue a need now exists for novel “. . . metrics for military
success in this world where it’s not about attrition anymore. It’s much more about
decision-making and creating dilemmas for an enemy.”30 In Clark’s view, the
Department of Defense should “embrace a new theory of victory and operational
concepts that focus on making faster and better decisions than adversaries, rather
than attrition.”31 This approach is in line with what the Chief of Staff of the Army
calls decision dominance.32 Clark’s solution enables faster and more effective decisions
by US commanders, while simultaneously degrading the quality and speed of
adversary decision making. Decision-centric warfare exploits emerging technologies
26. Amos C. Fox, Getting Multi-Domain Operations Right: Two Critical Flaws in the U.S. Army’s
Multi-Domain Operations Concept, Land Warfare Paper No. 133 (Arlington, VA: Association of the United
States Army, 2020).
27. Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy, Matthew D. Strohmeyer, and Christopher D. Forrest, “Strategic Shaping:
Expanding the Competitive Space,” Joint Force Quarterly 90, no. 3 (3rd Quarter 2018): 11.
28. US Air Force, Air Force Future Operating Concept: A View of the Air Force in 2035 (Washington, DC:
US Air Force, 2015), 7.
29. UK Ministry of Defence, Integrated Operating Concept (London: UK Ministry of Defence, 2021), 10.
30. Bryan Clark, “Analyzing New Military Technology,” interview by Tom Temin, Federal News Network,
July 30, 2021, https://federalnewsnetwork.com/defense-news/2020/07/analyzing-new-military-technology/.
31. Bryan Clark, Dan Patt, and Harrison Schramm, Mosaic Warfare: Exploiting Artificial Intelligence and
Autonomous Systems to Implement Decision-Centric Operations (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessment, 2020), iii; and Bryan Clark, Dan Patt, and Timothy A. Walton, Implementing
Decision-Centric Warfare: Elevating Command and Control to Gain an Optionality Advantage (Washington, DC:
Hudson Institute, 2021).
32. US Army, Army Multi-Domain Transformation: Ready to Win in Competition and Conflict, Chief of Staff
Paper (CSP) 1 (Washington, DC: US Army, 2021), 8.
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such as AI, autonomous systems, and man-machine collaborations used to
extend the reach, competency, and endurance of human operators. As with
maneuver warfare, the core metrics of this approach would be the number of
distinct dilemmas presented to the adversary and the speed with which they
are imposed.33
Here again we see the emphasis on dilemma generation as a means of confusing
and paralyzing opponents. This approach, however, is not simply nonmateriel; physical
destruction is embedded in the concept. Some dilemmas will be created by threatening
physical destruction and materiel costs. As Clark amplified in a follow-on inquiry:
We see attrition is an essential element, in the form of destruction and
degradation, to achieve dislocation and disorientation. In some cases an
enemy system or unit has to be destroyed or damaged to degrade enemy
decision-making. More importantly, though, the enemy has to fear losses.34

To enable decision-centric warfare, the concept leverages destruction,
distributed formations, dynamic aggregation and disaggregation of forces,
marked reductions in signature, and counter-C2 intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance actions designed to offer an effective response or
confound adversary understanding of our operations. Clark argues for
a relative advantage in cognitive capacity and decision making, with
enablers for protecting friendly C2 systems and leveraging the same
technologies to attack, distort, and degrade the decision making of
opposing commanders.

Systems Warfare
Former Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work developed a Joint
warfighting concept he called “systems warfare,” drawn from his extensive
study of warfighting concepts. The central idea of his concept is Joint
forces should aim to field battle networks that “operate better and faster
than adversary operational systems, and ones that cannot be destroyed like
the battle networks used today.” 35 The concept builds upon the mature and
now diffused precision-strike competition and explores new competitive
pressures, such as exploiting today’s emerging seventh military revolution
of autonomy and human augmentation as well as vulnerabilities generated

33. Clark, Patt, and Walton, Implementing Decision-Centric Warfare, 23.
34. Bryan Clark, correspondence with author, September 30, 2021.
35. Robert O. Work, “A Joint Warfighting Concept for Systems Warfare,” Center for a New American
Security, December 17, 2020, https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/a-joint-warfighting-concept-for-systems
-warfare.
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by the Information Age. 36 As Work notes, “The ability to out-range an
enemy has become far more difficult with the development of invisible
system strike capabilities such as cyber, counter-AI, and electronic warfare.” 37
His concept reinforces the importance of information-strike capabilities as
an element of combat power. The battle networks, rather than the major
platforms, are the key weapons systems and they confront each other
directly via long-distance virtual strikes.
Like DCW, Work promotes the development of capabilities such as
human-machine battle networks to exploit AI-enabled autonomy at scale.
He contends these human-directed and algorithm-enhanced networks will
lead consistently to better decisions that are made and acted upon faster than
any opponent. Like Clark’s DCW, systems warfare has both an offensive
and defensive character. Not only will systems warfare give the Joint force
a decisive advantage in its own OODA cycle, its networks would also
work directly against their opponent’s battle networks via cyberattack. 38
The concept underscores the need to identify critical nodes or systems
as part of the enemy order of battle to strike at and attrit the adversary’s
command functions.
Work incorporates the attrition and/or destruction of other components
of the adversary’s forces and explicitly includes attrition from firepower into
his concept, with the qualification that:
. . . the object of these f ires is not about the annihilation of
the enemy force, but of disrupting and destroying the inner workings
of the opposing system of systems. The specif ic targets chosen are
those that, if destroyed, will allow the Joint Force to gradually gain
an information and decision advantage in a systems confrontation.39

Thus, disruption and destruction are the primary defeat mechanisms
of this concept, in search of an information advantage we can exploit. Yet,
the human element is not ignored in systems warfare. In fact, the concept

36. F. G. Hoffman, “Will War’s Nature Change in the Seventh Military Revolution?,” Parameters 47, no. 4
(Winter 2017–18).
37. Work, “Systems Warfare.”
38. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War, 189–231.
39. Work, “Systems Warfare.”
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assumes the operational system with the best people and better (algorithmic)
processes will be at an advantage and outperform the adversary.40

Assessment
The strength in both systems warfare and decision-centric warfare
lies in their ability to exploit the expected benefits of AI-enabled cyber
operations. The application of AI-enhanced decision support systems or
autonomous weapons in military operations is a potential game changer. 41
These capabilities will be relevant to improved fires and enhanced maneuver.
AI-driven robotic swarms offer a step change in maneuver capability that can
operationalize a form of maneuver that overwhelms defenses in conventional
military operations.42 The dislocation that such maneuvers can cause
should be significant, and the kinetic effectiveness of simple drone attacks in
recent conflicts is suggestive of what the future holds.43 These concepts seek to
gain and hold a competitive edge in AI/machine learning. Of course, AI will
be a double-edged sword.44 Artificial intelligence will both sharpen the sword
and also mandate (and hopefully provide) a strong shield and thick deception
filter.45 Joint force development efforts must urgently come to grips with exactly
how to best employ and defend against these new technologies.
Systems warfare and DCW both exploit what European scholars call
the synthetic element of modern warfare, which some scholars expect will
alter warfare.46 Decision-centric warfare stresses the integration of human
thinking and machine speed—exploiting the best of human direction,
directly or indirectly, while still maximizing rapid decision making. This
thinking is consistent with assertions from recent scholarship arguing
“the combination of the synthetic and the human is giving birth to new
ways of war.”47 Systems warfare disrupts, degrades, or destroys an adversary’s
major command and control systems at the operational level and includes
more traditional firepower directed at key nodes and critical vulnerabilities.
40. Work, “Systems Warfare.”
41. Kenneth Payne, I Warbot: The Dawn of Artificially Intelligent Conflict (London: Hurst, 2021). For a critical
examination, see Sam J. Tangredi and Greg Galdorisi, eds., AI at War: How Big Data, Artificial Intelligence,
and Machine Learning Are Changing Naval Warfare (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2021).
42. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Swarming & the Future of Combat (Santa Monica, CA: RAND/National
Defense Research Institute, 2000).
43. Franz-Stefan Gady and Alexander Stronell, “What the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Revealed
about the Future of Warfighting,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, Expert Commentary (blog),
November 23, 2020, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2020/11/nagorno-karabakh-and-the-future-of-war.
44. National Intelligence Council (NIC), Global Trends 2040: A More Contested World (Washington, DC:
NIC, March 2021), 67.
45. See the recommendations of the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI),
Final Report (Arlington, VA: NSCAI, 2021), https://www.nscai.gov/2021-final-report/.
46. See introduction in Rob Johnson, Martijn Kitzen, and Tim Sweijs, eds., The Conduct of War in the 21st
Century: Kinetic, Connected and Synthetic (New York: Routledge, 2021).
47. See conclusion in Johnson, Kitzen, and Sweijs, Conduct of War, 300.
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While both systems warfare and DCW merit serious consideration by
Joint force developers and policy officials, each approach could benefit
from more historical analysis and a clearly stated theory of victory. At
present, they offer assertions of operational advantage that have merit given
the role of battle networks in modern forces. The value of AI in making
better and faster decisions in an adversarial context remains speculative.
However, it is worthwhile to posit AI as a desired capability in a future
operating concept for validation in both gaming and experimentation.

Modernizing Defeat Mechanisms
Having examined the inherent theories of victory and their related
defeat mechanisms in current concepts, this section explores how to update
these mechanisms and obtain a common lexicon for their utilization in
concepts and doctrine. In the past, such mechanisms represented the
building blocks of operations by which commanders plan to apply combat
power for specific desired effects and targets. While Joint and Marine
doctrines are silent on defeat mechanisms, US Army doctrine reflects their
potential. 48 Joint planning doctrine, however, does frame a relationship
between desired military objectives and effects and tasks. 49 Since defeat
mechanisms offer concrete ways of describing how such effects are created,
they could be incorporated within existing Joint doctrine to facilitate the
development of distinctive courses on action and tie desired outcomes to
effects, effects to tasks, and then tasks to component commanders.

48. Jerry Lynes, retired US Marine Corps colonel, correspondence with author, June 19, 2021.
49. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Planning, Joint Publication (JP) 5-0 (Washington, DC: JCS, 2017),
IV-27.
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Table 1. Defeat mechanisms and projected effects

Defeat
Mechanisms

Components of
Combat Power

Destruction

Dislocation

Desired Effects

Targets

Firepower

Attrition of
capacity

Physical
resources, forces,
and platfoms

Maneuver

Terrestrial
and temporal
positional
advantage

Cognitive state
of theater or
operational
commanders

Primarily
information/
cyber/EMS
Degradation
Can be achieved
kinetically or by
cyber weapons

Disorientation

Cyber or other
information
systems

Seeks to slow
or diminish
cognitive tasks,
decision making,
and control
capacity

Delay
decision making
and C2 capacity

Operational
capacity of
selective
adversary
networks/
systems

Culminating
Mechanism

Systems
disruption/
disintegration

Attacks links
between elements
of battle systems

Commanders at
all levels via C2
systems

Table 1’s first column reflects the defeat mechanisms introduced at the beginning
of the article. The subsequent columns summarize the principal component of
combat power associated with each defeat mechanism, the desired effect,
and specific target most often associated with it. The final column captures
what is considered the culminating mechanism—either systems disruption
or disintegration, a product of skillful operational art and orchestration of
effects in time and space.
These building blocks provide the underlying rationale behind a good
concept or operational plan. The need to apply multiple mechanisms,
orchestrated across time and space, is often overlooked. It is possible but
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unlikely a single mechanism, including destruction, would suffice. It is
more likely some combination of mechanisms will be employed to deny
the opponent’s strategic aims and force a resolution on favorable terms.
In major contests with a peer competitor, plans will require such
combinational efforts and the reciprocal effects of the mechanisms.50 The
correct combination and orchestration of these mechanisms is what makes
operational art so potent and demanding. At present, Joint doctrine lacks
the terminology to define and apply these mechanisms as components of
operational design, though US Army doctrine acknowledges them.
Systems disruption is only achieved by creative combinations of some mix
of the four defeat mechanisms. This term is adapted from Marine doctrine,
which incorporates the idea of thinking of the opponent as a system. The
doctrine argued against a slow erosion of an enemy’s defenses and sought to
penetrate the enemy system and tear it apart. It goes on to note “firepower
is central to maneuver warfare.” 51 Yet, that firepower is used to “contribute
to the enemy’s systemic disruption.” 52 The systems approach is useful, but
“systemic” implies a larger breakdown or collapse akin to strategic paralysis
and should be avoided. This approach is likely an overreach for a Joint
operational concept, especially for conflict against a large-scale peer.
The Army has used disintegration, the process of losing cohesion or
strength, as a Joint concept as far back as the early 2000s. 53 The concept
is analogous to systems disruption and superior to paralysis or dilemma
creation. Both terms remain viable for doctrine and concept development.
Both the Army and Marine Corps have organic firepower and maneuver
capabilities, and each service has developed capabilities for information/
cyber operations that can execute systems confrontation/destruction at the
operational and tactical levels. Thus, their ability to degrade and disorient
is considerable. Clearly, the Joint force can bring these mechanisms to
bear to achieve systems disruption or disintegration. Using these terms

50. Eado Hecht, “Defeat Mechanisms: The Rationale behind the Strategy,” Military Strategy 4, no. 2
(Fall 2014), 24–30.
51. US Marine Corps (USMC), Warfighting, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1
(Washington, DC: USMC, 1997), 4-4.
52. On Boyd, see Ian T. Brown, A New Conception of War: John Boyd, the U.S. Marines, and Maneuver Warfare
(Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2018).
53. Douglas J. DeLancey, Adopting the Brigadier General (Retired) Huba Wass de Czege Model of Defeat
Mechanisms Based on Historical Evidence and Current Need (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced
Military Studies, 2001); and US Joint Forces Command, Major Combat Operations Joint Operating Concept,
Version 2.0 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2006), 11.
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clearly and consistently will facilitate dialogue, the increased understanding
of plans, and the testing of proposed operating concepts.
Regrettably, the table fails to present the reciprocal interaction of the
defeat mechanisms as they relate to the moral, cognitive, and physical
spheres of warfare.54 The drafters of MDO understand this interaction
in the call for cross-domain applications. The critics ignore an extensive
body of military history regarding psychological/cognitive impacts and
instead stress physical attrition. Obviously, there are physical and kinetic
components to warfare, but they generate cognitive and psychological
effects as well as materiel losses. As anyone who has been punched in
the nose realizes, physical events also have moral/cognitive impacts.
The systems warfare concept is the most complete presentation
for achieving systems disruption at the operational level. Its strong
focus on systems and networks, however, should not be interpreted by
modern-day apostles of attrition as underplaying the necessity for
destruction to minimize the opponent’s ability to operate against us.
Additionally, this concept leverages information as an instrument of
combat power by including the destruction of systems and networks via
invisible strike from offensive computer/cyber operations. The Joint force
must also incorporate firepower and maneuver, including the eventual
fielding of autonomous and augmented systems that will produce greater
discrimination and speed in strike operations. These abilities will be
necessary for future contests, particularly in missile defense and cyber
systems, and in generating destruction of materiel and critical systems.
At the operational level of war, systems disruption or disintegration
should be seen as the result of a deliberate combination of defeat
mechanisms. This approach appears more plausible and relevant to this
era than the much-acclaimed effect of strategic paralysis or cognitive
dilemmas. Combinations of fires, maneuver, and cyberattack can generate
cascading effects against selected vulnerabilities that severely disrupt the
opposing force’s ability to respond effectively. Degrading C2 systems and
disorienting the information received by decision making via deception
or disinformation further complicates the adversary’s adaptation and
responses. The opposing commander’s ability to understand, assess, and
adapt in reaction to these thrusts will be slow and ineffective. To adapt
Liddell Hart’s conception, the desired effect is not that “the sword drops
from a paralysed hand,” but that the sword cannot be wielded in a coherent
54. Consistent with Boyd. See the chart in Hecht, “Defeat Mechanisms,” 25.
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and lethal manner. 55 At the operational level, systems disruption captures
the desired and achievable effects we seek and the transitory character of
most cyber-based weapons.56
Fire, maneuver, and information remain enduring elements in today’s
character of war. But they are increasingly connected and interactive.
Modern warfighting concepts should reflect this reality, as should doctrine
and operational art. The future requires a force capable of wielding both
sword and shield to blind, confound, and defeat future adversaries. We need
to weave and defend networks, while unraveling our opponent’s at the same
time. The destructive sword—by air, ground, and sea—will certainly be
applied with purpose and violence when needed. Fire and maneuver, however,
will be joined by operational C2 systems that link them and facilitate crossdomain applications that disintegrate the effectiveness of our opponents—
and generate a decided edge for the Joint force. For these reasons, refining
the thinking and application of defeat mechanisms represents a crucial aspect
of operational art now and for the emerging age.
In sum, this assessment suggests critics have some valid points. The Army
and Air Force—and by implication, Joint all-domain operations—should
not be focused on the creation of multiple dilemmas or strategic paralysis
as their end states. Yet, critics seem to believe physical actions only have
physical effects. Fire and maneuver, physical and cognitive/moral forces—
all interact in battle. There is little evidence in history of success that
depends solely on one method, especially among major states. Disintegration
or systems disruption become feasible when sought as the culminating
product of an operational approach that employs and sequences multiple
defeat mechanisms, orchestrated over time and space and directed at
critical vulnerabilities.

Conclusion
Speaking at a change of command ceremony in Hawaii, Secretary of
Defense Lloyd Austin correctly observed, “The way we’ll fight the next
major war is going to look very different from the way we fought the
last ones . . . In this young century, we need to understand faster, decide
faster, and act faster. Our new computing power isn’t an academic
exercise.”57 Every age, Clausewitz reminds us, has its own peculiar forms
55. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 212.
56. Max Smeets, “A Matter of Time: On the Transitory Nature of Cyberweapons,” Journal of Strategic
Studies 41, no. 1–2 (2018): 6–32.
57. Lloyd Austin, “Secretary of Defense Remarks for the U.S. INDOPACOM Change of Command,”
US Department of Defense, April 30, 2021, https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article
/2592093/secretary-of-defense-remarks-for-the-us-indopacom-change-of-command/.
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of warfare.58 The emerging age will evolve its own peculiar mode, one that
responds to political, social, and technological changes. Anticipating future
adversaries will be difficult but necessary.
The disruptive impact of new technologies makes what Peter Paret called
the cognitive challenge of war harder to address. 59 Gady properly assesses
that maneuver will be challenged in an age of ubiquitous surveillance. Victory
will not come about as simply as the by-product of creating dilemmas for
our opponent. Instead, victory will be the result of careful orchestration
of several types of explicitly defined defeat mechanisms tailored to the
mission and circumstances. Winning in the twenty-first century will require
the layered combination of kinetic and nonkinetic capabilities, more than
Gady’s suggestion for an updated version of France’s “methodical battle.” 60
To succeed, we must master battle network competitions that weave the
physical and psychological elements together.61
History favors institutions that examine their operating methods
and continuously refine their future visions of warfare.62 There is a touch
of speculation in these visions, and we need to encourage debate on the
merits of unproven methods and respect the prospects of agency by our
opponents. 63 Critics of emerging US concepts provide an invaluable service
in bringing attention to the need for critical validation. To reiterate, we
should drop the simplistic attrition versus maneuver debate and seek a
more holistic understanding of warfare, one that reflects the reciprocal
interaction of multiple sources of combat power. US military doctrine
should adopt combinations of interactive tools and effects, using both
firepower and maneuver to gain victory, which is what MDO and the
emerging Joint warfighting concept seek. As Austin observed, this approach
is not an academic exercise.
For the last 30 years, since Operation Desert Storm, the military defeat
of opponents could be assumed by virtue of our overwhelming dominance
in military power. Our officer corps has taken this assumption for granted
their entire professional lives. That fact appears to have diluted operational
doctrine and clouded concept development. It is time for US officers
58. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1987), 593.
59. Peter Paret, The Cognitive Challenge of War: Prussia 1806 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).
60. Gady, “Maneouvre vs Attrition,” 143.
61. John Stillion and Bryan Clark, What It Takes to Win: Succeeding in 21st Century Battle Network
Competitions (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2015).
62. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, eds., Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 604–14.
63. Lawrence Freedman, The Future of War: A History (New York: Public Affairs, 2017), 287.
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to gain an understanding of how to beat adversaries decisively in the
twenty-first century.

Frank Hoffman
Dr. Frank Hoffman is a distinguished research fellow at the National Defense
University in Washington, DC. His latest book, Mars Adapting: Military Change
under Fire, was published this year.
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ABSTR ACT: Assessing threats to the air littoral, the airspace between
ground forces and high-end f ighters and bombers, requires a paradigm
change in American militar y thinking about verticalit y. This article
explores the consequences of domain convergence, specifically for the Army
and Air Force’s different concepts of control. It will assist US military and
policy practitioners in conceptualizing the air littoral and in thinking
more vertically about the air and land domains and the challenges of
domain convergence.

F

or the first time in more than six decades, the US military no longer
dominates the skies over battlefields. In the largest battle of the
last decade—the fight to recapture Mosul from the Islamic State in
2016–17—the adversary was able to access and exploit the air domain closer
to the ground, even as US and coalition warplanes flew unimpeded in the
skies high above the battlefield. Small, cheap commercial drones loaded with
light explosives—effectively, tiny bombers—killed or wounded dozens of
Iraqi soldiers. 1 The enemy air threat became so serious it nearly brought the
Iraqi offensive “to a screeching halt,” when, according to General Raymond
Thomas, the US Special Operations Forces commander, the enemy’s drones
were “right overhead and underneath our air superiority.”2 Battlefields
in Nagorno-Karabakh, Syria, Ukraine, Yemen, and elsewhere have seen
combatants employ small, cheap unmanned aerial systems to combat an
adversary’s advantages in the air. 3

The authors would like to acknowledge the thoughtful comments and suggestions of Commander
Matthew H. Buyske, Colonel Lee G. Gentile Jr., Phil Haun, Lieutenant Colonel Michael P. Kreuzer,
John T. LaSaine Jr., Wing Commander Richard M. Milburn, Richard R. Muller, and Lieutenant Colonel
Chadwick Shields, as well as the anonymous reviewers at Parameters.
1. Joby Warrick, “Use of Weaponized Drones by ISIS Spurs Terrorism Fears,” Washington Post,
February 21, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/use-of-weaponized-drones-by
-isis-spurs-terrorism-fears/2017/02/21/9d83d51e-f382-11e6-8d72-263470bf0401_story.html.
2. David Larter, “SOCOM Commander: Armed ISIS Drones Were 2016’s ‘Most Daunting Problem’,” Defense
News, May 16, 2017, https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/sofic/2017/05/16/socom-commander
-armed-isis-drones-were-2016s-most-daunting-problem/.
3. Don Rassler, The Islamic State and Drones: Supply, Scale, and Future Threats (West Point, NY: US Military
Academy Combating Terrorism Center, 2018), https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Islamic
-State-and-Drones-Release-Version.pdf; John Wendle, “The Fighting Drones of Ukraine,” Air & Space Magazine,
February 2018, https://www.airspacemag.com/flight-today/ukraines-drones-180967708/; Ben Hubbard, Palko
Karasz, and Stanley Reed, “Two Major Saudi Oil Installations Hit by Drone Strike, and U.S. Blames Iran,”
New York Times, September 14, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/14/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia
-refineries-drone-attack.html; and Tom Kington, “Libya Is Turning into a Battle Lab for Air Warfare,” Defense
News, August 6, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/smr/nato-air-power/2020/08/06/libya-is-turning-into-a
-battle-lab-for-air-warfare/.
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The airspace between ground forces and high-end fighters and
bombers is quickly emerging as the more challenging and important
contest for air control. 4 Termed the air littoral, this airspace generally
located below 10,000 feet is defined as the “area from the Coordinating
Altitude to the Earth’s surface, which must be controlled to support
land and maritime operations and can be supported and defended from
the air and/or the surface.” 5 Just as the emergence of the submarine, the
self-propelled torpedo, and mines during the early-twentieth century added
subsurface threats in the contest for sea control, small autonomous drones,
low-flying missiles, and loitering munitions increasingly present a threat
to air control from below the altitudes of conventional air superiority. 6 Put
simply, relatively cheap and easy-to-access technologies are exponentially
increasing the number of actors with access to the air littoral and the
military capabilities to dispute its control. 7
Addressing this threat demands more than technological solutions; it
requires a paradigm change in American military thinking about verticality.
Adding a third dimension, that of vertical space, to conceive of both the air
and land domains as volumes, we propose a three-dimensional concept of
air control in time, planar distance, and altitude.
A volumetric concept of air control directs attention to critical
differences between the “blue skies,” where high-end air assets typically
operate, and the air littoral. Bringing the air war closer to the ground
fight will not only resurrect past Army–Air Force disputes about service
roles and missions, it will also place the Army and Air Force’s different
concepts of control in conflict. Whereas the Army is more likely to strive
for control of the air littoral through localized persistent occupation,
the Air Force is likely to pursue control through responsive, if fleeting,
presence. Adversaries are certain to exploit the gap between these differing

4. See Jules “Jay” Hurst, “Small Unmanned Aerial Systems and Tactical Air Control,” Air & Space Power Journal
33, no. 1 (2019): 19–33.
5. This definition draws from the Joint doctrinal definitions of the maritime littorals. See Joinf Chiefs of
Staff (JCS), Joint Maritime Operations, Joint Publication (JP) 3-32 (Washington, DC: JCS , 2018), I-5, https://
www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_32pa.pdf.
6. Milan Vego, Maritime Strategy and Sea Control: Theory and Practice (New York: Routledge, 2016), 136–53.
7. See Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization (New York: Picador,
2000), 47–51.
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concepts of control unless the US military moves quickly to close this
conceptual seam.

Air Superiority
Air control centers on preventing prohibitive or effective interference
with air, land, and maritime operations, thus securing the Joint force’s
freedom to maneuver and attack. Current Joint doctrine acknowledges
differing levels of air control. These range “from no control, to a parity
(or neutral situation) wherein neither adversary can claim any level of
control over the other, to local air superiority in a specific area, to air
supremacy over the entire operational area.” 8 Air forces typically aim
to achieve at least air superiority, whether a theater-wide and enduring
condition or one localized in time and geography for the achievement of
mission-specific objectives.
Joint Publication JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats, defines air
superiority as “that degree of control of the air by one force that permits
the conduct of its operations at a given time and place without prohibitive
interference from air and missile threats.” 9 The highest level of control
of the air is air supremacy, wherein the enemy is “incapable of effective
interference within the operational area using air and missile threats.” 10 For
decades, the United States has attained air superiority, if not supremacy,
in almost all of its military conflicts. Today, however, this superiority is no
longer a given.

The Eroding Foundations of US Air Superiority
With the renewed emphasis on great-power competition, academic
and policy debates have centered on whether the United States is losing
its military-technological advantages.11 While addressing high-end
capabilities is important, these debates run the risk of missing how
low-cost technological innovations will signif icantly alter the character
of war. The democratization of technology—the declining costs of
8. See JCS, Joint Air Operations, JP 3-30 (Washington, DC: JCS, 2019), I-1, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36
/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_30.pdf.
9. JCS, Countering Air and Missile Threats, JP 3-01 (Washington, DC: JCS, 2018), I-4, https://www.jcs.mil
/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_01_pa.pdf. Emphasis added.
10. JCS, JP 3-01. Emphasis added.
11. Robert O. Work and Greg Grant, “Beating the Americans at Their Own Game: An Offset Strategy with
Chinese Characteristics,” Center for New American Security, June 6, 2019, https://www.cnas.org/publications
/reports/beating-the-americans-at-their-own-game; James Maynika and William H. McRaven, Innovation and
National Security: Keeping Our Edge, Independent Task Force Report No. 77 (New York: Council on Foreign
Relations, 2019); and James Johnson, “The End of Military-Techno Pax Americana? Washington’s Strategic
Responses to Chinese AI-Enabled Military Technology,” Pacific Review 34, no. 3 (2019): 351–78, https://doi.org
/10.1080/09512748.2019.1676299.
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computing power and the Internet’s global reach, along with the dualuse nature of many current and emerging technologies—have made
airpower available to a much broader range of state and nonstate actors.12
In the past, f inancial, organizational, technological, and scientif ic hurdles
limited the development and employment of air forces to major powers.13
Today, however, commercial drones repurposed for military use offer
an affordable entry point into the air domain. These simple-to-operate
systems have placed advanced capabilities in the hands of any adversary
for a few thousand dollars or less, while the Internet has given millions
of people easy access to information about how to repurpose commercial
drones for military applications.14
America’s strategic competitors also seek to exploit these developments.
Both Russia and China have made large investments in high-end,
asymmetric capabilities for exploiting the air littoral in future fights—
whether they are conducting proxy wars or large-scale conventional
conflicts. 15 In 2019, Russia announced plans to add more than 300
short-range drones annually to its already large fleet to outfit its ground
forces with small, cheap drones armed with miniature bombs. 16 In
eastern Ukraine, since 2014, Russian-backed fighters have used multiple
drones, flying at different altitudes over target areas, to spot for artillery. 17
Similarly, the Chinese have begun to integrate smaller, tactical drones
into their tactical firepower targeting and damage assessments. 18 Most
worrying for the United States is the potential curtailing of the military’s

12. T. X. Hammes, “Technologies Converge and Power Diffuses: The Evolution of Small, Smart, and
Cheap Weapons,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis, no. 786 (2016); T. X. Hammes, “Cheap Technology Will
Challenge US Tactical Dominance,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 81 (2016): 76–85; T. X. Hammes, Deglobalization
and International Security (Amherst, NY: Cambria Press, 2019); Audrey Kurth Cronin, Power to the People:
How Open Technological Innovation is Arming Tomorrow’s Terrorists (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019);
and Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Technology and Strategic Surprise: Adapting to an Era of Open Innovation,”
Parameters 50, no. 3 (2020): 71–84. See also Alexander Boroff, “What Is Great-Power Competition, Anyway?”
Modern War Institute, April 17, 2020, https://mwi.usma.edu/great-power-competition-anyway/.
13. Sebastian Ritchie, Industry and Air Power: The Expansion of British Aircraft Production, 1935–41 (London:
Routledge, 1997); and Ferenc A. Vajda and Peter Dancey, German Aircraft Industry and Production, 1933–1945
(Warrendale, PA: SAE International, 1998).
14. Anne Stenerson, “The Internet: A Virtual Training Camp?,” Terrorism and Political Violence 20, no. 2 (2008):
215–33; and Marcus Schulzke, “Drone Proliferation and the Challenge of Regulating Dual-Use Technologies,”
International Studies Review 21, no. 3 (2019): 497–517.
15. Tyrone L. Groh, Proxy War: The Least Bad Option (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2019); and
Andreas Krieg and Jean-Marc Rickli, Surrogate Warfare: The Transformation of War in the Twenty-First Century
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2019).
16. Patrick Tucker, “Russian Troops Will Be Getting Tactical Bomb Drones,” Defense One, July 2, 2019, https://
www.defenseone.com/technology/2019/07/russian-troops-will-be-getting-tactical-bomb-drones/158179/.
17. Phillip A. Karber, “Lessons Learned from the Russo-Ukrainian War: Personal Observations,” Historical
Lessons Learned Workshop, sponsored by Johns Hopkins Applied Physical Laboratory & US Army Capabilities
Center (July 8, 2015), 12–16.
18. Elsa Kania, The PLA’s Unmanned Aerial Systems: New Capabilities for a “New Era” of Chinese Military
Power (Montgomery, AL: China Aerospace Studies Institute, 2018), 3–16.
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ability to provide effective support to US, allied, and partner ground forces
from the skies above.

Contesting the Air Littoral
By combining old and new technologies in innovative ways,
adversaries will vie for control of the air littoral. Clusters of technological
breakthroughs in nanotechnology, additive manufacturing (3D printing),
materials science, robotics, and quantum computing will allow the
employment of numerous small, cheap, smart, and highly lethal weapons. 19
Beyond the power of sheer numbers, swarms of autonomous systems
could confer qualitative advantages against lower numbers of exquisite US
weapon platforms.20
Swarm attacks complicate defenses because these systems disperse
across the battlespace, quickly massing at chosen moments to strike, before
swiftly breaking off and dispersing until the next attack. As Paul Scharre
explains, “rather than fighting against a formation,” the defender “faces an
insuppressible collection of targets that are, seemingly, everywhere and
nowhere at once.”21 For example, swarms of lethal miniature aerial munitions,
also known as loitering munitions, might “mine” the airspace, lying in wait to
collide with high-value US weapons systems, like fighter jets and bombers.22
The mere threat of collision could be enough to deny that airspace to
expensive fifth- or sixth-generation fighters, which would allow the enemy
to access and exploit the airspace to conduct quick strikes against military
bases, airfields, and logistical rear areas.23 The low profiles and small
signatures of these systems will also make them hard to detect and track,

19. Klaus Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution (New York: Crown Business, 2016), 1; and Hammes, “Cheap
Technology,” 77–80.
20. Christian Brose, “The New Revolution in Military Affairs: War’s Sci-Fi Future,” Foreign Affairs 98,
no. 3 (May/June 2019): 122–34; and Paul Scharre, Robotics on the Battlefield, Part II: The Coming Swarm
(Washington, DC: Center for New American Security, 2014), 16–18. See also John W. R. Lepingwell, “The
Laws of Combat?: Lanchester Reexamined,” International Security 12, no. 1 (1987): 89–134.
21. Scharre, Robotics on the Battlefield, 29. See also Paul Scharre and Michael D. Horowitz, An Introduction to
Autonomy in Weapon Systems (Washington, DC: Center for New American Security, 2015); M. L. Cummings,
Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Warfare, research paper (London: Chatham House, 2017); Paul Scharre,
Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2018); and
Benjamin M. Jensen, Christopher Whyte, and Scott Cuomo, “Algorithms at War: The Promise, Peril, and
Limits of Artificial Intelligence,” International Studies Review 22, no. 3 (2020): 526–50.
22. Leslie F. Hauck III and John P. Geis II, “Air Mines: Countering the Drone Threat to Aircraft,”
Air and Space Power Journal 31, no. 1 (2017): 28; and Ashley May, “Drones Can Do Serious Damage to
Airplanes, Video Shows,” USA Today, October 17, 2018, https://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/nation-now
/2018/10/17/drones-crashing-into-airplanes-quadcopters-damage-video/1657112002/.
23. J. Noel Williams, “Killing Sanctuary: The Coming Era of Small, Smart, Pervasive Lethality,” War on
the Rocks, September 8, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/09/killing-sanctuary-the-coming-era-of-small
-smart-pervasive-lethality/.
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complicating defensive efforts.24 China is actively pursuing such capabilities,
having recently tested a swarm of 48 so-called “kamikaze drones” loaded
with high-explosive warheads and launched from a truck and helicopter.25
Possession of these capabilities is not limited to near-peer competitors.
The commercial development of low-cost, lightweight advanced sensors and
the spread of AI surveillance technology and small drones will place these
systems within the reach of most combatants.26
These threats will converge at the boundary between the ground and
the blue skies, where high-end air assets typically operate, and transform
what Giulio Douhet referred to as the “coastline of the air” into a
“contested zone,” where adversaries can dispute control of the air.27 This area of
convergence and contestation constitutes the air littoral.28

A New Paradigm in Air Superiority
To address these threats successfully, military planners must reconceptualize
air control as a “volume rather than a flat bounded plane.” 29 In the past,
control of the air was won or lost in the blue skies: obtaining superiority
over the theater of operations generally amounted to control over all
the altitudes. But air control was never absolute. For example, even after
the Allies gained air superiority over Europe in 1944–45, the German
Luftwaffe still managed to cause tactical problems for ground troops. The
overall effect, however, was negligible. 30 US doctrine has traditionally
reflected these realities, conceiving the degree of air control as a simple
function of time and lateral space. Such characterizations are increasingly
outmoded; control of the air littoral is rapidly decoupling from that of
the blue skies. 31 Accordingly, the concept of air control must evolve into a
24. Alexis C. Madrigal, “Drone Swarms Are Going to Be Terrifying and Hard to Stop,” Atlantic,
March 7, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/03/drone-swarms-are-going-to-be
-terrifying/555005/.
25. David Hambling, “China Releases Video of New Barrage Swarm Drone Launcher,” Forbes,
October 14, 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2020/10/14/china-releases-video-of-new
-barrage-swarm-drone-launcher/?sh=3121d6892ad7.
26. Steven Feldstein, The Global Expansion of AI Surveillance (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2019), https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/09/17/global-expansion-of-ai-surveillance
-pub-79847.
27. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History,
1983), 17. The term contested zone comes from Barry R. Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military
Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,” International Security 28, no. 1 (Summer 2003): 22–24.
28. This definition draws from the Joint doctrinal definitions of the maritime littorals. See JCS, Joint
Maritime Operations, JP 3-32 (Washington, DC: JCS, 2018), I-5, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents
/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_32pa.pdf.
29. Alison J. Williams, “Reconceptualising Spaces of the Air: Performing the Multiple Spatialities of UK
Military Airspaces,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 36, no. 2 (2011): 256.
30. Thomas Hughes, Over Lord: General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Airpower in World War II
(New York: Free Press, 1995).
31. Hurst, “Small Unmanned Aerial Systems,” 28.
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more complex understanding, as a volume, localized in time, equidistant
plane, and altitude. 32
This reconceptualization shows the urgent need to modify the air tasking
order. The 72-hour tasking and planning cycle of the Air Operations
Center will be too slow and inflexible to define operations effectively in
a highly dynamic environment. The increasingly contested air littoral will
require closer cooperation and coordination at lower echelons of command
across all services and forces, necessitating the delegation and dispersion
of Air Operations Center and air tasking order responsibilities authorities.
Importantly, conceptualizing air control as a volume highlights critical
differences between the blue skies and the air littoral in four key areas:
vertical and temporal compression, airspace congestion, theater- and
operational-level assessment and planning, and domain convergence.
First, compared to the blue skies, the air littoral is a relatively narrow
flight corridor, confined by terrain and other vertical obstacles posing unique
operational challenges.33 Flying at low altitudes places aircraft within range of
ground-based attacks and renders them more vulnerable by restricting the field
of vision and making it harder to detect incoming threats. Further, the
compressed size of the littoral offers little reaction time, as the short vertical
distances within the littoral critically reduce the window for deploying
evasive countermeasures to battlefield threats, such as loitering swarms of
mini-drones launched from backpacks.34 Significantly, the high speeds and
long-turn radii typical of fifth- and sixth-generation fighters and bombers
reduce their maneuverability and agility in confined airspaces like the air
littoral, rendering them less effective and thus exposing a critical gap in US
air superiority.35
Second, compared to the blue skies, the air littoral is a high-density
threat environment. As US air assets fly at lower altitudes over enemy-held
territories, the airspace will approximate an “aerial minefield.”36 The small size
and proximity of the airspace to the land domain will enable adversaries to
mobilize and coordinate a defensive response, much as the maritime littoral
confers a home-court advantage to coastal defenders. Operating in the air
littoral will require US forces to maintain a constant, all-domain, and
32. JCS, Joint Air Operations, I-1.
33. JCS, Joint Urban Operations, JP 3-06 (Washington, DC: JCS, 2013), I-3, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36
/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_06.pdf.
34. H. G., “Ruffling Feathers: Why Drones Could Pose a Greater Risk to Aircraft Than Birds,” Economist,
January 26, 2018, https://www.economist.com/gulliver/2018/01/26/why-drones-could-pose-a-greater-risk-to
-aircraft-than-birds.
35. Federal Aviation Administration, Pilot’s Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge, FAA-H-8083-25B (Oklahoma
City, OK: US Department of Transportation, 2016), 14–41.
36. Posen, “Command of the Commons,” 22–30.
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multidimensional state of alert.37 Moreover, coordination challenges will
intensify. Enemy threats and the increasing frequency with which other services,
allies and partners, and commercial actors operate in and through the air littoral
will complicate the operational environment. As the categorical distinction
between unmanned aircraft and cruise missile vanishes, the military will
need more than increasingly complicated procedural control measures for
coordinating airspace control and joint fires support. Large numbers of manned
and unmanned aerial systems will require real-time integration and deconfliction
with numerous ground-based assets capable of massing large volumes of
long- and mid-range fires. To better coordinate both tactical airspace and
cross-domain fires, the United States may well need to expand the Joint
Air-Ground Integration Center, including the Air Support Operations Center,
down to the battalion or even company level.38
Third, the absence of a fixed enemy order of battle will complicate
theater- and operational-level assessment and planning. During the Cold
War, the United States could build a reasonably accurate enemy order of
battle and assume adversaries would become less effective over time as their
capabilities degraded and they were forced to focus more on defense and
rebuilding their capabilities. However, as adversaries begin to use 3D printing
to regenerate small aerial drone and other weapons capabilities quickly and
field them as fast as the rate of attrition, these assumptions will no longer
hold. In this operating environment, a linear air superiority doctrine—
the axiomatic belief in the need for a dedicated air superiority campaign to
seize and maintain control of the skies before executing other missions—will be
ineffective. Instead, the US air superiority paradigm must adapt to a real-time and
localized model of air control, capable of achieving a protective bubble around
ground forces and manned air assets at critical battlefield moments.
Finally, the air littoral, in traversing the air and land domains, increases
interactions and interdependencies between those domains. Traditionally, each
military service has focused on achieving dominance in its primary warfare
domain. The Army sought to occupy and control territory through land actions,
the Navy to command the high seas through fleet engagements, and the Air
Force to gain air supremacy through offensive air operations. The challenge from
the start was that no domain was wholly distinct from the others, such that
each service sought to expand its reach into the other domains, albeit part of a
single-domain orientation. The Army might use the air domain to employ
37. For a similar argument about the maritime littoral, see Yedidia Ya’ari, “The Littoral Arena: A Word of
Caution,” Naval War College Review 48, no. 2 (1995): 3.
38. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), The Joint Air Ground Integration Center, Army Techniques
Publication (ATP) 3-91.1/Air Force Tactics Techniques Procedures (AFTTP) 3-2.86 (Washington, DC: HQDA,
April 2019).
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rockets and artillery to wear down an adversary’s ground defenses. Similarly,
the Air Force might attack enemy air bases and ground-based radar systems
to suppress sortie generation.39 Even as the concept of “jointness” was born to
better coordinate such actions, the boundaries between the domains and the
domain-centric service structures remained firmly intact.40 The historical exception
was the seam between the land and sea domains, where the Army and Navy
meet in the maritime littorals, leading the Marine Corps to specialize in this
trans-domain environment.41
The Army and Air Force adopted a different solution, based on differentiating
the roles and missions of each service. As codified in the Key West Agreement,
the Army retained organic air assets such as helicopters, surface-to-air missiles,
and antiaircraft artillery, while the Air Force gained control of all strategic air
assets and fixed-wing tactical air support.42 This uneasy compromise has often
been a source of interservice friction. Increased interactions and interdependencies
between the Army and the Air Force lay bare the fiction of domain separation
in the air littoral. Although the solution is not a new Air Littoral Force, akin
to the Marines in the maritime littoral, the Navy and Marine Corps concept
of composite warfare has significant applicability to the air littoral, particularly
as an alternative model for addressing Army–Air Force jurisdictional problems.43

Vertical Reciprocity or Rivalry?
Exploiting the “vertical reciprocity” between the air and ground will confer
significant operational and tactical advantages. But it is also certain to resurrect
past Army–Air Force disputes about service roles, missions, and doctrine.44 By
exploiting the air littoral, land forces will be able to attack from multiple directions
and threaten adversaries with vertical envelopment.45 This ability to maneuver in
the air littoral will increase the defensive challenge for ground forces, who will
confront a “spherical challenge,” with threats in both the horizontal and vertical

39. Everett Carl Dolman, Pure Strategy: Power and Principle in the Space and Information Age (New York: Frank
Cass, 2005), 30–35.
40. William Dries, “Some New, Some Old, All Necessary: The Multi-Domain Imperative,” War on the
Rocks, March 27, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/03/some-new-some-old-all-necessary-the-multi
-domain-imperative/.
41. The authors thank Lieutenant Colonel Michael Kreuzer for suggesting this term.
42. Kenneth W. Condit, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy,
Volume 2 – 1947–1949 (Washington, DC: Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, 1996), 95–96.
43. Department of the Navy, Composite Warfare: Maritime Operations at the Tactical Level of War, Navy Warfare
Publication (NWP) 3-56 (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, December 2015).
44. Peter Adey, Aerial Life: Spaces, Mobilities, Affects (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 2.
45. George M. Dougherty, “Ground Combat Overmatch through Control of the Atmospheric Littoral,”
Joint Forces Quarterly 94, no. 3 (2019): 54–73; and Jules Hurst, “Robotic Swarms in Offensive Maneuver,”
Joint Forces Quarterly 87, no. 4 (2017): 105–11.

TOC

76

Parameters 51(4) Winter 2021–22

dimensions.46 Brigadier General Walter T. Rugen, director of the US Army’s
Future Vertical Lift Cross Function Team, asserts the Army’s exploitation of the
“lower tier of the air domain” could well be “decisive” in future wars, allowing Army
aviation to “hide in the clutter, show up at the time and place of our choosing to
really create chaos in the enemy’s decision cycle.”47
With adversaries seeking these same advantages, however, US ground
forces may well come under aerial attack. US Air Force Chief of Staff
General Charles Q. Brown Jr. reminds, “For decades, American, allied, and
partner warfighters have felt safe with top cover and strategic deterrence
our air forces have provided . . . These assumptions no longer hold true
today.”48 An increasingly accessible and contested air littoral stands between
the ground and the blue skies, threatening to eliminate effective Air Force
top cover.
With US aircraft operating in the blue skies, the Air Force will
become less responsive to the needs of land forces.49 Anticipating this
prospect, the Army has begun to expand its air and missile defenses, growing
the number of short-range air defense battalions, adding missile-hauling
Stryker vehicles, and assigning Stinger teams to support maneuver units. 50
At the same time, the Army seeks to develop long-range, land-based
missiles, such as precision-strike missiles, long-range hypersonic weapons,
and “Strategic Long-Range Cannon[s].” 51 Every indication is that the
Army seeks to operate in and contest the air littoral as a secondary line of
effort to preserve freedom of movement. As the Army incorporates more

46. Kobi Barak, “The Sky is No Longer the Limit: The Need for a Ground Forces UAV Fleet and
Multi-Dimensional Warfare Capabilities,” Dado Center Journal, 11-12 (2017): 38–60, 40.
47. Garrett Reim, “US Army to Exploit Crucial Weaknesses in Russian, Chinese Air Defences,” Flight
Global, September 24, 2020, https://www.flightglobal.com/helicopters/us-army-to-exploit-crucial-weakness-in
-russian-chinese-air-defences/140311.article.
48. Charles Q. Brown Jr., Accelerate Change or Lose (Washington, DC: US Air Force, 2020), 3,
https://www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/2020SAF/ACOL_booklet_FINAL_13_Nov_1006_WEB.pdf.
49. See Kamal J. Kaaoush, “The Best Aircraft for Close Air Support in the Twenty-First Century,” Air and
Space Power Journal 30, no. 3 (2016): 39–53, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals
/Volume-30_Issue-3/F-Kaaoush.pdf.
50. US Army, Army Air and Missile Defense 2028 (Huntsville, AL: US Army Air and Missile Defense
Integration Division, 2019), https://www.smdc.army.mil/Portals/38/Documents/Publications/Publications
/SMDC_0120_AMD-BOOK_Finalv2.pdf; and Gary Sheftick, “Army Rebuilding Short-Range Air Defense,”
Army News Service, July 3, 2019, https://www.army.mil/article/224074/army_rebuilding_short_range
_air_defense.
51. Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army Building 1,000-Mile Supergun,” Breaking Defense, October 11, 2018,
https://breakingdefense.com/2018/10/army-builds-1000-mile-supergun/; and L. Neil Thurgood, “Hypersonics
by 2023,” Army AL&T Magazine, September 4, 2019, https://asc.army.mil/web/news-alt-ond19-hypersonics
-by-2023/.
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organic air assets, however, it will surely resurrect past disputes with the
Air Force about service roles and missions. 52
More fundamentally, it will place the Army and Air Force’s different
concepts of control in conflict, specifically notions of persistent occupation
versus responsive presence. Military theorists and practitioners have
long recognized the land and air domains have different operational
advantages and limitations. In the land domain, the primary objective is
to conquer and control territory, with armies still the main instrument for
achieving that end. Indeed, armies are unique from navies and air forces,
in that they are the only service able to provide a permanent occupation
force in their primary domain. 53 In the words of Clausewitz, armies can
“stand fast, as it were, rooted to the ground.” To be sure, armies still must
move and maneuver—what Clausewitz termed “the essence of attack”—
but terrain, topographical features, and logistical networks impose
significant constraints on speed, mobility, and maneuverability. 54 Control
of the land domain is thus a function of the persistent occupation
of territory, conferring to the Army battlefield advantages while
simultaneously denying adversaries freedom of movement across the
same ground.
In contrast, the Air Force concept of control in the air domain centers
on responsive presence, not persistent occupation. Unlike armies, air forces
cannot live in their primary domain, as aircraft and crews must eventually
land to rest, refuel, and refit; the occupation of airspace may occur for a
time, but it is ephemeral. 55 What airpower offers instead are rapid and
lethal presence and the ability of aircraft and other airborne systems to
bypass terrain that would otherwise impede the movements of ground
forces for the quick delivery of effects across great distances.56 Control of the air
domain is thus mainly a function of the ability of air forces to access and

52. Valerie Insinna, “Air Force General Says of Army’s Long Range Precision Fires Goal: ‘It’s stupid’,”
Defense News, April 2, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/air/2021/04/02/air-force-general-says-of-armys
-long-range-precision-fires-goal-its-stupid/; Robert Brown, “AUSA Fires Back at Air Force: Long-Range
Missiles Aren’t ‘Stupid’,” Breaking Defense, April 6, 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/04/ausa-fires-back
-at-air-force-long-range-missiles-arent-stupid/.
53. Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, reprint (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute Press,
1988), 16.
54. Clausewitz, On War, 285.
55. Phillip S. Meilinger, “Ten Propositions about Airpower” (student paper, Washington, DC: Air University,
1995), 2.
56. Douhet, Command of the Air, 7–9.
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exploit the domain at a required time and place while denying those same
advantages to the adversary. 57
These differing Army and Air Force concepts of control will inevitably
come to the fore as the air littoral grows more congested and contested.
Put simply, in responding to the threat, the Army is more likely to strive
for control of the air littoral through localized persistent occupation,
while the Air Force is more likely to pursue control through rapid
presence to provide time-bound denial and fires. Thus, the Army is likely
to expand its organic air defense capabilities to create a persistent air
umbrella over its ground forces. By deploying drone swarms as an
occupying force in the air littoral, the Army could gain localized air
superiority and persistent aerial cover. General Kobi Barak, the former
chief of Israeli Defense Force’s ground forces, envisions “a type of
mission-specific Iron Dome that could provide tactical protection for
assembly areas, for forces preparing for an assault and for forward
command centers and others.” 58 A continuous aerial umbrella could also
create kinetic and non-kinetic effects from the air, including persistent
close-air support for ground forces.
Indeed, the Army is urgently developing a future system, Air-Launched
Effects, which will launch swarms of mini-drones to blanket the battlefield
with lethal and nonlethal fire. 59 Short of the Air Force ceding the air
superiority mission in the air littoral to the Army, the growing mission
overlap will cause a clash of air-centric and land-centric concepts of
control. Closing this seam before adversaries can exploit it is imperative.
The future contested environment demands the development of novel
operational concepts.

Conclusion
This new and unprecedented littoral challenge to US air superiority
calls for more than technological solutions. It requires a profound
paradigm change in US military thinking about the air domain. To this
end, we propose the US military update concepts of air control to account
for a third dimension, that of vertical space, thus localizing air control in
time, lateral space, and altitude. This reconceptualization directs attention
to critical differences between the blue skies and the air littoral, including
57. JCS, Joint Air Operations, I-I.
58. Barak, “Sky No Longer the Limit,” 41.
59. Jared Keller, “The Army Is Going All In on a Drone Swarm to Back Up Its Next-Generation
Helicopters,” Task and Purpose, August 25, 2020, https://taskandpurpose.com/news/army-drone-swarm-air
-launched-effects-contracts/.
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temporal and spatial compression, airspace congestion, theater- and
operational-level assessment and planning, and domain convergence. With
the air littoral traversing the air and land domains, the Army and the Air
Force urgently need to close the gap between air-centric and land-centric
concepts of control.
The first requirement should be the development of a roles and missions
commission to conduct a comprehensive review of existing service roles
and missions. The 1948 Key West Agreement (defining roles and missions)
and the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization
Act (delineating service and regional combatant command responsibilities)
helped contain interservice rivalry and built jointness. These roles and
mission compromises, however, are increasingly misaligned with the
emerging trans-domain operational environment. The commission should
focus on capability gaps and battlespace seams associated with zones
of domain convergence, such as the air littoral, and better delineation
of responsibilities for long-range fires, air defense, and cross-domain
command, coordination, and control.
The second requirement should be the development of Joint doctrine
for the air littoral. Military leadership should clearly identify different
types of air littoral operations and schemes of vertical maneuver and
explore new organizational structures based on functional commands,
such as composite warfare. Presently, the services are focused on
technological solutions, specifically countering unmanned aerial systems.
Gaining a competitive advantage in the air littoral, however, will
also require reconciling the Army and Air Force’s different concepts
of control—whether the air littoral requires persistent occupation or
a responsive presence capable of achieving localized air superiority at
critical battlefield moments.
Above all, both services must think more vertically. For nearly four
decades, both services have primarily concentrated on the horizontal
plane or the lateral distance from the enemy. Recent discussions of the
anti-access and area-denial challenge in the Indo-Pacific region follow
a similar pattern. 60 The contemporary operating environment, however,
requires an expanded multidimensional framework. The anti-access
and area-denial threat aims to push American power projection forces
outside their combat effective ranges, both laterally and vertically. The
60. Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, “Future Warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese Antiaccess/Area
Denial, U.S. AirSea Battle, and Command of the Commons in East Asia,” International Security 41, no. 1
(2016): 7–48.
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democratization of the air littoral represents the core vertical challenge, as
it significantly expands the battlespace from the US and allied perspective.
For ground forces, the close battle now includes not only the area
immediately in front of ground troops, but also the area immediately
above them. Similarly, the deep battle is the area well ahead and well
above the most forward-deployed ground forces. For air operations,
the fundamental challenge is no longer rapidly closing the distance to
conduct effective operations; it is vertical mobility and cross-domain fires.
Visualizing either the ground or air fights laterally is no longer adequate.
The military services must develop a new Joint all-domain framework grounded in
both horizontal and vertical spaces.
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ABSTR ACT: Colin S. Gray distinguished himself from other scholars
in the f ield of strategic studies with his belief that grand strateg y is
indispensable, complex, and inherently agential. This article identifies key
themes, continuities, conceptual relationships, and potential discontinuities
from his decades of grand strategic thought. Gray’s statement that “all
strategy is grand strategy” remains highly relevant today, emphasizing the
importance of agential context in military environments—a point often
neglected in strategic practice.

W

ith a career spanning from 1970 to his death in 2020,
Colin S. Gray was a titan of modern strategic studies. His
contributions to the field touched on most of the myriad
dimensions of strategy and may be all but unsurpassable. He was also greatly
respected as a scholar of grand strategy, though it was never the main
subject of his books or articles. Much of his work frequently referenced grand
strategy as a higher form of strategy, at times equivalent to statecraft.
This article compiles, organizes, and reconstructs Gray’s overall grand
strategic thought over the decades, identifying key themes, continuities,
conceptual relationships, and potential discontinuities. It argues Gray’s
conception of grand strategy emphasizes the agential context of military
strategy. War is more than a simple military contest: it inherently involves
nonmilitary forms ofpower. Grand strategy as agential context is an essential
reminder to military strategists the polity they represent can employ other
methods—economic, diplomatic, and so forth—to wage war, and it is vital
the various agencies wielding these dissimilar forms of power do not work at
cross-purposes.

Gray’s conception of grand strategy contradicts the mainstream
interpretation particularly favored in the United States, in which grand
strategy is identified as the master of policy. This view gained credence
following Paul Kennedy’s well-known remark that grand strategy “was
about the evolution and integration of policies that should operate for
decades, or even centuries.” 1 Some scholars are wary of the expansiveness
of this definition. Colin Dueck has carefully argued “grand strategy is not
1. Paul Kennedy, “Grand Strategy in War and Peace: Toward a Broader Definition,” in Grand Strategies in War
and Peace, ed. Paul Kennedy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), 4.
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synonymous with foreign policy in general,” even though he also suggests
“[i]t includes peacetime as well as wartime policymaking.” 2 Most scholars,
however, have embraced it enthusiastically. Christopher Layne asserts,
“[G]rand strategy is about determining a state’s vital interest—those
important enough to fight over—and its role in the world.” 3 More recently,
Charles Martel has argued, “In effect, strategy tells us what policies to
pursue, whereas foreign policy is about the how to do so. Missing is the
broad question of why the state pursues such policies using particular
strategies, which is the precise function of grand strategy.”4 In placing
grand strategy above policy, authors have essentially turned it into ideology;
particular grand strategies are specific ways of interacting with the rest
of the world for the sake of interacting with the world in that specific
way.5 As a crucial side effect, “[s]cholars—and, too often, policymakers—
sometimes skip this step [of performing grand strategy] on the implicit
assumption that if the plan is good enough, implementation will work
itself out.”6

Basic Views on Grand Strategy
To appreciate Gray’s recurring invocations of grand strategy, one must
begin with his basic views on the concept. His fundamental understanding
of grand strategy has four dimensions: (1) the awareness that, in some ways,
grand strategy is a compromise; (2) his preferred definition and what it
encompasses; (3) the relationship between grand strategy and the general
theory of strategy; and (4) the indispensability of grand strategy. These
underlying perspectives set up all further elaborations.
Although Gray referenced grand strategy in earlier writings, after the end
of the Cold War he came to believe it could serve as a compromise between
two disparate scholarly camps. One camp, strategic studies, emphasized
the continued relevance of military strategy, despite the relative peace of
the 1990s. The other camp, security studies, argued military power was no
longer relevant and the security agenda needed to be broadened to encompass
myriad forms of security.7 Gray recognized grand strategy as a compromise
2. Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2008), 10, 11.
3. Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present, Cornell Studies in
Security Affairs (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 13.
4. William C. Martel, Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice: The Need for an Effective American Foreign
Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 4.
5. Adam Elkus, “Must American Strategy Be Grand?,” Infinity Journal 3, no. 1 (Winter 2012): 24–28.
6. Paul D. Miller, American Power & Liberal Order: A Conservative Internationalist Grand Strategy
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016), 221.
7. Joshua Rovner, “Warring Tribes Studying War and Peace,” War on the Rocks, April 12, 2016, https://
warontherocks.com/2016/04/warring-tribes-studying-war-and-peace/.
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position for accepting the broadening—but not demilitarization—
of security. 8 This compromise understanding immediately separated
Gray from scholars following the mainstream, academic, international
relations–inspired approach to the field, which broadly defines grand strategy
as the framework into which foreign policy fits.9
This middle way inspired Gray’s favored definition of grand strategy:
“The direction and use made of any or all among the total assets of a
security community in support of its policy goals as decided by politics.
The theory and practice of grand strategy is the theory and practice of
statecraft itself.” 10 This description is broadly identical to his definition
of strategy: “By strategy I mean the use that is made of force and the threat of
force for the ends of policy.” 11 Though similar, there are key differences.
The first obvious difference is breadth. Grand strategy simply
encompasses many more instruments of power than does strategy. Indeed,
Gray suggests grand strategy is statecraft itself, which seems potentially at
odds with his view of grand strategy as a middle way which provides a role for
the military. Statecraft does not inherently require a military dimension in
conception or specific practice and so seems closer to security studies than
a middle way, which also encompasses military power. On the other hand,
Gray did not specifically clarify whether or not any particular practice of
grand strategy required the use of military power. While his writings never
considered grand strategy without a military dimension, this absence could
be due to the fact that strategy, rather than grand strategy, was almost always
his primary topic. Considering statecraft without a military dimension in
specific contexts was beyond the scope of Gray’s writing but not beyond the
scope of the concept.
The second difference concerns political direction. According to Gray,
strategy was instrumental without any control over the overall purpose, while
grand strategy also encompassed some degree of political direction over that
purpose. The inclusion of direction establishes grand strategy as a level of
analysis distinct from and superior to strategy. It also brings grand strategy
closer to policy, which provides guidance for and direction of strategy.
The third difference between Gray’s conceptions of strategy and grand
strategy is the latter controls all instruments of national power, rather
8. Colin S. Gray, “Approaching the Study of Strategy,” in International Security and War: Politics and Grand
Strategy in the 21st Century, ed. Ralph Rotte and Christoph Schwarz (New York: Nova Science Publishers,
2011), 17.
9. See Hal Brands, What Good is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman
to George W. Bush (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), 86.
10. Colin S. Gray, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 18.
11. Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 17.
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than military force alone. He rarely enumerated the instruments of grand
strategy, however, and was largely content with describing them as the
total power available a polity. He provided a taxonomy of grand strategy
only once, identifying the instruments of statecraft as diplomacy; trade and
investment; economic and financial assistance; propaganda, information, and
education; cultural inf luence; espionage, covert action, and political warfare;
military assistance and arms sales; military power (threat or use of force);
arms control; peacekeeping; and humanitarian assistance.12 Notably, the list
included positive inducements (such as various forms of assistance) as well as
coercion, marking another difference between the coercive logic of strategy
and grand strategy.
Nonetheless, Gray was adamant strategy and grand strategy should
only be understood through the general theory of strategy, although again
this statement may contradict other claims concerning grand strategy’s
equivalence with statecraft. “The general theory of strategy covers
both grand and military strategy.” 13 The sibling relationship between
strategy and grand strategy has three conceptual consequences. First,
“[g]rand-strategic and military-strategic analyses interpenetrate . . . When,
acting grand-strategically, policymakers select the mix of instruments
they will employ, that selection must be inf luenced critically by the
plausibility of the competing promises of net strategic effectiveness.” 14
The interpenetration of strategy and grand strategy is a recurring theme.
The second conceptual consequence is that both grand strategy and
strategy are performative. Neither is simply about choices but also about
how effectively those choices are implemented. “All military strategists,
and most grand strategists, cannot perform their duties unless their
schemes, great and small, are done, ‘in the field,’ by soldiers willing to
be led in that physically and psychologically horrendous circumstance of
the most acute personal peril.” 15 Notwithstanding the reference to specific
military implementation, Gray believed performance was equally crucial
for nonmilitary power.
The third conceptual consequence is, like strategy, grand strategy
suffers from what Gray called the currency conversion problem. “The
trouble is that there is a radical difference in nature, in kind, between
violence and political consequence . . . this dilemma of currency conversion
12. Colin S. Gray, Explorations in Strategy (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), 87.
13. Gray, Strategy Bridge, 19.
14. Gray, Explorations in Strategy, 86–87.
15. Gray, Strategy Bridge, 214.
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is central to the difficulty of strategy.” 16 That is, how does a strategist
ensure any action leads toward the desired political consequence? Although
it is fair to assert the currency conversion problem probably aff licts
military power more than nonmilitary power, it is still relevant for grand
strategy. Gray’s exploration of the relationship between strategic theory
and grand strategy cements the differences between his understanding
and that of the American mainstream, which typically ignores issues of
performance and currency conversion.
The final foundational perspective Gray held about grand strategy
was its indispensability, ref lected in the natures of war, the enemy, and
security. Gray asserted, “The necessity for some approximation to a grand
strategy is revealed in literally every conf lict conducted by all societies. In
times of troubled peace as well as actual war, communities do not compete
with their armed forces alone.” 17 Gray recognized the enemy has input into
the course and outcome of war, but he also understood this vote is grand
strategic: “it does not follow that the terms of engagement can be dictated
by American strategy. A smart enemy may succeed in finding ways
to prosecute conf lict asymmetrically, grand strategically and not only
militarily.” 18 To create and exploit asymmetric advantage in war, the
enemy can also employ nonmilitary instruments.
Gray recognized the security problems any polity might face are
inevitably multidimensional—and even if not, good (grand) strategy
would try to overdetermine the outcome anyway, particularly given the
difficulties of currency conversion. Thus, Gray suggested, “US policy and
grand strategy would be all but certain to have to resort to several tools
(for example, diplomacy, economic sanctions or assistance, and possibly
some regular military deployment and maneuvering for political effect).” 19
In contrast to Gray’s belief in the indispensability of grand strategy,
some scholars have proposed alternatives to, or declared the end of,
grand strategy. 20 This divergence stems primarily from basic definitional
differences. Gray considers the employment of nonmilitary instruments
generically mandatory, a sentiment not shared by all scholars or practitioners
toward foreign policy frameworks.
16. Gray, Strategy Bridge, 136.
17. Gray, “Approaching Study of Strategy,” 17.
18. Colin S. Gray, Maintaining Effective Deterrence (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), 37.
19. Gray, Explorations in Strategy, 211.
20. See for example, Daniel W. Drezner, Ronald R. Krebs, and Randall Schweller, “The End of Grand Strategy:
America Must Think Small,” Foreign Affairs 99, no. 3 (May/June 2020): 107–17; and Peter Layton, “Grand
Strategy? What Does That Do for Me?,” Strategist (blog), Australian Strategic Policy Institute, July 23, 2012,
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/grand-strategy-what-does-that-do-for-me/.
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In summary, Gray believed grand strategy: (1) obeys the dicta of the
general theory of strategy even though it is closer to policy than strategy
itself; (2) potentially employs inducements alongside coercion; and
(3) is indispensable. Although there are a few points of potential
inconsistency or vagueness, Gray’s appreciation of grand strategy is
intertwined with his understanding of strategy and war. His writings also
reveal other interesting and important conceptual relationships between
grand strategy and (1) geopolitics and strategic culture; (2) power; (3) war;
and (4) policy. These elements all culminate in a final relationship between
grand strategy and context.

Grand Strategy, Geopolitics, and Culture
Coincident with the first decade of Gray’s career, three big ideas
emerged—or reemerged—within strategic studies: geopolitics, strategic
culture, and grand strategy. 21 Gray’s writings demonstrate close links
between these three concepts, such that it is perhaps impossible to
address one fully without mentioning the other two. This connection is
perhaps most vividly demonstrated in Gray’s 1991 article on geography
and grand strategy, the first substantive section of which focuses on
strategic culture. 22
Gray believed geopolitics and grand strategy are essentially
synonymous, a view he enunciated early in his career. In the introduction
to The Geopolitics of Superpower, he wryly noted, “Had the long-hallowed
British verbal formula of ‘grand strategy’ not been expropriated to such a
persuasive effect by Edward Luttwak, this book might have been called
The Grand Strategy of the United States.” 23 The essential equivalence
between grand strategy and geopolitics is unsurprising given, first, Gray
also equated grand strategy with statecraft and, second, geography is
inescapable: “[a]ll politics is geopolitics,” “[a]ll strategy is geostrategy.” 24
While it does beg the question why he would use two different terms if
they were essentially synonymous, no definitive answer appears in his
published writings.
Geography was also crucial to Gray’s appreciation of strategic culture:
“The first-order subjects of interest to pursuit of the cultural perspective
on strategy have to be geography and history,” and further, “[t]he physical
21. Lukas Milevski, The Evolution of Modern Grand Strategic Thought (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press),
109–10.
22. Colin S. Gray, “Geography and Grand Strategy,” Comparative Strategy 10, no. 4 (1991): 311–29.
23. Colin S. Gray, The Geopolitics of Superpower (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1988), 1.
24. Colin S. Gray, “Inescapable Geography,” Journal of Strategic Studies 22, no. 2–3 (1999): 163.
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geographies of particular security communities, including their spatial
relations in all senses with other communities, always have had a large
inf luence on strategic choice.” 25 Geography shapes preferences; preferences
turn into choice; choices turn into history; and history in turn shapes new
grand strategic preferences. Gray may have been inspired by well-known
British warfare concepts, including a grand strategic–level cultural notion
encompassing not just how to use—and not use—land power and sea power,
but also financial power. Like Gray, authors such as Dueck and Alastair
Iain Johnston identify close relationships between grand strategy and
strategic culture. 26
Yet, this connection with strategic culture also betrays a limitation
of Gray’s grand strategic thought. Gray understood the importance of
tactical performance for strategic success and extended this principle
to grand strategy as well. However, he rarely discussed grand strategic
performance except when military activity contributes to it. Instead, whether
encompassing the cultural dimension of grand strategy explicitly or not, he
focused on the choice of instruments rather than their performance. This
decision indicates the sheer difficulty of studying grand strategy as a middle
way. It requires familiarity, if not mastery, of items in Gray’s taxonomy
of grand strategic instruments—a list which includes wildly varied forms of
power—and how they work. Total mastery requires not only a staggering
array of various expertise, but also the grand strategic imagination to
combine them effectively in thought or practice. The difficulty of this
task—challenging for both Gray and the entire field—is the foremost factor
inhibiting the development of the study of grand strategy.

Grand Strategy and Forms of Power
Although Gray rarely delved into the performativity of nonmilitary
power, he remained aware vital differences existed among the plethora of
instruments and orchestrating them simultaneously within a single conf lict
was a grave challenge.
To solve the question of how to coordinate various forms of power within
a single grand strategic effort, Gray relied on two main starting points. The
first was the role of geography. “The four geophysical environments for
conf lict—land, sea, air, and space—are distinctive as to technologies, tactics
(and hence doctrines, i.e., how to fight), and operational art.” 27 By placing
25. Colin S. Gray, Perspectives on Strategy (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013), 89, 90.
26. Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders; and Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand
Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).
27. Gray, “Geography and Grand Strategy,” 316.
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physical demands and requirements on humans and their technologies,
geography defines how power actually performs in conf lict. It is possible
to speak broadly of military power only to a certain point. Eventually,
geographic specificities dominate and distinguish land power from sea
power, air power, space power, cyber power, and nuclear power. However,
there is still merit in studying military power writ large, as it remains
collectively unique compared to nonmilitary power. 28
Nonetheless, military power does lead to an orchestration problem. It
is not merely a question of how a strategist coordinates various forms of
military power—that is, joint warfare—but of interchangeability: how to
employ military and nonmilitary forms of power. “Instead of the threat or
use of force, the grand strategist may be tempted to wage political,
psychological, subversive, diplomatic, economic, or cultural war. Of
course, the military instrument is wielded to psychological and political
effect, and subversive war naturally must have psychological and
political purposes. Strategic effect is generic.” 29 Although all forms of
power are unique—military forms more so than nonmilitary—their
consequences, in principle, should all be reducible to a unified framework.
While Gray did not truly develop such a unified framework, he did
propose some broad insights. With military issues, he suggested its
uniqueness demanded primacy among instrumental grand strategic
considerations. “Although all of the instruments of policy are important,
when the issue of the day is one of military security, questions of military
strategy will assume preeminent importance. The other tools of statecraft—
diplomacy, propaganda, economic pressure, subversion, and so forth—must
be regarded as supporting elements in a context that privileges military
behavior.” 30 Prescribing nonmilitary instruments a supporting role does not
deny their importance in the conduct of war, however, as they may ease or
unnecessarily exacerbate military strategic tasks.
Gray recognized the primacy of consideration military power enjoys is
limited to outright military conf lict. Polities may conduct conf licts with
and through any of the instruments at their command, and in particular
cases military power may be temporarily excluded. “Just as there are wars
wherein, for example, the maritime or the air element is dominant, so

28. Colin S. Gray, Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims on War, Peace, and Strategy (Westport, CT: Praeger Security
International, 2007), 66.
29. Gray, Modern Strategy, 162. Emphasis added.
30. Gray, Fighting Talk, 72.
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there are conf licts wherein economic, political, or subversive instruments of
grand strategy are accorded the status of leading edge.” 31
While Gray’s engagement with most nonmilitary forms of power ultimately
ended with these observations, he discussed soft power in more detail.
Joseph S. Nye Jr. originated the concept, defining it as “the ability to get what
you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from
the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.”32 While
the original definition has been corrupted over time and the term is now
essentially synonymous with nonmilitary power, Gray engaged with Nye’s
original conception of soft power. Because soft power is uncontrollable, with
a nature that is inherently attractive, rather than coercive or inducing, Gray
questioned whether it could be considered a grand strategic instrument.33
Despite its substantial theoretical and occasional real-world value, it is a form
of power which exists beyond the scope of grand strategy, and perhaps policy
as well. At times, soft power merely happens coincidentally, as an added benefit
to the greater actions of a politician or grand strategist. In the context of the
fungibility of power, it may sometimes achieve sufficient effect to replace partially
or fully the need for some other instrument of power. But no sensible strategist
would ever rely on its chance of occurring.
Gray’s final insight concerning the interchangeability of power is that the
limits of fungibility are manipulatable, and can sometimes be pushed further
than expected:
The substitutes need not even be close in character. Competent strategy
will find alternative means and methods, different people to command,
and uses for machines that their inventors and initial military operators had
not intended, in order to adapt in near real time to the challenge of necessity.
This is not to claim that all military, or grand strategic, assets are fully
fungible; of course, they are not. But the strategist needs to be a creative person,
selected in part for his ability to conceive of different routes to an objective.34

Ultimately, however, Gray left these questions for his successors to
develop: how to comprehend generic strategic effect in a way that encompasses all
forms of power (except soft power), within the full performative dimension.

31. Gray, Modern Strategy, 163.
32. Joseph S. Nye Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), x.
33. Colin S. Gray, Hard Power and Soft Power: The Utility of Military Force as an Instrument of Policy in the 21st
Century (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2011), 30.
34. Gray, Strategy Bridge, 155.
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Grand Strategy, War, and Complexity
Just as warfare occurs in war, with war the superior concept, so too
does (military) strategy occur as part of grand strategy. As Gray points
out, “War is a total relationship—political, legal, social, and military. Warfare
is the conduct of war, generally by military means. A narrow focus upon
warfare proper, which is natural enough for armed forces, can obscure the need
to function grand strategically, in doing which military behavior is only one
dimension of the effort, albeit a vital one.”35 The grand strategic perspective
therefore takes a certain priority, notwithstanding that in war the military
contest is inevitably the most important. Gray suggests this priority is not
necessarily one of significance but of analytical progression. Analysis of a
security challenge begins with grand strategy and incorporates (military)
strategy only once it is politically determined force will be employed.36
The military instrument cannot simply be unleashed on its own, without
first understanding the adversarial challenge and its context. To do so would,
at best, be an inefficient use of a polity’s resources. At worst, it could lead to
defeat or catastrophe.37 Gray’s discussions of grand strategic failures
frequently looked to twentieth-century Germany and the twenty-first-century
United States as examples.
The complexity of grand strategy and war is also reflected in the number
of agents responsible for conceiving and coordinating any grand strategy. This
challenge overshadows the task of coordinating combined arms and joint
warfare because the armed services are closer in perspective to one another
than to nonmilitary perspectives. Moreover, as Gray observes, the coordination
is constant, as the continuous adversarial interaction of war always creates
new challengess:
For a state to function well enough grand strategically, most of its
interconnected parts need to do at least a minimum of what they have to
do at a tolerable level of competence as contributors to a single war effort—
when the grand strategy key is turned. Moreover, someone, actually
several people, processes, and enforcers, are required if a war effort is to be
maintained in the face of surprises.38

35. Colin S. Gray, Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt? (Carlisle, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), 11.
36. Colin S. Gray, Categorical Confusion? The Strategic Implications of Recognizing Challenges Either as Irregular or
Traditional (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), 34.
37. Gray, Fighting Talk, 84.
38. Gray, Strategy Bridge, 129.
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Finally, Gray understood grand strategy often posed a danger to itself
due to its sheer complexity, which could obscure crucial elements of military
power and attendant strategy.39 Gray repeatedly emphasized the importance of
tracking the essential elements of war, even while maintaining awareness of,
and being prepared to act within, the full complexity of grand strategy and war:
If one embraces grand strategy as well as its subordinate military
strategy, the sheer complexity and diversity of agents, agencies, processes,
and happenings, all influenced by enemies, friends, and neutrals, is
apt to amount more to chaos than to order in any sense. Strategic theory
acknowledges complexity, diversity, contingency, the unwelcome influence
of the enemy’s efforts, and so forth. But also it must insist upon the
primary existential significance of an actual story arc to the course of
strategic history.40

Grand Strategy and Policy
The variety of actors involved in grand strategic management—
required both to master the full complexity of war and to direct the multiple
instruments of grand strategy—led Gray to question how to differentiate
policy and grand strategy. He realized his interpretation of grand strategy pushed
it into a rarified conceptual atmosphere, making it at times closer to policy
than to its foundational logic in strategy itself. Hence, he admitted in Strategy
and Politics, “Statesmen and strategists, who might be regarded as behaving
in a common category of responsibility, aspire to nudge their polity’s political
and strategic situation along a path of adequate security. This text is closer in
the spirit and focus to being a study of grand strategy than of strategy
approached narrowly in a strictly military mode.”41
Gray struggled between diverging reality and theory. He admitted
“[g]rand strategy undoubtedly is so close to policy that the two can seem
indistinguishable. There is merit in Clausewitz’s rather more limited,
highly apposite claim that ‘at the highest level the art of war turns into
policy.’ ”42 Elsewhere, Gray tested himself more thoroughly against this line of
thought that the highest levels of strategy become policy:
[E]ven though there is an obvious difference between a policy
goal and a strategy to secure it, the intimacy of the connection
between them is such that one could argue that insistence upon the
39. Gray, Perspectives on Strategy, 157–58.
40. Gray, Strategy Bridge, 176.
41. Colin S. Gray, Strategy and Politics (New York: Routledge, 2016), 8.
42. Gray, Fighting Talk, 84.
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distinction does more harm to understanding than it does good. On
balance, and it is only on balance, this discussion maintains that
the distinction between a policy objective and plans and actions
for its intended achievement is valid, necessary, and sustainable
under critical fire. However, we admit that policy and its
execution should be so closely interwoven and continuously in
dialogue that some apparent fusion of, and confusion between, the
two is always likely. 43

Because Gray’s conclusion acknowledges both the inherent messiness of
warfare in practice while maintaining the necessity of conceptual clarity
in theory, it may prove dissatisfying to some scholars.

Conclusion: Grand Strategy as Agential Context
Gray’s interpretation of grand strategy contains much potential
conceptual depth yet to be explored but which may further develop
grand strategy as an idea. He constantly reaff irmed “grand strategy [was]
an essential level of behaviour in the general theory [of strategy].”44
However, in order to encapsulate the meaning of Gray’s grand strategic
thought within his own thinking, one can rely on another word he used
incessantly: context.
Gray always emphasized the importance of context, which could be
understood as cultural, geographical, political, ethical, and so forth, with
as many potential specif ic contexts as there are dimensions of strategy.
As a context, grand strategy is unique. Unlike every other context or
dimension of strategy, grand strategy can be considered an agential
context. That is, the military agency inherent in strategy is situated
within a broader context of grand strategy def ined by simultaneous and
complementary agencies of nonmilitary power.
Military strategies must be nested in a more inclusive framework,
if only to lighten the burden of support for policy they are required to
bear. A security community cannot design and execute a strictly military
strategy. No matter the character of a conflict, be it a total war for survival
or a contest for limited stakes, even if military activity by far is the most
prominent of official behaviours, there must still be political-diplomatic,
social-cultural, and economic, inter alia, aspects to the war.45

43. Gray, Strategy Bridge, 113.
44. Gray, Strategy Bridge, 28.
45. Gray, Strategy Bridge.
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Within a particular perspective on strategy which emphasizes strategic
agency in war against a specific adversary, grand strategy is the master
context. It encompasses all activity instrumentally relevant to defeating the
enemy. Regardless of how deeply Gray, at any particular point in his
career, delved into considerations and discussions of grand strategy,
its contextual pressure on the practice of strategy is the single most
consistent overarching theme in his grand strategic thought. As a
repetitive drumbeat throughout his writing, this theme was a constant
reminder to his readers that, though military power generally—and rightly—
holds priority in war, it hardly ever produced the desired strategic effects
and ultimate political consequences alone. “No matter how military the
behaviour, and regardless of its geographical focus, all strategy is grand
strategy.”46 Gray’s understanding of grand strategy differs substantially
from mainstream interpretations. While his assertions about the
importance of understanding agential context—particularly the
instrumental agencies surrounding military power—may be regarded as
common sense, they are generally neglected in strategic practice.

Lukas Milevski
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Strategic Thought (2016).
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Sherman and His Historians:
An End to the Outsized Destroyer Myth?
Mitchell G. Klingenberg

ABSTR ACT: For years, scholars have viewed the career of William
Tecumseh Sher ma n in l ight of a n ant iquated dest royer my t h and
neglected his memoirs, which were written as a military textbook. This
essay reviews Sherman’s legacy and literature, both of which contributed
to the advancement of modern militar y thought. His experiences may
serve as a prescriptive text to servicemembers, providing critical lessons
on military warfare and philosophy still relevant today.

W

illiam Tecumseh Sherman emerged from the American
Civil War as a demon who practiced no restraint against
noncombatants. This impression found widespread acceptance,
especially among Lost Cause apologists. More than 150 years after the fact, the
trope that Sherman initiated total war in America has colored popular, scholarly,
and even professional military opinions. Even Henry James—foremost among
literary modernists—regarded Sherman as a terrible “Destroyer.”1 A scholar at
the University of Chicago, writing under the spell of the Lost Cause and in
the shadow of technological advances that marked World War II, claimed “from
the military policies of Sherman and Sheridan there lies but an easy step to
the total war of the Nazis, the greatest affront to Western civilization since
its founding.”2 Charles Royster’s award-winning The Destructive War: William
Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the Americans strengthened this
association between the vengeful prosecution of war in nineteenth-century
America and the federal commander.3 Other historians have perceived total
war—the deliberate targeting of civilians and economic resources—as a
distinctly American phenomenon, and Sherman as its key architect.4 Michael
Fellman, in his critical psychohistory of Sherman, depicts the general as full
of bloodlust and as a near lunatic who celebrated the destruction he wrought.5
The author is grateful to Thomas Bruscino, Wayne Wei-siang Hsieh, and Steven Woodworth for reading this
essay and offering helpful comments for its revision. He is especially grateful to Antulio J. Echevarria II for
inviting its submission.
1. Henry James, The American Scene (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1907), 167.
2. Richard M. Weaver, “Southern Chivalry and Total War,” Sewanee Review 53, no. 2 (Spring 1945): 277.
3. Charles Royster, The Destructive War: William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the Americans (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991).
4. Lance Janda, “Shutting the Gates of Mercy: The American Origins of Total War, 1860–1880,” Journal of
Military History 59, no. 1 (January 1995): 7–26; and T. Harry Williams, The History of American Wars: From 1745 to
1918 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981), 312.
5. Michael Fellman, Citizen Sherman: A Life of William Tecumseh Sherman (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,
1995).
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Scholars no longer regard the Civil War as total, a revision that should
have absolved Sherman of waging limitless war against the South as his
fiercest critics alleged, yet students of the general seem unable to escape the
destroyer myth.6 Some have added nuance to old views and conclude Sherman’s
hard-war policies were grounded in his tremendous intellect, respect for law,
intuitive grasp of modern democracies at war, or grand strategic vision.7 Others
have breathed new life into the destroyer narrative. For example, a student
monograph from the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies claimed
federal operational and strategic ends necessitated Sherman’s use of total war.8
Predictably, in writing against old myths, or in refashioning them, scholars have
added to their durability.
By accepting the destroyer narrative and viewing Sherman’s campaigns
through the prism of total war, students of war have lost sight of Sherman. They
have ignored Sherman’s lessons in the realm of operational art derived from
campaigning across the upper and lower South: lessons, Sherman believed, that
in logistics as well as “grand and minor tactics . . . added new luster to the old
science of war.”9 These lessons shaped the general’s postwar thought and came
with serious implications for the American profession of arms. Emphasis on
Sherman’s contribution to American military strategies of annihilation and
maneuver have obscured the general’s influence on the institutional development
of the US Army.10 Linking Sherman’s mastery of logistics to federal strategy
in the Civil War is warranted, but absent other considerations, it neglects
the fact that Sherman took his knowledge and experiences and arrived at the
conviction that, in future wars, American officers should possess the command
faculties to perform what he had accomplished. It was largely for this reason
Sherman established postgraduate professional schools for US Army soldiers,
the purposes of which were to produce ideal staff officers with experience of
military operations at a “model Post.”11
6. Mark E. Neely Jr., “Was the Civil War a Total War?,” Civil War History 37, no. 1 (March 1991):
5–28; Mark Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861–1865
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Wayne Wei-siang Hsieh, “Total War and the American
Civil War Reconsidered: The End of an Outdated ‘Master Narrative,’ ” Journal of the Civil War Era 1,
no. 3 (September 2011): 394–408; D. H. Dilbeck, A More Civil War: How the Union Waged a Just War
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016); and Aaron Sheehan-Dean, The Calculus of Violence:
How Americans Fought the Civil War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018).
7. John F. Marszalek, Sherman: A Soldier’s Passion for Order (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University
Press, 2007); and James Lee McDonough, William Tecumseh Sherman: In the Service of My Country, A Life
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2016).
8. Christopher S. Hoffman, Major General William T. Sherman’s Total War in the Savannah and Carolina
Campaigns (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2018).
9. William T. Sherman, “The Grand Strategy of the Last Year of the War,” in Battles and Leaders of the Civil
War, ed. Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence Clough Buel, vol. 4 (New York: De Vinne Press, 1888), 250.
10. Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), 148–52; B. H. Liddell Hart, Sherman: Soldier, Realist, American
(Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 1993); and Jay Luvaas, The Military Legacy of the Civil War: The European Inheritance
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1988), 216–25.
11. Marszalek, Sherman, 442.
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To understand Sherman as a whole, it is necessary to look beyond the Civil War
and take a longer view of his US Army career. Sherman’s record was not bound to
his grasp of strategy or military operations; nor was it confined to his understanding
of democracies or modern industrial societies at war. Rather, a holistic view of
Sherman places the commander within the wider stream of Army institutional history.
This view would do less to scrutinize Sherman’s tenure as Commanding General of
the US Army (a post noted for the frustration it brought to Sherman) as a missed
opportunity for Army reform. Similarly, Sherman’s establishment of the Artillery
School of Practice in 1875 at Fort Monroe, Virginia, and the School of Application
for Infantry and Cavalry at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1881, merit reassessment.
Hardly evidence of Sherman’s “conservative nature regarding military science,” the
creation of these postgraduate, professional-military institutions demonstrates how
critical it was for Sherman that future soldiers apply military science of the day to
campaigning, all with an eye toward fighting the next large-scale war.12 Finally,
Sherman must be understood as he viewed himself: as a teacher of war. Described
in great detail in the Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman—a prescriptive text full of
recommendations for military practitioners that has been misunderstood by scholars
and warfighters alike—Sherman’s campaigns yielded lessons that later found
application as subsequent generations of US Army officers studied and practiced the
art of war.13

Tethered to His Time?
Sherman’s biographers have grasped some of these features, but only in part.
Several have noted Sherman’s intent to “bring the Line and Staff into closer
harmony” during his tenure as Commanding General of the Army and thereby
mitigate organizational problems that resulted from the general in chief ’s
inability to requisition supply from the various bureaus and departments
within the War Department.14 This arrangement, which Sherman regarded as
an “absurdity,” had long hindered the effectiveness of military organization.
The question of who controlled the army and its resources—the commanding
general or the secretary of war—was vigorously contested and never totally
resolved.15 Yet with little variation, interpretations of Sherman’s postwar efforts
as a military reformer converge upon the conclusion that, insofar as he pursued
postwar reforms, he attained modest results because he failed to end insoluble
rivalries between the line, staff, and civil authorities.16
12. Marszalek, Sherman, 442.
13. William T. Sherman, Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman, ed. Charles Royster (New York: Library of America, 1990).
14. “Tenth Anniversary Meeting,” Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States 10, no. 37
(March 1889): 141.
15. Sherman, Memoirs, 896, 932–33; William B. Skelton, “The Commanding Generals and the Question of
Civil Control in the Antebellum U.S. Army,” American Nineteenth Century History 7, no. 2 (June 2006): 153–72.
16. Richard Allen Lewis, “Years of Frustration: William T. Sherman, The Army, and Reform, 1869–1883”
(PhD diss., Northwestern University, 1968).
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Liddell Hart’s classic assessment of Sherman offers a case in point. He
concludes of Sherman’s supposed failure and subsequent decision to travel
overseas to escape the fraught nature of civil-military politics, “if [Sherman]
could not maintain his own world he could at least enlarge his knowledge
of the world.”17 Similarly, Fellman has noted, to whatever extent Sherman
encouraged reform in some abstract sense, the general in chief nevertheless
remained a “narrow and inflexible conservator of a tiny military elite” who
fought least for change when it mattered most.18 John Marszalek’s classic
study provides a robust assessment of Sherman’s tenure as commanding
general, but it dwells on Sherman’s political fights with the Congress and
with the administration of President Ulysses S. Grant. Marszalek concedes “in
many ways, Sherman . . . tried to hang on rather than innovate,” and perceives
in Sherman a basic pragmatism oriented toward “[convincing] a hostile
nonmilitary world that army officers were professionals.”19 Steven Woodworth
also notes the political feuds that marked the commanding general’s tenure—
Sherman famously refused in 1873 to submit his annual report to the War
Department, citing the secretary of war’s control of the Army, and in 1874
moved his headquarters to St. Louis to escape Washington politics—even as
it reiterates Sherman’s unwavering commitment to military professionalism.20
James Lee McDonough devotes only a handful of pages in the weightiest
of Sherman biographies to the commanding general’s attempts at military
reform and reaches similar conclusions.21
Studies of US Army preparedness and professionalization in the postwar
years are similarly limited. They view Sherman as too moored to the Civil
War, which he perceived to be authoritative, since it was—at least in the
American view—the definitive military event of the nineteenth century.
Scholar-strategist J. P. Clark, in Preparing for War: The Emergence of the
Modern U.S. Army, 1815–1917, contends such officers as Sherman “held a
more rosy view of generalship during the war and consequently were more
inclined to believe that drastic changes to the army’s means of preparing
officers for war were not necessary.”22 Like Marszalek, Clark considers this
view an innate conservatism. While Clark acknowledges Sherman and his
peers were not “unthinking traditionalists,” still in “deriving their identity
from conflict” they shared a common “conceptual horizon.”23 Clark concludes
that for Sherman the Civil War as an “intellectual tether limiting how far the
17. Liddell Hart, Sherman: Soldier, 412–13.
18. Fellman, Citizen Sherman, 291.
19. Marszalek, Sherman, 443.
20. Steven E. Woodworth, Sherman: Lessons in Leadership (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 171–73.
21. McDonough, William Tecumseh Sherman, 665–69, 684–85.
22. J. P. Clark, Preparing for War: The Emergence of the Modern U.S. Army, 1815–1917 (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2017), 129.
23. Clark, Preparing for War, 129.
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profession could stray from past forms,” an assessment that does not square
with the Commanding General of the Army who declared, in 1883, the nation,
having “passed through its measles and whooping-cough period,” stood “at the
opening of a new epoch” and “on the threshold of a new era.”24
Assessments of Sherman’s conservatism, whether framed in his failed pursuit
of organizational reform, or in his purportedly modest capability to theorize
about the future of war, miss the mark. They diminish lessons the Civil War
bequeathed to the profession of arms and present Sherman as an uncritical
soldier whose instincts were oriented toward preserving an institutional status
quo. It is true, as commanding general, Sherman underscored the necessity of
practical learning and familiarity with the duties of company-level command
believing the company was “the basis of all good armies,” hence, good company
commanders in time would prove competent generals.25 It is also true Sherman
did not place equal emphasis on the instruction of senior-level command, or
what the US Army now considers strategic leadership as a category of
professional knowledge.
Yet, to interpret these points as evidence of Sherman’s conservatism is to miss
how he viewed intellect and practical action as working in concert to advance
sound knowledge of the principles of campaigning and warfighting. For example,
Sherman displayed great interest in professional military literature and nurtured
the intellectual curiosity of officers, even penning short, analytical responses
to articles he read in the Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United
States.26 Sherman served on the Military Service Institution’s board that selected
awards for the most insightful and original articles published in the journal.27
In his remarks on the institution’s tenth anniversary, Sherman emphasized all
US Army and Navy officers should read widely in times of peace on matters
historical, legal, and ethical, in addition to the latest professional literature.28
Yet, he also cautioned soldiers in their scholarly pursuits should not neglect “the
rudiments . . . the squad, company and battalion drill, the care of men, horses,
wagons, etc., and the thousand and one things learned by absolute contact with
soldiers but not from books.”29 Sherman was “wily” and inquisitive, quick to talk,
and always eager to hear the lessons his brothers-in-arms derived from their war
24. Clark, Preparing for War, 129; William T. Sherman, discussion response to Albert G. Brackett, “Our
Cavalry: Its Duties, Hardships, and Necessities at Our Frontier Posts,” Journal of the Military Service Institution
of the United States 4 (1883): 392.
25. A. C. Sharpe, “Organization and Training of a National Reserve for Military Service,” Journal of the
Military Service Institution of the United States 10, no. 37 (March 1889): 17.
26. William T. Sherman, “Military Law,” Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States 1, no. 1
(January 1880): 129–32.
27. “Annual Prize Essay,” Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States 3, no. 12 (1882): 501.
28. “Tenth Anniversary Meeting,” 140.
29. “Tenth Anniversary Meeting,” 140.
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experiences.30 Even so, Sherman demonstrated little patience in the postwar years
for criticisms of his campaigns from officers who lacked the skills, as he saw it,
to “move a battalion properly, in the presence of the enemy, from Fort Monroe
to Newport News.”31 Implicit in this statement is Sherman’s knowledge, acquired
through extensive campaigning, that the movement of armies required skill. If an
officer could not move a battalion, how could he possibly hope to move an army?
While the Civil War provided the dominant paradigm for Sherman,
the practical lessons he derived from the war were not unimportant.
The Civil War was the first large-scale conflict in global history in which
railroads found widespread use and influence in military operations. This
fact, and the federal use of waterways to move troops and supplies, bore
significant consequences on unprecedented scales for the organization of
logistics and expanded spheres of joint warfighting.32 Military operations in
the theaters of the Civil War occurred in zones that dwarfed entire swaths of
Europe. The distance from Baton Rouge, Louisiana, to Richmond, Virginia,
for instance, exceeds the distance from Moscow to the Franco-German
frontier.33 Moreover, the topography in these theaters of operation proved
uniquely difficult.34
Sherman’s successes in the war, accomplished in its most difficult theater
of operations, required careful intellectual study, tremendous attention to
detail, and a wealth of personal experience. Sherman drew from geographical
knowledge of the South he had acquired firsthand 20 years before.35
Possessed of great imagination and a strong artistic sense, Sherman was able
to map and picture roads in his mind.36 In the recesses of his mind were
hidden immediate solutions for the minute-to-minute problems encountered
during the 1864 Savannah Campaign, especially how to feed, supply, and
30. E. Shippen, “General Sherman,” United Service: A Monthly Review of Military and Naval Affairs 5 (April
1891): 340.
31. Sherman quoted in John P. Wisser, “Practical Instructions in Minor Tactics,” Journal of the Military
Service Institution of the United States 8, no. 30 (June 1887): 138.
32. Earl J. Hess, Civil War Supply and Strategy: Feeding Men and Moving Armies (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 2020), 3–4.
33. Willey Howell, “Lieutenant-General Grant’s Campaign of 1864–65, I,” Military Historian and
Economist 1, no. 2 (April 1916): 113–36; Willey Howell, “Lieutenant-General Grant’s Campaign of 1864-65,
II,” Military Historian and Economist 1, no. 3 (August 1916): 274–95; Arthur L. Wagner, Strategy: A Lecture
Delivered by Colonel Arthur L. Wagner, Assistant Adjutant-General, U.S.A., to the Officers of the Regular Army
and National Guard at the Maneuvers at West Point, Ky., and at Fort Riley, Kansas, 1903 (Kansas City, MO:
Hudson-Kimberly Publishing Company, 1904), 28–29; and Williamson Murray and Wayne Wei-siang Hsieh,
A Savage War: A Military History of the Civil War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016), 6.
34. Sherman, “Grand Strategy Last Year,” 250; Sherman, Memoirs; and Hess, Civil War Supply.
35. William T. Sherman, Address of General William T. Sherman to the Officers and Soldiers Composing the School of
Application at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, October 25, 1882 (Leavenworth, KS: 1882), 8; and Sherman, “Grand
Strategy Last Year,” 252.
36. William T. Sherman, “To John Sherman,” in Sherman’s Civil War: Selected Correspondence of
William T. Sherman, 1860–1865, ed. Brooks D. Simpson and Jean V. Berlin (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1999), 786.
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protect his army in hostile territory.37 These were herculean efforts that “taxed
and measured forethought, energy, patience, and watchfulness” with utmost
severity.38 Prior to the campaign, Sherman knew by county the number of
horses, hogs, beeves, and bushels of corn the land contained and how best to
feed his army.39 His memoirs are chock-full of references to provisions and the
movement of men, mules, and materiel.40 Additionally, they demonstrate the
empirical habit of mind required for careful mathematical tabulations.
Leadership for Sherman was not mere adherence to a particular theory of
command that moved soldiers by moral or physical example. Rather it was
a precise knowledge of an army’s integral parts and a firm understanding of
how all elements combined to produce unity of action—all to the end that
a commander must act to keep his army intact and project power. “To do
noble deeds is the end,” Sherman declared in 1889. He continued, “Action
and intelligence must be combined.”41 Interpreted in this light, officers at the
Artillery or the Infantry and Cavalry Schools were not merely participants in
mundane forms of garrison duty, but rather practitioners learning to integrate
practical knowledge of field armies with relevant study of military theory.
By the eve of the twentieth century, the Infantry and Cavalry School
at Fort Leavenworth had clearly established itself as an institution where
officers acquired practical field experience and engaged in serious intellectual
work. Required readings featured books useful for an Army officer on the
frontier such as William Carter’s Horses, Saddles, and Bridles, but also covered
high-level matters, such as staff-level planning and execution of military
operations, and constitutional, international, and military law.42 Students
attended lectures on a variety of military subjects. They considered the
historical development of field and coastal fortifications. Lectures on
the military geographies of Canada, Chile, Mexico, and Central America
demonstrated evidence of a widening strategic self-awareness and sense of
37. Victor Davis Hanson, The Soul of Battle: From Ancient Times to the Present Day, How Three Great
Liberators Vanquished Tyranny (New York: Free Press, 1999), 212; and Henry Davenport Northrop, Life
and Deeds of General Sherman: Including the Story of His Great March to the Sea (Cleveland: Lauer & Mattill,
1891), 562–63.
38. Thomas M. Vincent, “The Military Power of the United States, Indicated During the War of the Rebellion,
1861–’65, By: 1) The Mobilization and Disbandment of the Volunteer Forces. 2) The Logistical Measures,
Attaching to the Staff Departments and Corps. In Other Words, the Science of the Staff,” Journal of the
Military Service Institution of the United States 2, no. 5–8 (1881): 262.
39. Albert G. Brackett, “General William T. Sherman,” United Service: A Monthly Review of Military and
Naval Affairs 5 (June 1891): 578.
40. Sherman, Memoirs, 649, 653, 658–61, 879–82.
41. “Tenth Anniversary Meeting,” 141.
42. William H. Carter, Horses, Saddles, and Bridles (Leavenworth, KS: Ketcheson & Reeves, 1895);
Thomas M. Cooley, The General Principles of Constitutional Law in the United States of America (Boston:
Little, Brown, and Company, 1880); William Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents, revised, 2 vols.
(Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1896); and Regulations and Programme of Instruction of the U.S. Infantry
and Cavalry School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1895 (Leavenworth, KS: United States Infantry and
Cavalry School, 1895).
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American military power on an international scale.43 Officers theorized about
military technologies and their effects in shaping the character of modern
war.44 Nonetheless, they also took wider views, studying how nations of the
world “[embraced] all preparations made and considerations entertained to
meet the contingency of war”—in a word, military policy.45
Scholars have long advanced the view that Sherman did not intend for
the institutions he established to become laboratories of military thought.
Drawing from Sherman’s correspondence, Marszalek and Clark claim his
interest in postgraduate education for officers apparently went no further
than the Artillery School of Practice and later the Infantry and Cavalry
School, and that cultivating an intellectual habit of mind in officers through
formal education was not among Sherman’s goals for these institutions.46
Such interpretations accord with the findings of Timothy Nenninger,
Carol Reardon, and Todd Brereton in their classic studies of education and
professionalism in the officer corps.47 It is perhaps true Sherman could not
have imagined how the curriculum at the Infantry and Cavalry School would
evolve over time, and it would be an exaggeration to cite him as the individual
solely responsible for the sort of learning that happened there. Nevertheless,
claims that Sherman possessed only modest designs for professional military
education flatten the general’s well-documented plans for practical and
intellectual officers to command the Army in the future and misunderstand
the prescriptive nature of his memoirs.48

The Memoirs as Prescriptive Military Text
Sherman began work on his memoirs sometime after 1870, and in 1875,
D. Appleton and Company in New York published the Memoirs of General
W. T. Sherman as a two-volume set. The Memoirs were an instant sensation,
43. C. H. Muir, An Historical Sketch of Permanent Fortifications: A Lecture Delivered before the Class of Officers at
the United States Infantry and Cavalry School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, October 29th, 1896 (Leavenworth,
KS: United States Infantry and Cavalry School, May 1897); and Arthur Lockwood Wagner et al., Military
Geography: Lectures in the Department of Military Art, Delivered before the Class of Officers at the U.S. Infantry
and Cavalry School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1893–1895 (Leavenworth, KS: United States Infantry and Cavalry
School, 1895).
44. Joseph T. Dickman, Balloons in War: A Lecture Delivered before the Class of Officers at the United States Infantry
and Cavalry School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, March 27th, 1896 (Leavenworth, KS: United States Infantry and
Cavalry School, April 1896).
45. Joseph T. Dickman, Military Policy and Institutions: A Lecture Delivered before the Class of Officers at the United
States Infantry and Cavalry School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, January 16th, 1896 (Leavenworth, KS: United States
Infantry and Cavalry School, December 1896), 5.
46. Marszalek, Sherman, 442; and Clark, Preparing for War, 130–31.
47. Timothy K. Nenninger, The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army: Education, Professionalism, and the Officer
Corps of the United States Army, 1881–1918 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), 21–31; Carol Reardon,
Soldiers and Scholars: The U.S. Army and the Uses of Military History, 1865–1920 (Lawrence: University Press
of Kansas, 1990), 14; and T. R. Brereton, Educating the U.S. Army: Arthur L. Wagner and Reform, 1875–1905
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 13–14.
48. Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York: MacMillan Publishing
Company, 1967), 273.
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selling thousands of copies at seven dollars apiece, though how much they
profited Sherman in the long run seems unclear.49 Admirers wrote to him
expressing their approval. But the Memoirs also generated political opposition
and resulted in a pamphlet war, prompting Sherman to issue a revised
and expanded edition in 1886.50 On the whole, however, appreciation for
Sherman’s reminiscences—buoyed by praise from Ulysses S. Grant—surpassed
criticisms of the work.51 In an appendix to his three-volume history of the
Civil War, a leading European scholar declared Sherman’s memoirs were of
“incomparable value” to the historian.52
Although Sherman’s memoirs are amongst the most-cited sources for
students of the Civil War seeking to understand his military career, historians
have neglected the specific way he describes his military experiences and
his purposes for taking this approach. One critic dismisses Sherman’s
memoirs as self-serving, treats them as a medium through which the
general settled old scores, and gives the impression the text is unreliable.53
Other scholars have wrongly assumed Sherman intended merely to
write about the war as a historical event, and as a result the Memoirs have
been underutilized as an instructional text. More than the fascinating
anecdotes they contain, the Memoirs shed light on Sherman’s knowledge of
warfighting and its organizational demands. They invite students of war to
see firsthand the complex dynamics of leading a field army in large-scale
combat operations. Only in analytical works of Civil War logistics and supply
have the Memoirs received proper treatment in this regard.54
Similarly, students of military history have not wrestled with the
important question of why Sherman published his memoirs. Russell Weigley’s
1962 assertion, that Sherman deliberately composed the Memoirs to influence
future generations of military practitioners, and his later observation that
Sherman’s achievement “[was] almost unique among such literary efforts
in their thoughtfulness about the future of war,” have gone almost unnoticed.55
This failure illuminates the disconnect between what historians profess
49. Charles Royster, “Note on the Text,” in Sherman, Memoirs, 1121; McDonough, William Tecumseh Sherman,
709; and Marszalek, Sherman, 457–58.
50. See entry for 1875 in Charles Royster, “Chronology,” in Sherman, Memoirs, 1112.
51. John Russell Young, Around the World with General Grant: A Narrative of the Visit of General U. S.
Grant, Ex-President of the United States, to Various Countries in Europe, Asia, and Africa, in 1877, 1878, 1879:
To Which Are Added Certain Conversations with General Grant on Questions Connected with American Politics
and History, vol. 2 (New York: American News Company, 1879), 290–91.
52. Louis-Philippe-Albert d’Orléans, History of the Civil War in America, vol. 3 (Philadelphia: Porter and
Coates, 1888), 853.
53. Fellman, Citizen Sherman.
54. Earl J. Hess, Civil War Logistics: A Study of Military Transportation (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 2017); and Hess, Civil War Supply.
55. Russell F. Weigley, Towards an American Army: Military Thought from Washington to Marshall (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1962), 83; and Weigley, History United States Army, 273.
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to know about operational military history and what students of the war
actually know about its crucial aspects. Memoirs of the war published in
the postbellum era were legion but contributed little to the advancement
of military thought.56 As Weigley wrote:
Sherman sought throughout his Memoirs to underline the strategic,
tactical, and logistical lessons of the war. Conspicuously among the
memoirists, he wrote a concluding chapter in which he tried to sum up the
military precepts suggested by his experience. No other Civil War memoir
comes so close to being a military textbook.57

Indeed, Sherman so desired the principles he derived from his
wartime experiences to be prescriptive, he titled the ultimate chapter (in
the first edition of his memoirs) and the penultimate chapter (in the revised
and expanded edition) “Military Lessons of the War.” The instructive
character of his memoirs is best understood in the context of Sherman’s
conviction, expressed in an 1885 paper read before the Military Service
Institution of the United States, that memoir and biography—the record of
history—are “philosophy teaching by example.”58
There are also deeper meanings to “Military Lessons of the War.” Much of the
chapter functions as a philosophical reflection, in the Clausewitzian sense, on the
nature of armed conflict. Sherman makes explicit references to the Crimean and
Franco-Prussian wars and their military lessons.59 Sherman wrote this chapter
after his African, European, and Mediterranean tours from 1871 to 1872—
during which he visited Austria, Egypt, England, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Malta, Russia, Spain, Scotland, Switzerland, and Turkey—a panoramic
event that enabled him to travel to European battlefields and to engage
in careful, comparative evaluation of military policy.60 Travel also afforded
Sherman opportunities to ponder the character of modern warfare in an
international context.61 Conditions in the United States, he concluded,
diverged significantly from those in much of Europe. Hardly evidence of his
conservatism, this fact points to Sherman’s eagerness to consider alternative
modes of military policy—as well as his boundless enthusiasm for studying
armies, fortifications, and military schools—and to draw his own conclusions.62
56. Weigley, Towards an American Army, 83.
57. Weigley, Towards an American Army, 83.
58. Sherman, Memoirs, 873; William T. Sherman, “The Militia,” Journal of the Military Service Institution of the
United States 6, no. 21 (March 1885): 3.
59. Sherman, Memoirs, 887.
60. Royster, “Chronology,” in Sherman, Memoirs, 1111; Sherman, Memoirs, 893–94; William T. Sherman,
“Sherman on Franco-Prussian Battlefields: Extracts from General William T. Sherman’s Diary of His European
Tour in 1872,” Century Magazine 58, no. 2 (June 1899): 278.
61. Sherman, Memoirs, 885.
62. See, for instance, William T. Sherman, “General Sherman in Russia: Extracts from the Diary of
General W. T. Sherman,” Century Magazine 57, no. 5 (March 1899): 866–75.
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Far from being a provincial theorist tethered to the American Civil War,
Sherman possessed a cosmopolitan outlook and demonstrated a willingness to
graft, wherever useful, the best of European military thought and practice into
his profession of arms.
These points have escaped Sherman biographers. Alhough Liddell Hart
possessed impressive knowledge of Sherman’s role as a military theorist, and
perceived in his 1864 and 1865 campaigns the apotheosis of the indirect
approach, he is silent on the theoretical aspects of Sherman’s Memoirs.63
Marszalek concludes, curiously, the Memoirs contain “too little insight
into [Sherman’s] philosophy of war.”64 Noteworthy among Sherman’s
chroniclers for his attention to the Memoirs as a work of military science
is British historian Brian Holden Reid, who observes Sherman’s opus
reflected the commanding general’s military priorities and was unique in
revealing its author’s “prime interest in the technical military dimensions of
the war.”65 Alone of all Sherman scholars, Holden Reid correctly perceives
the value of the Memoirs as less in their historical qualities—though they
introduced important correspondence and official records from the Civil War
into public view—than in their contribution to the advancement of military
thought and Army professionalization in the United States.66
Sherman outlined numerous lessons in his memoirs, encompassing an
array of subjects pertinent to warfighting and developing a future fighting
force: unit organization from company to corps; campaign logistics and
supply; communications and technology; provisions and subsistence, as
well as the nutrition and health of soldiers in a field army; the importance
of education for civilian officers, and for officers trained at the United
States Military Academy; the requisite size of the peacetime army to
maintain preparedness and allow for rapid mobilization; the necessity of
reforming the command structure of the army by subordinating bureaus
under the auspices of the War Department to the authority of the
commanding general; civil-military relations; and the discipline, habits, courage,
and intelligence required of a general officer.67
As with his precise campaign summaries, Sherman offered astute local
insights in “Military Lessons of the War.” His observation that the corps
was “the true unit for grand campaigns and battle” and should maintain a
63. B. H. Liddell Hart, “The Signpost that was Missed,” Infantry Journal 41, no. 6 (November–December 1934):
405–11; and Liddell Hart, Sherman: Soldier, 418–19.
64. Marszalek, Sherman, 462.
65. Brian Holden Reid, The Scourge of War: The Life of William Tecumseh Sherman (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2020), 451–52.
66. Holden Reid, Scourge War, 452.
67. Sherman, Memoirs, 873–99.

TOC

106

Parameters 51(4) Winter 2021–22

complete staff and possess all means for independent action, in any theater,
pointed to how the US Army would fight in future wars.68 Additionally,
this chapter demonstrates Sherman’s belief in the promise of military
education. While the Civil War proved capable volunteer officers could rise
from civilian life, Sherman wrote, even these officers expressed regret at not
having studied the “elementary principles of the art of war,” a knowledge that
might have spared them the hard experience of learning military operations
in the “dangerous and expensive school of actual war.”69
Not long after the Memoirs appeared, Sherman’s lessons made strong
impressions on younger officers looking to shape the intellectual culture of
their profession. Upon first glance, little is surprising about this impact since
the Memoirs, like Grant’s and General Philip Sheridan’s reminiscences, were
recommended reading for lieutenants preparing for US Army careers.70
Almost immediately, however, Sherman’s memoirs assumed a greater
stature. On subjects ranging from tactics to telegraphic communications,
and as a historical record, young officers appealed to the Memoirs as an
authoritative text.71 This trend continued into the twentieth century. American
soldiers in the new US Army drew from Sherman’s experience in military
policy, noting the need for an abundant supply of well-trained regulars to
anticipate mobilization, and from Sherman’s expertise in logistics, citing
the Memoirs for the distance an army could operate away from its base of
supply.72 Drawing from the Memoirs, and from Sherman’s recommendation
to abolish the knapsack as an article of US Army equipage, a French officer
cited Sherman’s 1864 experience as a helpful guide for determining the
maximum weight an infantryman could carry without compromising combat
effectiveness.73 Hoping to avoid the casualties claimed in World War I,
officers of the interwar period saw in Sherman’s aversion to pitched battle a
blueprint for success in future armed conflicts.74
68. Sherman, Memoirs, 876.
69. Sherman, Memoirs, 878.
70. James A. Moss, Officers’ Manual (Springfield, MA: F. A. Bassette Company, 1906), 39; and “From the
U.S. Military Academy, April, 1903,” Journal of the United States Cavalry Association 14, no. 49 (July 1903): 152.
71. John Bigelow Jr., “The Sabre and Bayonet Question,” Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United
States 3, no. 9 (1882): 79; F. C. Grugan, “The Use, Development and Influence of the Electric Telegraph in
Warfare,” Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States 3, no. 11 (1882): 380; L. W. V. Kennon,
“Considerations Regarding the ‘Battle Tactics’ of Infantry,” Journal of the Military Service Institution of the
United States 7, no. 25 (March 1886): 20, 43, 45; and W. S. Scott, “Kilpatrick’s Raid Around Atlanta, August 18th
to 22d [sic], 1864,” Journal of the United States Cavalry Association 3, no. 10 (September 1880): 270.
72. H. B. Ferguson, “Recruitment, Mobilization, and Concentration,” Journal of the United States Infantry
Association 4, no. 3 (November 1907): 382–83; and John B. Barnes, “Theater of War,” Journal of the United
States Infantry Association 4, no. 4 (January 1908): 596, 598, 603.
73. Sherman, Memoirs, 882; and Carre, “Historical Review of the Load of the Foot-Soldier–Concluded,”
trans. P. L. Miles, Journal of the United States Infantry Association 5, no. 6 (May 1909): 932.
74. Bernd Greiner, “ ‘The Study of the Distant Past is Futile’: American Reflections on New Military Frontiers,”
in The Shadows of Total War: Europe, East Asia, and the United States, 1919–1939, ed. Roger Chickering and Stig
Förster (Washington, DC: German Historical Institute and Cambridge University Press, 2003), 248–49.
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Conclusion
In January 1865, while planning his advance against Charleston, South
Carolina, from Savannah, Georgia, Sherman summoned naval lieutenant
Stephen Luce, commander of the USS Pontiac (then conducting joint
operations with Sherman’s army), for a command council. “On reporting
to headquarters,” Luce recalled in later years, “General Sherman indicated
in a few, short, pithy sentences, and by the aid of a map, his plan of
campaign.” The plan impressed Luce, who likened the experience to a
religious conversion: “After hearing General Sherman’s clear exposition of
the military situation the scales seemed to fall from my eyes . . . It dawned
upon me that there are certain principles underlying military operations
which it were well to look into; principles of general application whether
the operations were conducted on land or at sea.” 75
From this council Luce learned there existed “such a thing as a
military problem; and there was a way of solving it; or, what is equally
important, a way of determining whether, or not, it was susceptible
of solution.” Luce concluded the secretary of the navy should possess a
staff, and, to fulfill their duties, officers of this staff should undertake “a
special course of study.” 76 So inspired, Luce in 1884 helped establish the
US Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, and served as its first
president. 77 Sherman’s contributions to the intellectual heritage of the US
Navy are also born of the fact that, at Alfred Thayer Mahan’s request, the
general read and commented on a series of lectures that Mahan delivered
at the Naval War College and later published in the compendium Naval
Strategy. 78 Thus Sherman, the founder of the Army’s Command and General
Staff College and the inspiration for the Naval War College, ought to be
known as the father of joint professional military education.
Academic historians who have neglected operational art and
order-of-battle military history, or who view Sherman entirely through
the prism of the Civil War, may be forgiven for seeing him in light of
the old destroyer myth. It is perhaps unreasonable to expect specialized
treatment of Sherman’s acumen for military operations in studies written
for popular readerships. All the more reason, then, to celebrate the
75. S. B. Luce, “Naval Administration, III,” Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute 29, no. 4 (December
1903): 820–21.
76. Luce, “Naval Administration, III,” 820–21.
77. Ronald H. Spector, “Professors of War: The Naval War College and the Modern American Navy”
(PhD diss., Yale University, 1967), 44–52.
78. Alfred Thayer Mahan, Naval Strategy: Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of
Military Operations on Land; Lectures Delivered at U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R. I., between the Years 1887
and 1911 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1911), 124.
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publication of Holden Reid’s The Scourge of War, the latest installment in
Sherman literature. 79 Holden Reid probes Sherman’s intellect and moves
the iconic figure beyond familiar conversations of total war; he assesses
Sherman’s US Army career at various command echelons from the bottom
up to see Sherman’s successes and failures at the tactical, operational, and
strategic levels of war. On the subject of Sherman’s tenure as commanding
general, Holden Reid is the most thorough to date and points to new
directions in Sherman scholarship.
Operational military historians and military practitioners, however,
must be judged more harshly for neglecting the technical lessons Sherman
bequeathed to the field. As one historian has written, the soldiers who
matriculate through and commence from the US Army Command
and General Staff College are Sherman’s heirs. 80 Their vocation has
been shaped by the model of professional military education Sherman
established, and their future success as staff officers requires a mastery
of the principles and skills he learned throughout the campaigns
of the Civil War and sought to carry into the future. The lessons
of Sherman’s era may seem anachronistic to soldiers in the twenty-first
century, but any mode of thought that views conditions of the historical
present as above and beyond the circumstances of the past is hardly
original, let alone helpful. The fact that the question, “Is the study of
military history worth while?” (as one soldier put it in 1929), springs
forth perennially reveals more about the practitioners who pose it than
the usefulness of the past they ignore. 81
Any view that assumes inevitable progress and boundless, revolutionary
increases in the complexity of military operations will have its blind
spots, and if warfighters are to be empathetic students of the past, they
must see through the kind of analysis that comes on the cheap. Such
worthy insights require careful study of history, delineating not only its
differences from the present, but its continuities. Servicemembers of
the twenty-first century should remember their predecessors in the
Civil War era, the postbellum period, and every age since have typically
regarded their epochs as exceptional and as uniquely marked by
unthinkable advances in military science. They have always considered
the future of warfare with uncertainty, believing it contained far greater
79. Holden Reid, Scourge of War.
80. Thomas Bruscino, “Introduction: Sherman’s Heirs” (unpublished manuscript, consulted January 2021).
Cited with the permission of the author.
81. C. M. Bundel, “Is the Study of Military History Worth While?” Infantry Journal 34, no. 3 (March 1929):
225–38.
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complexities than armed conflict in any previous age. 82 As students of
war seeking to anticipate and comprehend its future, members of the
Joint force should read the Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman to remind
themselves they are not unique, and even their circumstances, while
different, are not unprecedented. In the process, they can encounter and
emulate William Tecumseh Sherman, one of war’s greatest practitioners
in any context.
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82. Dickman, “Balloons in War”; and J. Halpin Connolly, “War in a Mechanistic Civilization,” Infantry Journal
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On “The US Army and the Pacific:
Challenges and Legacies”
Brian McAllister Linn

I

This commentary responds to David M. Finkelstein’s article, “The US Army
and the Pacific: Challenges and Legacies,” published in the Autumn 2020
issue of Parameters (vol. 50, no. 3).

n his Parameters article, David M. Finkelstein invites countries that
presume to “question US willingness to defend American interests and
those of our allies and partners [to] please review the historical record.”1
One might expect the head of the Center for Naval Analyses’ China section
to recall Sun Tzu’s stricture to put yourself beyond the possibility of defeat
first before seeking to defeat an enemy. Any historically informed other
country could quickly review that record, which includes, in barely a century,
the Siberian intervention debacle, our passivity toward Japan’s aggression in
China in the 1930s (the USS Panay), the abandonment of the Nationalist
Chinese and South Vietnam, and the over half-century’s imprisonment of the
USS Pueblo. More relevant to Parameters’ readership, and especially Army
officers, is that a review of the historical record does reveal two things
Finkelstein fails to acknowledge. The first is a tradition of the US Navy drawing
the Army into its Pacific strategic agenda. The second is that while jointness
is a laudable objective, there are not only fundamental differences between sea
power and Landpower, but between the US Army’s and Navy’s core interests.
Finkelstein dismisses the accusation that the United States is an “external
actor” and “latecomer interfering in Asian security affairs.” He asserts the
region’s importance to “our national well-being” dates “to the earliest days
of our country as a maritime trading nation.” Indeed, he alleges the United
States’ “permanent military presence” in the region has been manifest since
1835, with the creation of the East India Squadron. That the establishment
of this squadron coincided with a maritime trade shipping narcotics and
armaments to Asia and exporting its indentured labor goes unsaid. Moreover,
it was neither economic nor national interests that prompted a US Navy
commodore to defy his government’s instructions to remain neutral and instead
assist a British attack against Chinese forces during the Opium Wars. In short,

1. David M. Finkelstein, “The US Army and the Pacific: Challenges and Legacies,” Parameters 50, no. 3
(Autumn 2020): 113–19, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol50/iss3/11/.
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contrary to Finkelstein’s altruistic narrative, from the beginning both our
nation and our Navy’s foray into the Pacific provides ample justification
for Asian suspicion of our commercial and security motives today.
One of Finkelstein’s arguments for an expanded Army role in the
Indo-Pacific is its alleged “firm foundation of continuity of presence
and a deep operational legacy.” But the historical record undermines
this assertion. The Army’s permanent presence only began in 1898 after
Commodore George Dewey’s Asiatic Squadron shattered the antiquated
Spanish squadron at Manila Bay. Army leaders, who had naively assumed
the Navy might have warned them of this initiative, were soon ordered to
send an expedition to the Philippines. The Army captured Manila with
relative ease—though the Navy claimed the credit. Far more difficult was
the Army’s long and bloody conquest of the archipelago to secure the
strategic results of Dewey’s cheap one-day, one-off tactical stroke.
This pattern of the Navy looking to the Army to resolve its
problems continued with the emergence of the nation’s first true
joint strategic problem: defending the new Pacific empire. The
Navy insisted on a Philippine base to maintain its battle fleet
in Asian waters but refused to commit that fleet to defend it.
During the Japanese-American war scare of 1907, the Army’s planners
discovered the Navy had stationed its four armored cruisers in Japanese
harbors. Its sole Pacific-based battleship could not depart from the West
Coast for two months and only two ancient monitors and a few torpedo
boats defended the Philippines. At that time the Army had 15,000
soldiers—almost a quarter of its total personnel—in the archipelago.
With few exceptions, insisting the Army stay to fight for an Asian base it
declined to defend remained the Navy’s position for the next three decades.
The consequences played out tragically in 1942 when the Asiatic Fleet
departed the Philippines; those soldiers left behind suffered the greatest
land defeat in the nation’s history.
For Army strategists studying the Pacific’s legacy and challenges,
I offer three strategic truths proposed by the great naval strategist Julian
Corbett over a century ago. First, one of the great benefits of maritime
power is the freedom it offers a nation to limit its military commitments.
Second, naval forces are able to sail away from their commitments and
armies are not. A final and related point is Corbett’s observation that
“command of the sea” may be general or regional, fleeting or permanent. The
United States’ “uncontested military dominance” in the Pacific after
World War II was a temporary condition and a reversal of previous
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policy. The United States (and its Navy) had conceded regional maritime
supremacy in the Far East to the British throughout the nineteenth
century and to Japan implicitly after 1907 and explicitly in 1922 with
the Washington Naval Treaty’s 5-5-3 ratios. The Pueblo Incident might
be taken as indicative of an insignificant naval power’s ability to impose
fleeting local command over its waters. Indeed, only by the most qualified
definition of uncontested can Finkelstein substantiate his claim for
American military dominance in the Pacific since World War II.
The Army serves the nation and it will go where the nation bids.
But its strategists must rigorously study costs, benefits, dangers, and
likely consequences. Appeals to a faux-historical narrative should have no
place in their assessment. A balanced analysis of the Army’s “deep
operational legacy” in the Pacific—the controversial pacification of the
Philippines, the humiliation of Bataan, the bitter interservice battle over
the central or southwestern Pacific, the “Big Bugout” and the Korean
stalemate, and the still embittering Vietnam War—should be as much a
source of caution as an incentive.
Army strategists would do well to question Navy-generated demands
for expansion in the Pacific and examine their historic legacy there. They
could start with one of their own “Old China Hands.” In a 1969 letter to
an Army War College student concerned about Vietnam, General Matthew
Bunker Ridgway outlined the following strategic principles:
. . . identify what are and what are not our vital national interests.
Commit armed forces only in a situation that lies clearly within the zone
of those interests, and where all other means offer little or no hope of being
effective. Recognize that the world has radically altered since the days
of ‘gunboat diplomacy’, or when, as in the case of Great Britain in the
19th century, a small military commitment might be rewarded with large
national gains. Reject any political involvement that might gradually
commit us to military efforts that could jeopardize our basic security or those
vital national interests which cannot be compromised.2

2. Matthew B. Ridgway to Gerald G. Gibbs Jr., letter, October 18, 1969, in Gerald P. Gibbs, “United States
Policy Towards Future Wars of National Liberation (student paper, Army War College), US Army Heritage and
Education Center, Carlisle, PA.
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Women as War Criminals: Gender, Agency, and Justice
By Izabela Steflja and Jessica Trisko Darden
Reviewed by Dr. Heather S. Gregg, professor of military strategy,
US Army War College

H

olding perpetrators of war crimes accountable
became a focus of post-conflict justice in the twentieth
century and has continued to be a critical component
of war termination today. Despite several high-profile
post-conflict tribunals, ranging from the genocide in Rwanda
to the bloody conflict in the former Yugoslavia, few women
have been brought to trial as war criminals—and even fewer
have received sentences equal to their male counterparts.
Women as War Criminals investigates this contrast, seeking
to understand this bias and its underlying conditions and
“provide a more holistic approach to women and justice” (9).

Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2020
180 pages
$14.00

At the heart of their argument, Izabela Steflja and Jessica Darden contend
“women as war criminals go unnoticed because their very existence challenges
our deeply held assumptions about war and about women” (3). They focus on the
social and political contexts that produce gender and racial stereotypes and note
women are often victims of violent conflicts. For this reason, post-conflict justice
has focused on bringing perpetrators of these crimes—most often men—to trial
and overlooked the possible role of women. These stereotypes describe women
as inherently peaceful, nurturing, and motherly and assume women engage in
atrocities either because they are monsters or they have been manipulated by male
leaders, thus denying the women agency in their acts. Steflja and Darden also
highlight the growing body of literature supporting the Women, Peace, and Security
Act of 2017 and its emphasis on women as peacemakers and not perpetrators of
violence—another bias downplaying the role of women as perpetrators of war
atrocities. Ultimately, gender-based stereotypes about women help explain the
paucity of women brought to justice as war criminals.
The authors test their argument through four short cases of women brought
to trial for war crimes across several cultures and conflicts: Biljana Plavšić, the
former president of the Bosnian Serb Republic (Republika Srpska), and her
role in directing mass murder and rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina; Pauline
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Nyiramasuhuko, former minister for women and family development in
Rwanda, and how she facilitated the rape and murder of women in the Rwandan
genocide; Lynndie England, a former enlisted US Army Reserve soldier, tried
by Army courts-martial for violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
in connection with the torture and prisoner abuse at the Abu Ghraib prison in
Baghdad, Iraq; and Hoda Muthana, an American-born Yemeni woman who
emigrated to Syria and joined ISIS.
Steflja and Darden examine the women’s court cases, noting where gender
stereotypes were used as a defense. For example, all four women used the defense
of being mothers to challenge their charges, implying the nurturing nature of
mothers could not allow for murder, rape, or torture. Interestingly, Plavšić used
this defense—having no children of her own—as “the Mother of the Serb nation”
in Bosnia to seek a lesser charge and sentence (11).
Critically, each of the defenses centered on the women being manipulated by
men to perpetrate war crimes, including Nyiramasuhuko, who ordered the rape
of fellow women in Rwanda, and England, whose courts-martial focused on
her intellectual challenges and coercion by male soldiers. From these cases, the
authors conclude: “ ‘A man made me do it’ remains a plausible defense” (122). In
other words, these women were presented as lacking agency and were thus not
responsible for their actions. Despite this fact, each of the women defended their
actions outside of court, including in media interviews, memoirs, and biographies.
Notably, Steflja and Darden propose racial bias also played a role in the verdicts
and sentencing of the perpetrators. Nyiramasuhuko, a Black African woman, is
the only woman still in prison. Muthana, an Arab Muslim, remains in Syria for
her ISIS affiliation and has not been granted permission to return to the United
States. By contrast, Plavšić and English, both White Western women, are free;
therefore, the authors surmise “white women can negotiate plea deals, but Africans
certainly cannot, not even the Christian Nyiramasuhuko” (127).
Women as War Criminals concludes “women war criminals are a long-standing
phenomenon” requiring greater attention in post-conflict literature (121). The
implications of the authors’ research are important to understanding the role
women play as active and willing participants in war and holding them accountable
for the atrocities they choose to commit. It points to the need for the Women, Peace,
and Security Act of 2017 to include the role of women not only as peacekeepers,
but as war makers. Finally, the book offers a cautionary note on the use of
gender-based stereotypes in trial defenses: women can and do perpetrate war
crimes and should be held accountable.
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Agent Sonya: Moscow’s Most Daring Wartime Spy
By Ben Macintyre
Reviewed by Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, professor emeritus, US Army War College

B

en Macintyre’s Agent Sonya is an insightful and
important biography of Colonel Ursula Kuczynski,
who went by the code name Sonya throughout her long and
eventful career as a spy for the Soviet military intelligence
(GRU). She was born in 1907 into a wealthy German family,
with a father who was sympathetic to communism and
supportive of the Soviet Union. At 17, she described herself
as a member of the German Communist Party and
New York: Crown, 2020
participated in a number of communist events. Macintyre
400 pages
often simply calls her Ursula due to her use of false
$28.00
identities and various surname changes through marriage. He
describes her as a brilliant, ambitious, adventurous, and risk-addicted operative
who was dedicated to her craft as a Soviet intelligence agent.
Ursula’s transformation from a communist activist to a Soviet agent occurred
when she traveled to Shanghai, China, with her first husband. Like most European
expatriates, Ursula lived in the privileged international settlement portion of the
city and had little contact with the Chinese. In her community of expatriates,
she met the “radical American writer, Agnes Smedley,” whose work she greatly
admired (18). Smedley worked with Soviet intelligence and felt Ursula was
worth recruiting as a GRU operative. Moscow agreed, and Smedley set up a
meeting between Ursula and Richard Sorge, the most senior Soviet GRU agent
in Shanghai at that time, who would eventually become one of Stalin’s most
important spies. Ursula agreed to work with Sorge and help the communist
cause in any way she could. This agreement was an important commitment
as the Chinese Public Security Bureau ruthlessly hunted down both Chinese
and foreign communists, and as a German Jew she could expect no help from
Nazi diplomats.
Sorge trained Ursula in the fundamentals of clandestine action and encouraged
her to take advantage of her penchant for languages and study Russian. Later,
she agreed to attend a seven-month intelligence training course in Moscow,
despite having to leave her family. After completing the training, Ursula was sent
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to Japanese-controlled Manchuria to help arm, supply, and finance communist
Chinese resistance forces while evading the ruthless Japanese secret police,
the Kempeitai.
Following her successful work in the Far East, Ursula was sent to Poland,
where she felt her assignment was little more than serving as a “secret postman”
(143). GRU headquarters concurred she was being underused and sent her
to Switzerland to recruit her own team of agents to infiltrate Nazi Germany.
While she did excellent work there, Moscow later ordered her to leave due to
an increased danger of being discovered and even deported to Germany (since
she had entered Switzerland on a German passport). With few other options,
Ursula divorced her husband and married a British communist and member of her
network, Len Beurton. She then left for the United Kingdom, arriving in February
1941 as a legal immigrant and resuming her activities as a GRU agent.
Macintyre notes that unlike Soviet agents, Nazi spies were not active in the
United Kingdom between 1939 and 1945 due to the quick detection of their
radio transmissions by codebreakers at Bletchley Park. Throughout the war, the
Nazi danger remained the central concern for British domestic security force,
MI-5, while Soviet espionage was of only limited interest. These priorities helped
Ursula advance in her work and become the handler for one of the most important
spies in history, the expatriate German physicist and lifelong communist,
Klaus Fuchs. Fuchs appeared to the British to be uninterested in politics,
except for opposing the Nazis, and correspondingly was allowed to begin working
on their nuclear research project in June 1941.
As his research progressed, Fuchs became increasingly unhappy the West
was not sharing its atomic secrets with its Soviet ally. This discontent led
him to contact Soviet intelligence and offer to obtain secret information on
their behalf. Eventually, Fuchs was assigned to Ursula, who supervised his
intelligence-gathering activities. She worked with Fuchs for about a year
until he was assigned new handlers after he was sent to the United States to
participate in the US Manhattan Project. After the war, the British arrested
Fuchs when US codebreakers cracked portions of previously indecipherable
Soviet messages. Ursula was implicated in Fuchs’s espionage but not
conclusively. After several badly bungled MI-5 interrogations and the defection
of one of her agents to British intelligence, Ursula and her children successfully
fled to East Germany, where she was considered a hero. She died there in
July 2000.
Macintyre is a leading contemporary writer on historical intelligence topics,
and this book is one of his best. He interviewed all of Ursula’s living family
members and numerous other people involved in her story. Ursula’s own
writings later in life, which encompassed both fiction and nonfiction, also
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proved useful as did declassified MI-5 files and the surviving publicly
available records of other intelligence services.
Agent Sonya is interesting because of its detailed consideration of the
espionage activities of human spies, although it is clearly outdated on the use of
technology. Ursula’s career also illustrates how small mistakes in the fields
of intelligence, counterintelligence, and general security can lead to serious
consequences. There are numerous lessons in the book about how espionage
and counterespionage activities should be addressed to maximize their
potential for success and how such activities can be bungled.
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Special Operations: Out of the Shadows
Edited by Christopher Marsh, James D. Kiras, and Patricia J. Blocksome
Reviewed by Major Zachary Griffiths, director, Commander’s Action Group,
Special Operations Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve

I

n the last 20 years, US Special Operations Command has
doubled in size and tripled in budget. But has research
into special operations kept pace? Special Operations: Out of
the Shadows introduces academic special operations research
to nonspecialists while delving into the field’s “debates
and cutting edge research” (4). Skillfully assembled by the
editors of Special Operations Journal, this volume includes
updated articles previously published in the journal and newly
written chapters.

Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 2020
231 pages

This publication marks an important milestone in special
$85.00
operations studies—publishing an initial volume of works.
Special Operations offers a more generalized and American focus than Special
Operations from a Small State Perspective (2017), which explored Scandinavian
special operations. Other special operations research can be found in PRISM:
A Journal of the Center for Complex Operations—which published Austin Long’s
“The Limits of Special Operations Forces” and “Special Operations Doctrine:
Is It Needed?” by Charles T. Cleveland, James B. Linder, and Ronald Dempsey
in 2016—or focused outlets such as Special Operations Journal.
Special Operations is divided into theoretical and applied sections. The editors
open the theoretical section with a strong chapter on the history of and research
into special operations. Then, James D. Kiras in chapter 2 and Christopher Marsh,
Mike Kenny, and Nathanael Joslyn in chapter 3 debate whether special operations
needs a comprehensive theory. In chapter 4, Kevin L. Parker rejects formalizing
a human domain of conflict but calls on other domains to integrate human
factors. Homer W. Harkens in chapter 5 offers information on the evolution of
special warfare as a concept that both novices and experts will find valuable. Dan
Cox’s chapter 6 describes terrorism’s connection with insurgency and concludes
with important recommendations for unconventional warfare practitioners. The
theoretical section concludes with Ben Zweibelson’s call for greater incorporation
of design thinking in special operations in chapters 7 and 8.
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The applied section connects special operations with contemporary security
issues. Richard Rubright, leading with chapter 9, argues the United States
must weigh the costs and benefits of employing proxy forces in pursuit of our
goals because of the challenges in controlling their actions. In chapter 10,
Charles K. Bartles offers a well-grounded view of the debate over the Gerasimov
Doctrine and concludes with a valuable discussion of Russian irregular warfare
organizations. Paul S. Lieber and Peter J. Reiley in chapter 11 provide an
accessible and practical guide to combating ISIS radicalization efforts with
psychological operations grounded in social science. In their respective chapters,
James M. DePolo in chapter 12 and Steven R. Johnson in chapter 13 describe
the evolution of American foreign security cooperation organizations and how
the authorities for military support to countering transnational terrorism have
evolved. The editors conclude by offering direction for special operations research,
with emphasis on understanding contributions to space and cyber operations.
Special Operations offers a rich bibliography—more than 17 pages—
of peer-reviewed articles, history, military journals, military doctrine, and official
government publications which provides fodder for future research in a notoriously
difficult subject to study. Unfortunately, few authors drew on student papers from
the Naval Postgraduate School special operations/irregular warfare curriculum or
the service staff colleges. Despite their mixed quality, many of these papers could
offer important unclassified perspectives into issues facing operational special
operations forces that are ripe for further study.
Unfortunately, as a collective work, Special Operations encourages special
operations forces to do more without acknowledging the opportunity costs. For
example, Zweibelson acknowledges the high costs of leaders investing “their own
valuable time” and a “special operations design education [that] needs to mirror
the long-term operator development glide path” (81, 89). However, he never
supports his assertion that “long term deliverables will undoubtedly return on the
investment in [unrecognizable] ways” (96). With flat and declining budgets, what
areas should be cut to make room for increasing the countering of transnational
crime or increasing design thinking? Special Operations neither articulates targets
for cuts nor makes compelling cases for the new ideas.
The individual chapters vary in quality and scope, a tension exacerbated by
aiming for both novice and expert audiences. Generally, shorter chapters, like those
by Parker on human factors and Harkins on special warfare, were more engaging
and challenging than their longer counterparts. Similarly, Lieber and Riley
structured their psychological operations chapter around utilizing a compelling
method to defeat ISIS radicalization. In a few places, the authors descended
into jargon (see “change poet” on page 85), but terms were generally defined and
acronyms minimized throughout (85).
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Acceptable for novices and experts interested in the field’s debates, Special
Operations will inspire students in developing their research projects and reveal
new perspectives to academics studying irregular warfare and related topics.

Nonstate Warfare: The Military Methods
of Guerillas, Warlords, and Militias
By Stephen Biddle
Reviewed by Ben Wermeling, defense and operations research analyst

F

or much of the twenty-first century, the American
military has spent considerable effort fighting nonstate
actors such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban. This effort has sparked
considerable scholarly and military interest in nonstate actors
among the United States and Western countries. Much of
the resulting literature assumes nonstate actors primarily
wage guerilla or irregular warfare. In recent years, though,
some nonstate actors have used methods associated more
Princeton, NJ: Princeton
with conventional warfare. In the Donbas War, for example,
University Press, 2021
Ukrainian separatists fought from entrenched positions
464 pages
$35.00
using heavy weaponry, including tanks and artillery, to
hold ground. Stephen Biddle explores these variances in
military behavior in Nonstate Warfare: The Military Methods of Guerillas, Warlords,
and Militias.
Biddle’s central argument asserts the military methods of nonstate actors can
be predicted by their internal politics and perceived stakes in conflict, as well
as the state of military technology available. Early chapters elaborate on this
theory. First, Biddle describes a spectrum of military behavior based on common
understandings of irregular and conventional warfare and provides a system to
code this behavior by considering factors such as the willingness of combatants to
contest territorial control and their distinguishability from noncombatants.
The sophistication of military technology plays a substantial role in
determining optimal behavior along this spectrum. Increasingly, lethal weapons
provide incentives for both state and nonstate militaries to employ methods closer
to the midspectrum. Such weapons require militaries to operate from concealed
and covered positions in dispersed groups, as opposed to massed formations, to
limit casualties. Demands for greater dispersion make it more challenging for
states to concentrate their usually larger militaries to crush nonstate forces that
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try to contest territory, making relatively conventional methods more viable for
nonstate forces. In particular, Biddle contends the proliferation of precisionguided weapons, like anti-tank missiles, since the late-twentieth century has given
nonstate actors a much better capability to contest territory.
Midspectrum warfighting requires coordination and specialized,
interdependent roles to be effective. Not all nonstate actors will be able to
master complex techniques such as combined arms operations or fire and
movement tactics. Nonstate actors with more mature institutions and high
perceived stakes in conflict are more likely to implement midspectrum
methods and perform them effectively. Mature institutions allow greater trust
and coordination among the elites and their factions within nonstate groups.
Additionally, if elites perceive high stakes in the conflict, such as their possible
death or imprisonment, they are more willing to incur the expensive costs of
training personnel in midspectrum warfare.
The case studies—selected based on their ability to test the theory—are
well chosen: Hezbollah, Jaysh al-Mahdi, the Somali National Alliance, the
Croatian National Guard, the Serbian Army of Krajina, and the Viet Cong.
Biddle’s choices will lead to greater confidence if the theory predicts outcomes
correctly and more accurately than prior theories. Other explanations of nonstate
actors’ military behaviors include whether they come from tribal cultures that
supposedly encourage irregular warfare or the degree of materiel superiority
their state opponents possess. To gather sufficient granular detail to code
military behavior, Biddle conducted interviews with participants in most of the
conflicts analyzed.
The varied case studies offer interesting insights and comparisons while
providing solid evidence for the new theory. Several examples are instructive.
Hezbollah comes from a tribal background and receives Iranian support, much
like Jaysh al-Mahdi did before its disbandment. Despite facing the powerful state
militaries of Israel and the United States, the military methods of the two groups
differed significantly. Hezbollah had mature institutions and perceived high
stakes in the 2006 Lebanon War, which facilitated the organization’s remarkably
conventional methods in battle, unlike Jaysh al-Mahdi.
When the Americans intervened in the Somalian Civil War, the Somali
National Alliance fought more conventionally on the margin despite hailing
from a tribal society and fighting a superpower. American efforts to kill insurgent
leadership drastically raised the stakes of the war compared to the earlier
skirmishes to loot resources.
The Viet Cong, as described in the last case study, was a sophisticated
organization fighting for existential stakes; however, it waged predominantly
guerilla warfare. When the Viet Cong attempted more conventional warfighting
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in the Tet Offensive, American forces inflicted severe losses. The light 1960s-era
weapons (from a time before widespread precision firepower) could not stop
massed state forces from overrunning the Viet Cong’s positions with relative ease.
The book concludes with inferences about future warfare. Given the
proliferation of increasingly lethal weaponry, both state and nonstate actors
still face increasing incentives to converge on midspectrum military methods,
further narrowing differences in behavior. In this probable future environment,
Biddle suggests the US military adopt a lighter, updated variation of its legacy
force structure with more dismounted elements, rather than a more radical
transformation that focuses on very irregular or conventional forces. This structure
would maximize the military’s capability against the modal future opponent while
maintaining the residual ability to fight enemies using methods toward the edges
of the spectrum of military behavior.
Nonstate Warfare is timely since nonstate actors in recent decades have used more
conventional military methods and little research has attempted to explain the
differences in nonstate military behavior. Biddle’s thorough coding methodology
to operationalize military behavior offers a more precise understanding of warfare
than the guerilla/conventional dichotomy, replacing vagueness with conceptual
clarity. His well-researched case studies strongly support his theory. An area
for minor improvement would be a more significant differentiation of assessed
wartime stakes, which would provide a more nuanced analysis. Though beyond the
scope of the book, a theory explaining nonstate warfighting before the twentieth
century would also be valuable.
The book’s main insights, that state and nonstate actors face similar incentives
and that their chosen military methods differ in degrees rather than categories,
have important implications for both military professionals and scholars. Nonstate
Warfare is highly recommended reading for both groups.
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Battlegrounds: The Fight to Defend the Free World
By H. R. McMaster
Reviewed by Dr. John C. Binkley, adjunct professor of history,
Loyola University of Chicago

A

fter four tumultuous years of the Trump administration,
the Biden-Harris administration needs to reset
American foreign policy. H. R. McMaster—a retired US
Army lieutenant general and the former national security
advisor to President Donald Trump—addresses this issue in
Battlegrounds: The Fight to Defend the Free World. He clearly
notes any reset of American foreign policy must focus on a
group of important battleground nations that will decide the
direction of America’s future in the world, as well as the state
of democratic institutions in the United States and the West.

New York: Harper, 2020
560 pages
$35.00

While McMaster may have been tempted to write a tellall book memorializing his experiences in the Trump administration, he rejected
that opportunity to write a primer which outlines the direction of an American
foreign policy reset. In doing so, he focuses on what he considers key battleground
arenas: China, Iran, the Middle East, North Korea, Russia, and South Asia. He
also recognizes collateral arenas such as environmental and climate politics and
the future role of democratic institutions, all issues a Biden-Harris administration
cannot ignore.
McMaster, who received a PhD in history from the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, is well known for his seminal study of the Vietnam
War, Dereliction of Duty (1997). Consequently, as a historian and foreign policy
practitioner, he analyzes each battleground and reviews the historical background
of each battleground arena to understand the policy situation as it existed at
the end of the Trump administration. In each case, he finds American foreign
policy over the last several administrations, and in some cases over much longer
periods of time, was fundamentally flawed. While each battleground arena has its
peculiarities based on historical and geographic dynamics, the underlying reasons
for the flawed policies are twofold: a tendency of American policy to be driven by
strategic narcissism and, conversely, an absence of strategic empathy.
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Strategic narcissism is “the tendency to view the world only in relation to the
United States and to assume that the future course of events depends primarily
on US decisions or plans” (15). Strategic empathy is the ability to appreciate the
desires and goals of other nations and their people and to understand these groups
can affect policy regardless of America’s desires. This two-sided policy failure has
warped America’s ability to understand the dynamics at work in the battleground
nations, placing blinders on American policymakers.
After a historical overview, McMaster discusses how America should deal
with each battleground. While the specific proscriptions offered vary from
battleground to battleground, there are commonalities among them. First, he
suggests American foreign policy needs to be robust and, in fact, very hawkish in
nature. In this regard, he is willing to confront adversaries and friends alike. This
robust almost aggressive policy is particularly clear regarding China, Iran, North
Korea, and Russia. He argues the United States should push back against Russian
aggression in the Ukraine and Russian disinformation worldwide. Similarly, the
United States needs to confront Chinese movements in the South China Sea
and China’s theft of Western intellectual and technological property.
In both cases, McMaster makes a great deal of sense. Moreover, his analysis of
North Korean interests and motivations for developing a nuclear weapon seems to
be spot on. In the case of Iran, he notes the nation must ultimately make a decision:
either receive the benefits of a responsible member of the international community
or exist in isolation. McMaster understands the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action—which the Obama administration hoped would halt Iran’s nuclear
arms program and that the Trump administration scrapped—only addresses a
symptom of the difficult relationship between Iran and the West. Constant pressure
is the only approach that may force Iran to choose the path toward responsibility.
Second, as a student of the Vietnam War, McMaster correctly recognizes
the flaws in that war being repeated in Afghanistan and Iraq. These include
the failure to develop a long-term strategy, which can gain the support of the
American people, and a lack of appreciation for the social aspect of the wars.
Having said that, readers might wonder how McMaster would gain public support
for what appears to be an open-ended conflict.
Third, McMaster seems willing to apply tough love to erstwhile allies such
as Pakistan and the countries of the Middle East. Pakistan’s role as a nuclear
power makes its relationship with America more important than the situation
in Afghanistan.
Though a good read, Battlegrounds has one major flaw—or, in this case, an
omission. While McMaster claims to be absolutely apolitical, which partially
explains his decision to limit writing about the Trump administration, he
actually makes a political choice by virtue of his criticisms of the Obama
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administration and what he considers a new left slant of Democratic foreign
policy. He sees lack of consistency and trust to be two great problems of American
foreign policy. Yet, he seems unwilling to confront the Trump administration
for exacerbating these problems. At the same time, while he wants the United
States to push back against Putin’s aggression, he ignores Trump’s obsequious
approach toward the Russian leader. In short, while he is readily willing to
blame other administrations for their faults, he fails to confront the impact of
Trump’s actions.
While readers can agree or disagree with McMaster’s recipe for America’s
foreign policy success, they cannot ignore the issues he raises. Consequently,
I heartily recommend the book for anyone interested in the future direction of
American foreign policy.

Atomic Salvation: How the A-Bomb Attacks
Saved the Lives of 32 Million People
By Tom Lewis
Reviewed by Michael E. Lynch, research historian,
US Army Heritage and Education Center

I

n Atomic Salvation, Tom Lewis explores the question
of whether or not the use of the atomic bomb in
World War II was necessary to end the war against Japan.
Today this question has taken on a moral and emotional
dimension, as many people conflate the strength of the
two relatively small atomic bombs used on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki with the power of today’s nuclear weapons,
concluding they were overkill and unnecessary. Reality,
Havertown, PA: Casemate,
however, shows conventional fire bombing raids on Tokyo
2020
364
pages
were far more devastating and caused greater casualties
$34.95
than either of the two atomic bombs. While Atomic
Salvation purports to be an “exhaustive analysis” of the
necessity of using the atomic bomb, it presents little new information (7).
Lewis argues the atomic bomb was necessary and its deployment saved
many more lives than it took. Analyzing the potential lives to be saved
based on projected daily casualty figures from the fighting in the Pacific and
using plans for Operation Downfall, the pending invasion of the Japanese
Islands projected to last until the end of 1946, he calculates the potential
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casualties for both the Allied and Japanese people would have totaled more than
32 million people.
Lewis reaches the right conclusion, but he does so by repeating—and in many
cases excessively quoting—experts who have already reached this conclusion.
His extensive reliance on Richard B. Frank’s Downfall: The End of the Imperial
Japanese Empire (1999), John Toland’s The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the
Japanese Empire, 1936–1945 (1970), Edwin P. Hoyt’s Japan’s War: The Great Pacific
Conflict (1986), Stephen Harper’s Miracle of Deliverance: The Case for the Bombing
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (1985), and others make it difficult to discern if he has
added any new information. Indeed, the bibliography is almost devoid of primary
sources. Additionally, Lewis uses Gar Alperovitz as a straw man to attack specious
arguments for not using the atomic bomb, which is all too easy to do. On a positive
note, he extensively cites the US Strategic Bombing Survey and correctly identifies
errors within the survey.
The book badly needs additional editing. A good editor could have helped
Lewis avoid careless mistakes such as typos, culturally incorrect spellings, incorrect
rank or position descriptions, purple prose such as “to say that time was of the
essence would be the understatement of the 20th century,” and glitches such as
five separate footnotes in one sentence (199).
In addition, Lewis’s careless writing led him to make some egregious factual
errors. There are many examples, but chapter 18 provides two errors on successive
pages. On page 296 Lewis identifies Charles Sweeney as the pilot of the Enola
Gay (Sweeney flew Bock’s Car over Nagasaki), and on page 297 he features a
globe showing atomic tests around the world. The caption, and Lewis’s apparent
intention, indicates tests in the United States, but the photograph features Asia.
Last, his tendency toward repetition led him to repeat an entire block quote from
chapter 2 in chapter 17.
A work of this kind calls for a certain amount of conjecture about what might
have happened had the invasion taken place, but Lewis’s speculation steered
him to hyperbole. For instance, he alleges the American public would have
been so outraged if the United States had decided not to use the bomb that
“armed insurrection would have been a very real possibility” (250). He also argues
President Harry S. Truman had no choice but to use the bomb because “he
would have been deposed from office by public revolt or military coup, and a more
co-operative leader installed” (250).
While Lewis uses some sources well, he fails to understand the background
of some of the authors. Key examples include Paul Fussell, a US Army
infantry officer, and William Manchester, a US Marine, whose memoirs and
recollections he cites extensively. He treats their first-person accounts respectfully,
but seems not to understand they both survived the war and became widely
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respected historians. Manchester’s experiences as a Marine rifleman are
evocative, but Lewis adds little to what Manchester published himself. One of
Manchester’s best known works is the biography American Caesar: Douglas
MacArthur 1880–1964 (1978), which Lewis could have profitably used to explore
the issues of war termination and the pending invasion from the point of view
of the General of the Army who commanded the Southwest Pacific Theater. In
conclusion, Atomic Salvation would be twice as good if it were half as long—
and if it added new facts to an already well-documented argument.

The American War in Afghanistan: A History
By Carter Malkasian
Reviewed by Dr. John Nagl, visiting professor, national security studies,
US Army War College

F

ew Americans not of Afghan blood understand the
United States’ involvement in Afghanistan better than
Carter Malkasian, who led the Garmser district support
team for nearly two years during the Obama administration.
From that experience, Malkasian wrote War Comes to Garmser
(2013), a small classic of counterinsurgency literature that led
Marine General Joseph Dunford Jr., then commanding the
effort in Afghanistan, to take Malkasian as his political adviser. Malkasian stayed on as the special assistant for strategy
during Dunford’s service as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, continuing to focus on the war in Afghanistan, and has
now written—what is likely to be for many years to come—
the definitive work on the American war in Afghanistan.

New York: Oxford University
Press, 2021
576 pages
$34.95

Malkasian’s analysis begins with America’s significant involvement in
supporting resistance fighters to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.
Assisted by the Americans, the Afghan mujahideen demonstrated the fighting
qualities that earned Afghanistan the moniker “the graveyard of empires” and
defeated the Soviet Union. Included among the mujahideen supporters was a
Saudi named Osama bin Laden.
After the Soviet withdrawal, the United States displayed little interest in
Afghanistan for a decade. Afghanistan’s descent into chaos was snapped partially
into order when the Taliban imposed a strict version of sharia law on the
troubled country. The Taliban also provided a home base for bin Laden from
which he planned and executed the attacks of September 11, 2001. They refused
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to hand him over to the United States for justice, resulting in an American
invasion that turned into the country’s longest war—bin Laden’s plan
executed almost to perfection, although he did not live to see its final chapter.
Malkasian explores the war in exacting detail, focusing on south and east
Afghanistan and the two principal antagonists: the Americans and the Taliban.
He covers the initial US invasion, which led to the collapse of the Taliban
regime in December 2001, and the critical failure to engage the Taliban in the
government that emerged afterward, which he calls a “narrow and inflexible
approach [that] contravened diplomatic wisdom to bring adversaries into a . . .
political settlement” (76). It proved the first of many missed opportunities. Bin
Laden slipped across the border into Pakistan, where he would remain in hiding—
but continue to exercise leadership of al-Qaeda—for the next decade.
Pashtun tribal leader Hamid Karzai became the interim—and later the
elected—president of Afghanistan and a small force of approximately 8,000
troops from the United States and 5,000 from allied nations, mostly NATO,
began building a new Afghanistan that would not again serve as a safe haven
for terrorists. American attention turned to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, which had
played no role in the attacks of September 11 but nonetheless became the next
target in President George W. Bush’s War on Terrorism. As an insurgency
exploded in Iraq, the Taliban took advantage of the lack of American attention
and gained strength in Afghanistan. President Barack Obama saw no
alternative but to surge tens of thousands of troops to fight against the Taliban
insurgency. However, he announced a withdrawal date that reassured the Taliban
they could wait the Americans out, leading many to remark, “Americans have
the watches, but the Taliban have the time to wait” (various). Vice President
Joseph Biden argued against the surge of troops into Afghanistan, recommending
a smaller US troop commitment to conduct counterterrorism and train Afghan
security forces, but was overruled.
President Donald Trump believed the war in Afghanistan was not in America’s
interest and repeatedly threatened to withdraw all US troops; his commitment
to ending the war led to a negotiated agreement with the Taliban that this
withdrawal would be accomplished by May 1, 2021. By then, however, Biden was
president; he delayed the withdrawal date first to September 11 and then to August
31, 2021, continuing to commit to that date even as a resurgent Taliban seized
power over Kabul on August 15, 2021. A US and international airlift evacuated
Americans and many Afghans who had assisted the United States in its longest
war outside of the country. After an absence of two decades, Taliban rule returned
to Afghanistan.
Malkasian spreads the blame for America’s failures in Afghanistan widely,
noting the Russian, Iranian, and Pakistani support for the Taliban, as well as
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American impatience, wavering commitment, and failure to understand the
Afghan people. Most of all, however, he pays tribute to the Taliban, who “stood for
what it meant to be Afghan” because they “embraced rule by Islam and resistance
to occupation, values that ran thick in Afghan history and defined an Afghan’s
worth” (454). An Afghan government supported by an outside power could not
inspire the same degree of cohesion and devotion fostered by the Taliban.
The final reckoning on this fifth war in Afghanistan remains to be calculated.
Nearly 2,500 US troops were killed and more than 20,000 wounded; while Afghan
casualties are unknowable, the total probably exceeds half a million. Al-Qaeda
was dealt a heavy blow, but the Islamic State took on its mantle of jihad and
remains a strong presence in post–America Afghanistan. An Afghan people who
have experienced democracy and freedom face an uncertain and deeply troubling
future. Their eagerness to leave Afghanistan during the troubled final weeks of
August suggests the suffering of this unfortunate country will continue for
decades to come.
While the American people broadly support the end of the mission in
Afghanistan, if not the manner in which it was conducted, there is still no
guarantee American involvement is truly over, just as there was no guarantee
when the Soviet Union withdrew in ignominy three decades ago. To be ready
for that eventuality—and to build a force that is truly capable across the entire
spectrum of conflict—military professionals can find no better preparation than
a thorough contemplation of Malkasian’s The American War in Afghanistan.
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Strangling the Axis: The Fight for Control of the
Mediterranean during the Second World War
By Richard Hammond
Reviewed by Dr. James D. Scudieri, senior research historian,
US Army Heritage and Education Center

I

n Strangling the Axis:The Fight for Control of the Mediterranean
during the Second World War, Richard Hammond takes a
wider view of the war on Axis commercial shipping in the
Mediterranean during the Second World War. He starts
with a very effective introduction, a mere 10 pages, that
outlines the following eight chapters. Chapter 1 summarizes
prewar strategy and plans, while chapters 2 through 8 are
chronological, in increments of five to seven months, starting
in June 1940 and ending in May 1943. The conclusion
integrates the introduction with the narrative chapters.

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2020
290 pages
$39.99

The central theme of the book is the lack of a
holistic historical accounting of the effects of the Allied war on Axis
shipping beyond noting impacts on the land war in North Africa (4, 6).
Previous histories have highlighted the impacts of the anti-shipping war
on the North African land war, but inadequately. Hammond concludes
the increasing efficacy of British anti-shipping operations, attacking not
only traditional sea lanes but also coastal shipping, exercised a deadly
impact on Axis maritime strength. What the British lacked in capacity—
described in detail—they compensated for with their de facto forward
positioning for most of the Desert War. Hammond believes the historiography—
with its excessive emphasis on the land motor transport—has failed to acknowledge
this impact (142).
Hammond’s coverage is sweeping and comprehensive. He presents his
evidence by building a solid foundation in the relevant Italian and German
documents, besides the Allied sources and the historiography. His wider
war goes beyond the swirling armor-centric actions in the Western Desert
campaign, and analyzes operations throughout the Mediterranean and Aegean
regions. Each chapter is well organized, integrating maritime operations with
land operations in considerable but concise detail. Hard statistics document
Axis sustainment requirements, shipping losses by cause, and supply tonnages
lost and delivered. Readers can follow developments in the air, on land, and on
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the sea as independent missions became more joint. In a sense, Hammond’s
commitment to a more holistic analysis provides much in terms of the current
joint functions.
His analysis of British efforts includes land-based airpower, naval aviation (both
carrier-borne and shore-based), submarines, and surface warships. Interestingly,
British political and diplomatic concerns on rules of engagement early in the
war limited military options, for example unrestricted maritime warfare, with
some lasting through early 1942 (28–30). Worse, British submarines were
low-end boats technologically, and they had relatively poor-quality torpedoes and
insufficient stocks of the latest designs (46, 71).
Hammond devotes a lot of attention to the fielding of more effective aircraft
types, covering other enablers and joint techniques on the opposing sides.
For example, he discusses the advance of Allied and Axis signals intelligence,
the British introduction of air-to-surface vessel radar, more effective Italian
anti-submarine warfare skills, and British use of operational research, such as
systems analysis. He also showcases the evolution of command-and-control
structures. Unsurprisingly, Malta retains its historical significance.
Sheer attrition cost the Axis not only tons of supplies lost at sea, but also
numerous hulls. These shipping losses themselves became a prohibitive cost.
New Axis construction and even Vichy acquisitions could not replace the
attrition. Hammond states outright Axis shipping losses became precarious
starting in September 1942 and precipitated a broader Mediterranean collapse
around October 1942 (10, 127, 166). By May 1943, the Axis could not conduct a
Tunisian “Dunkirk.” The stubborn Axis defense and successful evacuation of
Sicily clouded their dire strategic situation. Abandonment of Corsica, Sardinia,
and some Aegean possessions presaged a broader Mediterranean collapse due to
their isolation (169–72, 200–3).
Hammond’s articulation commendably avoids hyperbole. He admits when the
anti-shipping war contributed little to the land war. One example is the initial
British offensive against the Italians in North Africa in 1940 and another is the
Allied Operation Husky on Sicily (49–50, 191–92).
This review offers one caveat. While Hammond has balanced his narrative
with the related land operations admirably, he is perhaps too accepting of the
typical criticism of British Army equipment, especially tanks, compared with
their German counterparts in 1941 through early 1942. The first tank battles
in the Western Desert underlined deficient British combined arms, rather than
inferior equipment.
Strangling the Axis raises numerous issues related to security today. The Allied
war on Axis shipping in the Mediterranean took place in three domains across the
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length and breadth of a sea line of communications. Current developments in greatpower rivalry and preparations for large-scale combat operations suggest several
potential variations. Maritime power still moves the bulk of physical goods
among nations. Future conflict in five domains could commence hostilities
well before traditional warfare, for example cyber and space interference with
shipping lanes. If traditional warfare breaks out, what vulnerabilities would
beckon, both along the sea lanes and to anti-access and area-denial actions at
ports of departure and arrival? How should Army multi-domain operations
and Joint all-domain command-and-control concepts evolve and prepare?

Loss and Redemption at St. Vith:
The 7th Armored Division in the Battle of the Bulge
By Gregory Fontenot
Reviewed by Gregory J. W. Urwin, professor of history, Temple University

E

ver since S. L. A. Marshall published his flawed
1947 bombshell, Men against Fire: The Problem of
Battle Command, historians have debated the effectiveness
of the US Army in the European theater of operations
during World War II. Eminent scholars such as Russell F.
Weigley and Martin van Creveld have credited the ultimate
American victory to greater numbers, superior artillery
and air support, and more abundant resources. Meanwhile
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
a younger generation of historians—including Ohio State
University Press, 2020
290 pages
University alumni Michael D. Doubler, Russell A. Hart,
$39.99
and Peter R. Mansoor—have argued that while the more
seasoned German Landser may have outclassed the
American GIs in their initial encounters, the Americans learned from hard
experience and eventually became a worthy opponent.
A former tank battalion commander and a distinguished veteran of Operation
Desert Storm, Gregory Fontenot analyzes the trials and ultimate triumph of the
7th Armored Division from the perspective of a professional soldier. Loss and
Redemption at St. Vith is a detailed operational history of the US 7th Armored
Division during the Battle of the Bulge(December 16, 1944 to January 25, 1945).
Drawing extensively on Americanand German archival materials, with interviews,
and correspondence conducted with several veterans, Fontenot grounded his
grassroots research on a thorough reading of earlier histories of the Ardennes
Offensive, an approach that armed him with an obvious mastery of the subject.
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Although Fontenot seems to have discovered his passion for
researching military history at the Command and General Staff College at
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, his book complements the scholarship of the Ohio
State University scholars and demonstrates the “underappreciated excellence
of the US Army’s average units as compared to the 1944 edition of the German
Army” (286). While apologists for the American soldier often highlight the
performance of the 1st Infantry Division, the 82nd Airborne Division, the
4th Armored Division, and other elite formations, Fontenot reminds readers
that “plain old vanilla draftee divisions” like the 7th Armored Division, the
“Lucky Seventh,” bore the brunt of the fighting in the American advance across
northwest Europe (285).
When three German armies containing 28 divisions launched Adolf Hitler’s
Ardennes Offensive nine days before Christmas in 1944, the Lucky Seventh
received orders to proceed to St. Vith. From their position along a strategic
road and railroad junction, on what became the northern flank of the enemy
penetration, the division denied the Germans the use of the road and rail
networks that passed through St. Vith for six crucial days. By midnight on December 18,
the Lucky Seventh linked up with the battered elements of other American divisions
to cover 52 miles of front line. This tenaciously held, horseshoe-shaped line badly upset
German timetables and helped thwart Hitler’s last desperate bid to change the course
of the war.
Like other American armored divisions, the Lucky Seventh was a balanced
combined-arms formation designed for offensive operations based on fire
and movement. It served under the command of Brigadier General Robert
W. Hasbrouck, an officer whose tank corps–cavalry school background
disposed him to execute the Army’s armored doctrine faithfully. During the
struggle for St. Vith, Hasbrouck preferred to conduct an active defense, issuing
his subordinates mission-oriented orders and fighting his units as flexible
task forces. Strong defensive positions, experienced and aggressive leaders,
and a basic adherence to solid doctrine—enhanced by inspired displays of initiative—
enabled the defenders of St. Vith to fend off eight German divisions until severe
attrition and the weight of enemy numbers forced the surviving Americans to retreat
across the Salm River.
In the following weeks, First Army restored the 7th Armored Division to fighting
shape, which allowed the unit to join the counterattack on January 20, 1945. After
three days of fierce fighting, the Americans retook the previously lost ground at
St. Vith and blotted out any shame the division’s personnel felt over abandoning the
town earlier in the campaign.
Fontenot claims the initiative exercised by junior American officers and private
soldiers played a decisive role in shaping the outcome of the Battle of the Bugle.
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He repeatedly stresses the importance of leadership in every situation and
emphasizes that a unit’s performance depends on the quality of its officers.
Additionally, he also admits he considers Hasbrouck the book’s central character,
although Hasbrouck shares the stage with other American officers whose
judgment and adaptability contributed to denying St. Vith to the Wehrmacht for
nearly a week.
Loss and Redemption at St. Vith is a significant contribution to World War II
historiography. It provides apologists with an additional case study to plead
their cause and dissects one of the Army’s biggest battles in terms that officers
serving today can readily understand.

Between Five Eyes: 50 Years of Intelligence Sharing
By Anthony R. Wells
Reviewed by Andrew Ziebell, Army Reserve officer

I

n Between Five Eyes: 50 Years of Intelligence Sharing,
Anthony R. Wells attempts to present both a personal
story of a fascinating career and a comprehensive history
of intelligence sharing. Wells, who began his intelligence
analysis career in 1968, shares his deep understanding of
the history of intelligence and the relationship between
the “Five Eyes”: the United States, the United Kingdom,
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Unfortunately, he
loses the thread of his narrative quite often, and either
the personal angle or the historical angle would have been
better discussed alone.

Havertown, PA: Casemate,
2020
256 pages
$34.95

The subtitle of the book refers to the period of time Wells served in—
or on the periphery of—the intelligence community. He emphasizes the Five
Eyes relationship as a truly special one, yet readers will find a wide range of
historical background that falls well outside this scope and adds little to the
narrative. Indeed, his description of his early activities with naval intelligence
and his role in assessing the Soviet submarine threat conjures up images of
Tom Clancy’s The Hunt for Red October (1984).
While Wells’ well-researched historical accounts are drawn from the most
authoritative sources, his logic can be difficult to follow. Many chapters are
repetitive and appear to have been written separately with little consideration
for how they might fit together into a coherent story. In chapter 6, “Intelligence
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Roles, Missions, and Operations, 1990–2018,” Wells strays far afield into the
history of Bletchley Park during World War II. He details the reading of
Soviet messages in the post-war era and the failure to foresee the Chinese
intervention in Korea and the Soviet occupation of Prague in 1968. Within
the same chapter, readers learn about the importance of signals intelligence—
from the Arab-Israeli conflicts to the Falklands crisis to the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan. Overall, Wells delivers little information on intelligence roles,
missions, and operations between 1990–2018 and frustratingly less background
on his contributions.
Despite the book’s title, Wells often refers to Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand only in passing or as an afterthought rather than providing concrete
examples of their contributions to the Five Eyes. This oversight may be a
product of his perspective from the positions he held in the United States and
the United Kingdom rather than an intentional slight, but it does disservice to
their significant involvement.
Perhaps the greatest shortfall of the book is the lack of coverage given to
two of the most significant events of the early-twenty-first century. The shortest
chapter of the book, “September 11, 2001 and Its Aftermath,” spends little time
reflecting upon the intelligence failures that led to 9/11. Wells also sidesteps
the recent debate about the decision by the UK government to accept the US
assessment of Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction program and
his alleged support of terrorist networks, and he mentions the Chilcot Report
only once. This omission is unfortunate as the 2016 report—published after a
seven-year inquiry—condemned the British intelligence community for not
challenging the US findings. Given the space devoted to so many topics far
outside the purported scope of the book, this omission is an odd choice.
Despite these criticisms, Wells excels in synthesizing his knowledge and
experience to assess current trends and offer predictions about the future.
Between Five Eyes—in particular the final two chapters on emerging threats
and the Five Eyes community in the twenty-first century—is a useful primer
on the future of intelligence and the challenges the community faces. This is,
after all, the purpose of intelligence gathering and analysis: to confirm what
is known, fill in what is unknown, and posit possible outcomes. While Wells
provides readers with much information, he unfortunately leaves them with
more questions than answers.
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How ISIS Fights: Military Tactics in
Iraq, Syria, Libya and Egypt
By Omar Ashour
Reviewed by Dr. Robert J. Bunker, director of research and analysis,
C/O Futures, LLC

O

mar Ashour—an associate professor of security and
military studies in the Doha Institute for Graduate
Studies in Qatar and director of the Strategic Studies Unit in
the Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies—has written
a superb and pithy book on Islamic State (IS, ISIS) warfighting
approaches and the organization’s various iterations in Egypt,
Iraq, Libya, and Syria.
Ashour first reviews the current literature on the Islamic
Edinburgh, SCT: Edinburgh
University Press, 2021
State, focusing on explanations—including variables such
256 pages
as population, local support, and geography—related to
$120.00
“how and why weaker armed nonstate actors (ANSAs)
beat or survive stronger armed state actors (ASAs)” (4). He then develops his
central research emphasis and seeks to answer: “How did IS fight and why
did it militarily endure and expand in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Egypt?” (15–16).
How ISIS Fights is divided into a foreword, acknowledgments,
table and abbreviations listings, six chapters, a bibliography, and an
index. The foreword—written by Larry P. Goodson, a professor at the
US Army War College—highlights the groundbreaking findings and
the extensive nature of the fieldwork, interviews, and review of primary
sources (ISIS publications and videos) underpinning the research project.
The chapters, whose titles betray the tactical subtleties of these specific
operational environments, consist of: 1) an introduction which sets out the
project methodology and parameters; 2) the Islamic State fighting style
in Iraq (Fallujah, Mosul, and Ramadi); 3) the Islamic State fighting style
in Syria (Raqqa Governorate); 4) the Islamic State fighting style in Libya
(Derna and Sirte); 5) the Islamic State fighting style in Egypt (actually
the Sinai); and 6) a conclusion regarding ISIS after territorial defeats and
research findings.
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The case studies follow a logical and consistent format: context, battlefront(s)
focus, offensive and defensive descriptions, battlefront(s) analysis, tactics/
innovations, and post-territorial operational environment futures. The notes
are extensive and in English, although at times the original Arabic language
sourcing is apparent. Ashour clearly understands the tactical and operational
nuances of each case study and provides supporting tables to organize the
material. Infantry weaponry and suicide-operations—especially vehicle-borne
improvised explosive devices, given the ISIS deficiency in artillery—play
heavily in the various tactical approaches, as does the increasing use of
weaponized commercial drones. Ashour also discusses ISIS’s ability to shift
rapidly between terrorist, insurgent, and conventional tactics and specific
battlefront variations.
The only real criticism of the book is its highly analytical and dense
writing—readers will need multiple reviews of the material to absorb
its complexity. This complexity, however, is why the research effort is so
highly valued for post-graduate study. A few new acronyms appear in the
work: “iALLTR - Intelligence; absorb/recruit; loot; lead; transfer” and
“SCCLC - Soften-creep; coalition-build; liquidate-consolidate (modus
operandi)” along with a number of improvised explosive device variations
such as “HBIEDs – house-borne improvised explosive devices” (vii, viii).
Further, readers should remember Jihadi/Salafi terminology is crucially
peppered throughout the book and should be embraced as a component of the
ISIS reality construct to understand better the opposing force mindset.
Ashour’s research findings focus on understanding ISIS combat
performance, utilizing “the four variables of combat effectiveness, military
effectiveness, expansion, and endurance” as a conceptual lens (197).
This focus highlights ISIS attributes such as fighter-types, unit-cohesion,
autonomization, combat-multiculturalism, iALLTR, and SCCLC. A
categorization of tactics highlighted in table 6.1 identifies the 16 types
identified (206). While the micro-, meso-, and macro-level factors analysis is a
bit complex, it pans out with the insights gained.
Of the many research findings provided, this one ultimately stands out: “The
organisation rapidly adapted to changing environments and situations” (209).
ISIS exhibits a strategic and operational flexibility setting it apart from
other ANSAs. Ashour indicates the organizational decision-making
process of ISIS—its feedback loop (akin to a tactical level observe, orient,
decide, act loop)—allowed constant exploitation of the rapidly shifting
battlefront environments where its forces were deployed. The stronger
ASAs kept reacting to ISIS adaptations, and thus, constantly lost the
operational initiative.
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How ISIS Fights is a no-nonsense, compact book that effectively
bridges the scholar-practitioner divide in defense and security studies by
filling a critical gap in ISIS threat characterization—a global insurgent entity
still very active throughout the Middle East, Africa, and other geographic
regions. Students at the US Army Command and General Staff College,
the US Army War College officer educational levels, and scholars and
professionals deeply focused on counter-ISIS research and operations
will find it useful. While great-power conflict has rapidly become the
new raison d’être of US national military strategy, and rightly so, the
ISIS hydra—while pretty much dismembered—still has some bite left in it.

Mars Adapting: Military Change during War
By Frank G. Hoffman
Reviewed by Colonel J. P. Clark, PhD, strategist, US Army

I

n Mars Adapting, Frank G. Hoffman—a research fellow at
the National Defense University—turns his attention to
the question of military adaptation in war. Hoffman was a
contributing author to the 2006 Army-Marine Corps Field
Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency (2006), coined the
term hybrid warfare, and served as a lead author for the 2018
National Defense Strategy (2018). Though there has been an
increase in attention paid to military change, Hoffman is again
blazing a path many others will soon follow. Mars Adapting
deserves close scrutiny, and readers will be amply rewarded
for doing so.

Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 2021
368 pages
$39.95

Hoffman’s title indicates his principal focus: changes made in response to the
surprises of war. Within that context, he considers everything from small local
adjustments to significant institution-wide shifts. He examines organizational
dynamics similarly. Mars Adapting explicitly seeks to fill the gap in bottom-up
studies in the literature, but does not exclude the top-down. Some of the most
interesting passages examine the complex interactions between local adaptations
and those made from on high.
To illustrate the processes of military adaptation, Hoffman employs four
case studies drawn from the modern US military experience: submarines in
World War II, air power in the Korean War, the Army in Vietnam, and the
Marine Corps in Iraq. Inevitably, every author employing case studies faces
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difficult choices in establishing the boundaries from which the cases will be drawn
and then in determining whether to examine more cases for diversity or fewer
cases for greater depth and nuance. In both respects, Hoffman chose well.
Hoffman limits the case studies to the last century of US military experience.
While this decision will undoubtedly draw criticism as too narrow a selection
upon which to provide a universal guide to military adaptation, this pragmatic
choice is beneficial for intended readers. All the case studies occurred within
an organizational context similar enough to today’s environment to be readily
applicable. Cases from militaries with markedly different structures, practices,
or cultures—or from the more distant US past when the organizational context
was quite different—would have diminished the book’s value. For instance, it
would be anachronistic to fault the Civil War–era Army for not having an official
center for lessons learned, but neither would a detailed accounting of the best
practices of the Army of the Potomac be of direct value.
The use of fewer case studies to allow for a deeper examination sets Mars
Adapting apart from similar books offering more but disappointingly cursory
cases. Hoffman’s chapter-length case studies, grounded in a mixture of
secondary sources and archival research, are the right vehicle to grapple with
the complexities of adaptation. Rather than simplistic good or bad examples of
adaptation, each case study presents a mixture of results so readers gain a greater
appreciation for the interlocking challenges of adaptation. For instance, in
the chapter on the Army in Vietnam, Hoffman shows there was an evolution
in tactics. That adaptation, however, occurred within a rigid conceptual
framework set by Generals William Westmoreland and William DePuy,
which locked the units of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, into
seeking ways to fight attritional battles more effectively on the enemy’s
terms. It was adaptation but not of the type that led down a productive
strategic path. One critical insight from these cases is that adaptation takes
time. Even the most successful instances required 18 to 24 months for
full institutionalization.
Hoffman also presents a theoretical framework for military adaptation.
Well versed in the relevant literature across multiple disciplines, he offers
an excellent summation of the field in the first two chapters. The academic
study of military change has been largely dominated by international relations
theorists, most notably Barry Posen and Stephen Peter Rosen, and Hoffman
gives that school of thought due attention. In developing his theory, he
draws more heavily on the scholarship of military historians Theo Farrell and
Williamson Murray and the field of organizational learning theory.
Mars Adapting makes two important theoretical contributions. The first
contribution is a model for adaptation that accounts for both top-down and
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bottom-up change in a process of inquire, interpret, investigate, integrate, and
institutionalize. The second contribution is a list of attributes that define
any organization’s capacity to adapt: leadership, organizational culture, learning
mechanisms, and dissemination mechanisms.
Hoffman’s model and attributes will contribute to academic inquiries and help
practitioners think systematically and rigorously about military adaptation. Both
communities will benefit from the case studies, and the nuanced examples within
the case studies will stimulate further thought. Perhaps inevitably, the model
and attributes seem more descriptive than prescriptive. They provide a useful
taxonomy for analysis but do not fully capture why certain leaders or
organizations have the creative spark of successful adaptation while others fall
short. This is consistent with one of Hoffman’s major findings: adaptation is a
difficult and complex process.
Hoffman fittingly concludes with a set of questions for further exploration,
situating the book at the start of a long conversation rather than at its end.
Mars Adapting is required reading for all scholars and practitioners interested
in the questions it raises.

Military Coercion and US Foreign Policy:
The Use of Force Short of War
Edited by Melanie W. Sisson, James A. Siebens, and Barry M. Blechman
Reviewed by Steven Metz, professor of national security and strategy,
US Army War College

C

oercion is an important component of American
statecraft and strategy—vital enough it is taught
in the core course at the US Army War College. It first
became the subject of rigorous social science analysis in
Thomas C. Schelling’s 1966 Arms and Influence. The central
idea of coercion is adroit threats can, under certain
conditions, allow states to attain strategic objectives without
war. The key is to clarify expectations of the adversary and
London: Routledge, 2020
make them believe there will be painful consequences
250 pages
if they do not comply. Like deterrence, coercion requires
$160.00
capability, communication, and credibility. But, where
deterrence is designed to forestall a potential adversary’s action, coercion is
active and immediate and is intended to make an adversary stop or change its
current actions.
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In 1978, Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan expanded Schelling’s
initial concept, publishing a series of case studies assessing when coercion
works or does not work. Today’s renewed great power competition increases
the potential risks and costs of a major war—protracted conflict is always
more likely among equal adversaries—and thus makes effective coercion
even more important. For this reason, the editors and contributing authors of
Military Coercion and US Foreign Policy have updated Blechman and Kaplan’s
efforts with recent case studies.
Military Coercion and US Foreign Policy has two purposes: “to provide
information about the conditions under which particular types, sizes, and
uses of the US military increased or decreased the likelihood of coercive
success during the period 1991–2018” and “to determine how uses of
the US military were, or were not, integrated with other tools of foreign
policy in ways that enhanced or degraded US credibility” (10). As with its
predecessors, Military Coercion and US Foreign Policy aims to harness social
science and history to shape security policy, rather than solely to advance
knowledge. The book is more a work of praxis than theory.
The first three chapters lay out the theoretical framework and are
followed by five case studies covering Syria, Iraq and Iran, the Balkans,
Russia, and China—all written by renowned experts. The conclusions are
unsurprising to anyone who has thought seriously about the use of force
in statecraft. For instance, what is threatened “can be determinative”;
the clarity and specificity of threats and demands affect the outcome;
deploying forces into a region from outside it often augments the
credibility of a threat; and last, sanctions and military coercion do not
“partner well,” since sanctions indicate a willingness to rely on methods of
compliance other than force (164–65). For coercion to work, an adversary
must feel certain military force will be used if they fail to comply. The
intricate psychology of coercion creates challenges for the United States.
As the editors of the book explain:
. . . messages are filtered through the target actor’s strategic culture,
domestic political culture, and by the temperament, experiences,
and predispositions of its leadership. Messages thus inherently are
vulnerable to misinterpretation, an eventuality made more likely
by the inconsistencies in the statements made by policymakers,
particularly when allies are involved, and by a lack of specificity in
the nature of threats and demands levied (168).

Put differently, effective coercion requires clarity and consistency—two things
US policy often lacks. The book argues coercion will be more important but
also more difficult for the United States in an era of great-power competition.
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The period covered in the book, 1991–2018, was one of clear US primacy.
The failure of coercion—or its clumsy application—was not disastrous as the
power disparity between the United States and its adversary amplified the
credibility of threats. But with greater parity between the United States and
its potential adversaries, particularly China, there will be less room for error
and stricter requirements for a threat to be credible. Thus, the book’s editors
conclude, “pursuit of US interest in the coming decades . . . will require a
discipline in the planning and in the implementation of coercive strategy
that the relatively permissive environment of the last 30 years most often
did not” (176).
While the book’s contributors are all top-tier security experts, some
chapters are better than others. Despite this discrepancy, the editors and
authors succeeded in updating the original work of Schelling, Blechman,
and Kaplan and provide an updated framework for analysis to inform policy
in an increasingly dangerous time. Every senior military leader, foreign
policymaker, and strategist should read this book.
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Technology and War

War at the Speed of Light: Directed-Energy Weapons
and the Future of Twenty-First-Century Warfare
By Louis A. Del Monte
Reviewed by Jeffrey Caton, president, Kepler Strategies LLC

L

ouis A. Del Monte’s War at the Speed of Light:
Directed-Energy Weapons and the Future of TwentyFirst-Century Warfare is a difficult book to categorize. Akin
to the allure of a richly illustrated sideshow tent, the book’s
glossy cover and dire warnings of future disasters may entice
prospective readers. But when the veil is drawn, the interior
reveals contents incongruent with expectations. Del Monte
claims over 30 years of experience with technology, and
his recent books include Genius Weapons (2018) and
Nanoweapons (2017), as well as a book on time travel.
Curiously, a search of scholarly and professional publication
databases reveals few earlier works.

Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 2021
280 pages
$29.95

In the introduction, Del Monte vows to describe “the ever-increasing and
revolutionary role of directed-energy weapons in warfare” (1). He posits that
“the nature of warfare is changing in three fundamental ways”: through artificial
intelligence, directed-energy weapons, and reliance on electromagnetic energy. He
promises that “this book delineates the threat that directed-energy weapons pose
to disrupting the doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD)” (1). Del Monte
touches on aspects of these topics, but never delves into a critical dialogue for any
of them.
Del Monte divides the book into four major sections. The first section, “The
Game of Cat and Mouse,” has three chapters designed to provide historical
context. The contents are a hodgepodge of Cold War issues and warfare
technology culminating in a review of the Third Offset Strategy (popularized by
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel in 2014), as well as Del Monte’s construct of
a “Fourth Offset” based on alliances, technology, and the threats of Russia and
China (47). In sum, the chapter is an unnecessary prelude that forewarns readers
of Del Monte’s op-ed approach to the book: personal opinions supported by a
medley of facts that favor his narrative. Neither the exercise of critical thinking
nor the addition of opposing dialogue are luxuries the author abides.
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The second section, “Directed-Energy Weapons,” serves as the
85-page heart of the book, organized into four chapters on laser,
microwave, electromagnetic pulse, and cyberspace weapons. The discussion
on lasers is superficial and highlights only a few US systems currently under
development. Absent is any mention of the successful missile engagements
by the Missile Defense Agency’s Airborne Laser Test Bed in 2010.
In fact, the entire Missile Defense Agency merits only a single sentence
in the book. Instead, Del Monte rehashes a few Soviet-era laser devices
(for example, the Sary Shagan facility) covered in better detail in the 1986
DoD publication Soviet Military Power.
The credibility of Del Monte’s arguments is often questionable. He
summarily dismisses the technological advances of President Ronald Reagan’s
Strategic Defense Initiative as irrelevant for directed-energy discussions.
Also, Del Monte oversimplifies many complex matters into a fait accompli.
For example, his reasoning why the United States should fear an EMP
attack by rogue nations is the assertion: “President Richard Nixon conducted
foreign policy by attempting to convince enemy leaders he was irrational and
volatile . . . Nixon was acting. North Korea and Iran are not” (127). Simply
put, there is too much tangential conjecture and too little thoughtful analysis.
With regard to cyberspace weapons, Del Monte harangues about Russian
interference in US elections and offers a confusing perspective on electronic
warfare. His only cyberspace-specific issue is a recap of the 2010 Stuxnet as
“the first-ever cyber weapon” (135). Yet, in 2008, Operation Buckshot Yankee
transformed how the Department of Defense defends in cyberspace. Also,
the 2007 Russian cyberspace attacks on Estonia helped lay the foundation
for NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. Del Monte
mentions neither.
The book’s third section, “Shields Up, Mr. Sulu,” is a thankfully short (23
pages) digression on directed-energy countermeasures and force fields that
adds little to the book except more references to Star Trek. Del Monte offers
only “bug bounties” as cyberspace countermeasures and an anemic four pages
to present Army, Navy, and Air Force electronic warfare countermeasures
(158). He also offers a lesson in plasma physics and a generic discussion of a
Boeing patent for a plasma force-field concept.
The final section, “The Coming New Reality,” covers autonomous warfare,
space warfare, and MAD. Within a jumbled three chapters, Del Monte
doubles down on his rejection of particle-beam weapons as directed energy.
While this is certainly convenient, he fails to recognize the Department of
Defense and the rest of the world do consider particle-beam weapons as
directed energy. In fact, strategic defense initiative programs successfully
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demonstrated particle-beam technologies for directed-energy application
in 1989. Del Monte also seems unaware that US space defenses routinely
trained for the threat of Soviet anti-satellite weapons as well as high-altitude
nuclear detonation and electronic attacks in the 1980s and 1990s.
Del Monte’s final chapter, “Not Gambling with the Fate of Humanity,”
showcases his alarmist nature and shallow knowledge of national
security doctrine. He undercuts his discussion of MAD by contorting its
underlying premise to be “a belief that small nuclear states, having fewer
nuclear weapons, can deter aggression by large nuclear nations” (214).
The culminating revelations are Del Monte’s whimsical guidelines to
“eliminate nuclear weapons . . . use autonomous weapons only under human
supervision . . . [and] arm autonomous weapons only with conventional
warheads” (221).
War at the Speed of Light makes no serious contribution to the fields of the
technical, military, and national security arts and sciences. Simply put, this is a
book to avoid in lieu of much better subject material freely available to the public.
To be fair, Del Monte has admirers. Indeed, his chapter endnotes appear to be
extensive and are a redeeming quality of the tome. Unfortunately, the bounty
of information contained in the credible sources is rarely shared with readers.
While there is little doubt Del Monte would be a competent high-school
physics teacher, the book clearly demonstrates that authoritative discussions of
future warfare technology and national security are best left to others.
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Article Submissions
Content Requirements
Scope
Submissions to the US Army War College Press must address strategic issues regarding US
defense policy or the theory and practice of land warfare while exhibiting the highest standards of
research and scholarship. Actionable strategic, policy, or instructional recommendations must be
included. For more information, visit https://press.armywarcollege.edu.

Audience
US Army War College graduates, other senior military officers, policymakers, and members of
academia concerned with national security affairs.

Clearance
Members of the US military and employees of the US Department of Defense must provide a
memo from the local Public Affairs Office stating a submission is appropriate for public release
(see AR 360-1, ch. 6).

Concurrent Submissions
Submissions must not be available on the Internet or be under consideration with other
publishers until the author receives notification the submission will not be published or until the
work is published through the US Army War College Press.

Formatting Requirements
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1. Monographs (accepted from USAWC faculty and staff only): 20,000 words (15,000-word
main text, 5,000 words in the foreword anwd executive summary).
2. Articles: 5,000 words or less.
3. Commentaries: 2,500 to 3,000 words.
4. Book reviews: 800 to 1,000 words.

File Type
Text must be provided in a single MS Word document (.doc).
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Visual Aids
Charts, graphs, and photographs may be provided to clarify or amplify the text. Tables must
be presented in the body of the Word document. Microsoft-generated charts and graphs must
be submitted in Excel. And photos must be provided as .jpg images of not more than 9MB
(at 300 dpi). If any table, chart, graph, or photograph has been previously published, written
permission from the copyright holder to republish the content must be included with the submission.

Citations
Use the Chicago Manual of Style format to document sources. Indicate all quoted material by
quotation marks or indentation. Reduce the number of footnotes to the minimum consistent
with honest acknowledgement of indebtedness, consolidating notes where possible. Lengthy
explanatory footnotes are discouraged and will be edited.
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usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@mail.mil

Include
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2. Attach all files, including graphics.
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policy and military practionners?

Timelines
Receipt
Please allow 1 business day for confirmation of receipt.

Review
Articles: 4 to 6 weeks.
Monographs (accepted from US Army War College faculty and staff only): 10 to 12 weeks.
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Idaho Army National Guard, practice combined arms battalion, squad-level
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The training combined dry fire rehearsal culminating in a live fire exercise.
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Chopper Pickup
An Alaska Army National Guard UH-60L Black Hawk helicopter lands to
pick up Air Force special warfare airmen during small unit training at Joint Base
Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska, November 18, 2020. Conducted under physical
and mental stress, small-unit training reinforces fundamental combat skills and
fosters team cohesion.
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